Factors Influencing Decision Making in Networked Organizations: A Case Study on Leadership and the Formation of the Non-Department of Defense Schools Program (NDSP) Task Force by Langenderfer, Michelle K.
 








FACTORS INFLUENCING DECISION MAKING IN NETWORKED 
ORGANIZATIONS: A CASE STUDY ON LEADERSHIP AND THE FORMATION 





SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
Degree of 






MICHELLE K. LANGENDERFER 
Norman, Oklahoma 
2016 
FACTORS INFLUENCING DECISION MAKING IN NETWORKED 
ORGANIZATIONS: A CASE STUDY ON LEADERSHIP AND THE FORMATION 






















Dr. Courtney A. Vaughn, Chair 
 
________________________________ 
Dr. Nicole Campbell 
 
________________________________ 
Dr. Gary Copeland 
 
________________________________ 
Dr. Susan Sharp 
 
________________________________ 




























© Copyright by MICHELLE K LANGENDERFER 2016 
All Rights Reserved 
DEDICATION 
 
I dedicate the following dissertation to my parents, and to the military, civilians, and 






I am indebted to my dissertation chair, Dr. Courtney Vaughn, and to my 
committee members Dr. Nicole Campbell, Dr. Gary Copeland, Dr. Susan Sharp, and 
Dr. Joan Smith who provided the guidance and positive encouragement to pursue my 
topic, and whose support did not waiver despite the ebb and flow of my nomadic 
lifestyle the past three years.   Courtney, thank you for providing the freedom to 
translate and balance my comfort of theoretical structure with my enjoyment of the 
eclectic qualitative world.   A special thank you to Dr. Copeland and Dr. Sharp who, as 
professors for the Advanced Programs Cohort 6, sparked my theoretical and 
methodological curiosities.  
I am fortunate to come from a family with a rich military history.  My father, 
Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) John Richard McNealy, United States Army, and my 
mother Kathaleen Dell Galland McNealy, who supported two Vietnam deployments 
and multiple moves in 23 years, instilled the values of a good education, hard work, and 
persistence.  To my mother who taught me to be creative and independent and to my 
father who never failed to listen, advise, and convince me that I could do whatever I 
wanted (as long as I had a plan!).   
The motivation behind this dissertation was to pay homage to them and to the 
countless number of people who influenced me.  To Herman Hurd, Marvin Dickerson, 
and Gregory Holzinger from the United States Army Garrison in Stuttgart, Germany for 
the friendship, guidance and support during my first military civilian job in 2007.  To 
Wayne Boswell, Paul Jerome, Mike Lynch, and Harvey Gerry who later contributed to 
my success in the frenetic life at a combatant command.  I could not have asked for a 
v 
 
better mix of mentors.  To Patrick Rothbauer, United States Installation Management 
Command, who found a place for me with the Plans, Analysis and Integration Office so 
that I would not have to resign in order to pursue this degree.  To my older brother, 
Colonel J. Michael McNealy, United States Army, whose professional and educational 
accomplishments continue to motivate me.  To special friends Mike and Jennie Wilson 
for the home away from home and endless encouragement over the years. 
To those who graciously participated in the interview process, I am truly 
grateful. The depth of your experience and weight of your positions provided a 
distinctive level of legitimacy to my research.  While certain restrictions prevent me 
from naming everyone, I can highlight the generosity of Vice Admiral Dick Gallagher, 
United States Navy (Retired); Major General Michael Snodgrass, United States Air 
Force (Retired); Colonel Lester Niblock, United States Marine Corps (Retired); and 
Mike Lynch, Colonel, United States Air Force (Retired) and former Chief of Policy and 
Legislation at DoDEA.  
To the members and professors of Cohort 6 for the opportunity to learn, teach, 
discuss and debate (sometimes vehemently!).  Thanks especially to my roommates 
Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Udell, Bill Brabazon, and Kim Chamblin.  To Aiden, Caleb, 
and Barrett Chamblin, thank you for sharing your mom Kim so that we had the time to 
challenge, motivate, frustrate, and inspire each other.  
Finally, to my husband Colonel Mark “Doc” Langenderfer, United States Air 
Force, who, in 2010, brought home a brochure about a PhD program with an emphasis 
in organizational leadership. Thank you for believing I could do this, and for your 
enduring counsel and support.  
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................ iv 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... x 
PROLOGUE ..................................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER ONE ............................................................................................................. 31 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 31 
Problem Statement and Research Questions .................................................................. 31 
Literature Review ........................................................................................................... 33 
Research on Family and Quality of Life ........................................................... 33 
 Institute for Defense Analyses Report (2000) .................................................. 33 
USAFE School Board Program (2002) ............................................................. 37 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 38 
CHAPTER TWO ............................................................................................................ 40 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 40 
Review of Related Literature .......................................................................................... 40 
Organizational Change in the Military ............................................................. 40 
Network Theory ................................................................................................ 42 
Leadership Theory ............................................................................................ 42 
Theoretical Framework (Logic Linking Data to Propositions) ...................................... 46 
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Model .................................................................. 47 
Policy Entrepreneur .......................................................................................... 50 
Policy Windows ................................................................................................ 50 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) ............................................................. 51 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 52 
CHAPTER THREE ........................................................................................................ 54 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 54 
 Qualitative Research ........................................................................................... 54 
 Case Study .......................................................................................................... 55 
 Process Tracing and Timelines ........................................................................... 56 
 Unit of Analysis .................................................................................................. 57 
 Obtaining Institutional Review Board (IRB) Approval ..................................... 57 
Sources of Data ............................................................................................................... 60 
vii 
 
Researcher Reflexivity and Memos .................................................................. 60 
Publically Available Documents ....................................................................... 62 
Data Collection and Analysis for Documents ................................................... 63 
Participants ........................................................................................................ 68 
Data Collection and Analysis for Interviews .................................................... 69 
Criteria for Interpreting Findings ...................................................................... 79 
Validity and Reliability .................................................................................................. 80 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 80 
CHAPTER FOUR .......................................................................................................... 82 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 82 
 Organizational Agendas and Quality of Life Priorities ...................................... 84 
Explanation Building ...................................................................................................... 86 
Budgets and Military Construction ................................................................... 87 
Exceptional Family Member (EFMP) Policy Issues ........................................ 88 
Transformation of the Non-DoD School Program (NDSP) and Database ....... 89 
Organizational and Programmatic Transformations ......................................... 90 
United States Africa Command ........................................................................ 93 
Papa, Hungary ................................................................................................... 94 
Renewed Focus on the Pacific Region and Changes in the  
Intelligence Community .................................................................................... 95 
Closing of the Dormitory in London ................................................................ 98 
Leadership ....................................................................................................... 104 
 Decision to Create the Task Force .................................................................. 106 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 108 
CHAPTER  FIVE ......................................................................................................... 110 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 110 
Answers to the Research Questions ............................................................................. 111 
 Timing and Window of Opportunity ................................................................ 112 
 Timing .............................................................................................................. 113 
 Multiple Avenues ............................................................................................. 115 
              Quality of Life Conference and European Schools Council ............................. 116 
 Relationships and Communication in Pushing Agendas .................................. 120 
viii 
 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 131 
CHAPTER SIX ............................................................................................................ 133 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 133 
Evaluation of Theoretical Framework .......................................................................... 133 
 Timing .............................................................................................................. 134 
 Relationships and Networks ............................................................................. 135 
 Leadership Qualities and Actions of Policy Entrepreneurs .............................. 136 
 Communication and Defining Problems .......................................................... 137 
 Motivation ........................................................................................................ 139 
Summary of Findings ................................................................................................... 141 
Implications and Recommendations for Future Research ............................................ 142 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 144 
EPILOGUE ................................................................................................................... 146 
References .................................................................................................................... 149 
APPENDICES .............................................................................................................. 167 
Appendix A: Department of Defense Organizational Chart ........................................ 168 
Appendix B: United Campaign Plan (UCP) COCOM Areas of Responsibility 2011 . 169 
Appendix C: Acronyms ................................................................................................ 170 
Appendix D: Case Study Protocol Questions and Relationship to Theory .................. 173 
Appendix E: Charts and Diagrams ............................................................................... 176 
Diagram 1.  Educational Advisory Committees ........................................................... 176 
Diagram 2.  Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) ................................................... 177 
Diagram 3.  Four Year Integrated Defense Planning Cycle ......................................... 178 
Diagram 4.  DoDEA MILCON Budget Fiscal Years 2003-2014 ................................ 179 
Diagram 5.  Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP) Budget Fiscal Year 2003-2014 ...... 180 
Diagram 6.  Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP) Budget Comparisons ..................... 181 
Diagram 7.  Preliminary Positional Leadership Changes 2007-2010 .......................... 182 
Diagram 8.  Timeline of Events 2000-2011 ................................................................. 183 
Appendix F: Case Study Documents Database Table of Contents .............................. 184 
A. Publically Available Documents (TAB 1- TAB 11) ........................................ 184 
B. Interview Transcriptions and Notes (TAB 12) ................................................. 191 
C. Personal Memos and Memoed Reading Notes (TAB 13) ................................ 192 
ix 
 
D. Process Pieces: Original Drawings with Handwritten Notes (TAB 14) ........... 192 
Appendix G: Sample Freedom of Information Act  Request Letter ............................ 194 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  EUCOM Chain of Command for Educational Issues ...................................... 7 
Figure 2.  EUCOM Chain of Command School Council Engagement with DoDEA .... 14 
Figure 3.  Component Commands and DoDEA Council Engagement .......................... 15 
Figure 4.  EUCOM's European Schools Council ........................................................... 17 
Figure 5.  Council Committee Relationship with Administrators and Commanders ..... 34 
Figure 6.  Wright's Proposed Council, Committee, School Board, and Schools Officer 
Relationships .................................................................................................. 35 
Figure 7.  Kingdon's Streams.......................................................................................... 50 
Figure 8.  Relation of Punctuated Equilibrium to Window of Opportunity ................... 51 
Figure 9.  Sample Timeline Applied to Kingdon’s Streams and PET ............................ 52 
Figure 10. Leadership Changes Chart 2007-2010 .......................................................... 74 
Figure 11.  Timeline 2000-2010 ..................................................................................... 75 
Figure 12.  Timeline 2007-2010 with Theoretical Framework ...................................... 76 
Figure 13.  Explanation of Events Leading to Decision to Create a Task Force ......... 103 
Figure 14. Way Around a Negative Response Scenario One ....................................... 121 
Figure 15. Way Around a Negative Response Scenario Two ...................................... 122 
Figure 16. Way Around a Negative Response Scenario Three .................................... 122 







The Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) and the United States 
military fall under the purview of the Secretary of Defense.  However, leaders at 
multiple levels within this organization do not systematically consider the requirements 
for the education of school-age children when developing new strategic military 
missions in overseas and remote locations worldwide where there are no DoDEA 
schools or adequate educational opportunities.  During 2007 to 2010, the debate on who 
should fund the Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP), a roughly $50 million ancillary 
program of DoDEA, shifted into a larger conversation on the importance of supporting 
the warfighter and the evolving military quality of life agenda to keep families together.  
Reoccurring concerns, such as quality of education, policy limitations, and increased 
budget requirements, from multiple organizations networked through a robust school 
council system resulted in a decision by the Director of DoDEA in spring 2010 to create 
a task force.  Considering the challenges of advancing agendas in bureaucratic, 
hierarchical organizations, I used qualitative case study methods based on Yin’s (2009) 
five-component design to illuminate this decision-making process and to show how the 
topic of the NDSP elevated to the highest level of the school council system.  Kingdon’s 
(1984) policy streams, policy entrepreneur and policy window model, underpinned with 
leadership and network theories, formed the theoretical framework.  Punctuated 
Equilibrium Theory provided a rival explanation to add to discussion on incremental 
change, status quo, and abrupt change.  A triangulation of three data sources (researcher 
memos, semi-structured interviews of former military and civilian members of the 
educational council system, and publically available documents) revealed a unique 
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confluence of leadership at positional and Action Officer (AO) levels, changes in 
military missions, ongoing program transformations and the second and third order 
effects of previous decision-making that contributed to the outcome to create the task 
force.  Leadership, communication, and relationships were prominent themes.  This 
study has theoretical implications for organizational leaders at decision-making levels, 
and provides practical guidance for civilian and military AOs who endeavor to advance 
agendas effectively. 
Keywords: organizational leadership, Kingdon, policy, network theory, DOD, decision-







 How do agendas advance, both personal and organizational, in multilayer 
organizations that connect to, or network with, multiple other organizations?  Imagine 
an organizational agenda item as if it were a locally grown plant like cacao in Indonesia, 
beans in Guatemala or a special type of flower in rural Afghanistan.  Then think of the 
steps and requirements needed to elevate and to transform the rudimentary product into 
a marketable item such as chocolate, coffee, or opium.  Consider the challenges and 
barriers to overcome to include environmental conditions, geography, financial 
constraints, laws, legislation, and governing bodies that police and/or regulate the 
production and consumption.  Depending on the legality of the product and the process, 
envision the network of activities and exchanges needed to navigate the system between 
and among individuals and groups to transform and distribute the merchandise from 
street corners to global markets.  Inherent in the story are individuals with skills, 
abilities, limitations, and connections at various levels to facilitate the production and 
distribution as well as to circumnavigate impediments.  There is also a clear fiscal 
motivation at the multiple levels ranging from ability to barter for needed sustenance, 
shelter, and basic needs to establishing power and territorial supremacy.  I use this 
example to encourage a systems approach view regarding the interactive nature and 
interdependence of internal and external factors in an organization, that can affect, both 
positively and negatively, the ability to advance agendas in the decision making process 
of organizational life.  Now consider a public organization not predicated on making a 
profit such as the military. 
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 The diagram in Appendix A shows an example of a formal organizational 
network of a public organization.  In this case, it is the Department of Defense (DoD) 
organized with the Secretary of Defense at the head.  The organizational chart shows 
the relationships between and among the military services, the military Combatant 
Commands such as U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and the defense agencies and 
activities, such as the civilian run Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) 
that oversees the educational support of military and civilian children in certain 
locations.  The depiction also represents the formal chain of command from each of the 
individual organizational parts of the Department of Defense up to the Secretary of 
Defense who is the top-level authority and decision maker ultimately responsible for the 
allocation of resources and setting the tone and priorities of the overall organization.  
However, the Secretary of Defense “ serves at the pleasure of the President”  so the 
responsibility and authority of the Secretary of Defense is tempered by the upward 
reporting chain to the President of the United States and the engagements with Congress 
to provision resources.  While this is the formal chain of command structure for each 
organization, a rank order also exists between the civilian and military that establishes 
other authorities and protocols for interactions.  For example, the document, “Order of 
Precedence for the Department of Defense,” OSD 22346-05, established that the 
civilian head of a defense activity such as DoDEA, is equivalent to a three-star general, 
which approximates the rank of the three-star Deputy Commander of a Combatant 
Command such as EUCOM.  In addition to rank structure and chain of command 
reporting, regulations and directives establish where and when to delegate a 
responsibility.  For example, Department of Defense Directive 1342.20 established 
3 
 
DoDEA as a DoD field activity operating under the authority, direction, and control of 
the Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (PDUSD 
(P&R) (DoD Directive 1342.20 Department of Defense Education Acitvity (DoDEA), 
1992, 2007, p. 2).  The Deputy Undersecretary reports to the Under Secretary of 
Defense who reports to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).  Meanwhile, the head of a 
Combatant Command reports directly to the Secretary of Defense.  The crux of this 
research situates at the juncture of the civilian education side represented by the 
Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) and the operational war fighting 
military side represented by the Combatant Command (Appendix A, focus on sections 
labelled DoD Field Activities and Combatant Commands).  Engagement on the issues 
of supporting the education of civilian and military affiliated children in locations where 
there are no adequate educational opportunities within various Combatant Command 
Areas of Responsibility (AOR) is the common thread.  While my ideal audience is the 
military and civilian decision makers and action officers who carry the “burden” of 
navigating a system often constrained by competing priorities to organize support to 
facilitate moving agendas and to resolve conflict, the theoretical concepts and lessons 
discussed are just as relevant to any public organization.  
Describing the functions of an organizational system, such as the Department of 
Defense Education Activity (DoDEA), its processes, responsibilities, its leadership 
structure and interactions with military organizations, such as the United States 
European Command (EUCOM), to someone who does not have or who has limited 
background into that world is a challenge.  My own perspectives confine me, by virtue 
of having worked in just a small subsection of its intricate network (for a list of 
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organizations, see Appendix C).  Yet, it is that same perspective that provides the basis 
of my own understanding of the world in which I functioned to accomplish professional 
and personal objectives, to provide leadership and to advance the goals, objectives, and 
agendas of my organization.  Before I outline my research, the reader must first 
understand how the military warfighting operational side connects with the educational 
support side within the Department of Defense structure through the educational 
advisory committees established in the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 
1342.15, “Educational Advisory Committees and Councils.”  This document connects 
DoDEA with military commanders to resolve education issues (see Appendix E, 
Diagram 1).  In addition, it is essential for the reader to appreciate the activities of the 
network of military organizations that occur outside the parameters of the DoDI that 
impact DoDEA and the military relationship.  This sets the stage for moving on to a 
discussion of the process of decision-making within this bounded system, that I refer to 
as the school council network, that shapes the unit of analysis for my case study. 
 In this Prologue, I devote a considerable amount of time describing the function 
and actions of several organizations in the school council network, as well as illustrating 
the expected leadership activities at each level.  I begin with background on my role in 
the school council network.  I provide an overview of the structure, purpose, and 
responsibilities of the educational advisory committees.  Next, I discuss the network of 
organizations by evaluating the relationship of EUCOM and DoDEA.  I outline the 
three primary ways that the military resolves education issues in an overseas 
environment and provide examples at each level of types of issues and avenues to 
resolution.  Then, I summarize the structure of EUCOM’s support, through the 
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European Schools Council (ESC), of its Component Commands: United States Air 
Forces in Europe (USAFE), Naval Forces in Europe (NAVEUR), United States Army 
in Europe (USAREUR), Marine Forces in Europe (MARFOREUR) and Special Forces 
Operations Command in Europe (SOCEUR).  I provide several examples to illustrate 
how DoDEA, EUCOM, and its Components work together on issues that are outside the 
purview of the educational advisory committees.  In addition, I imbed in this prologue a 
cursory historical overview of the legislation that shaped DoDEA, a review of the 
educational advisory committees and council system created to address educational 
concerns.  I include an overview of DoDEA’s Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP) 
established to provide support to students in locations where there are no established 
DoDEA schools or reasonable access to a quality education.  Finally, I provide 
background on the specific request generated from the educational advisory committee 
system process to create a special task force to review the Non-DoD Schools Program 
worldwide.  I discuss my interest in this topic, as a former member of EUCOM and later 
as an organizational leadership scholar.  My overview culminates with my research 
questions. 
 In February 2008, as an Army Civilian, I joined the staff of the Quality of Life 
(QOL) Branch in the Directorate for Personnel and Readiness (J-1) Division at the 
Headquarters of the United States European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, 
Germany.  EUCOM is a joint force combatant command (COCOM) led by a four-star 
Admiral or General who is also the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) (See Appendix B for global map of all 
Combatant Commands).  The Quality of Life Branch dealt with the policies and 
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programs for all things that are quality of life related or support the force and family to 
include all department of defense schools, morale, welfare and recreation programs, 
health care, and behavioral health.  Although my employment form stated I was a 
Management and Program Analyst, my office job title was Dependent Education Policy 
Proponent.  Most people simply acknowledged me as the education liaison to the 
Command.  My primary responsibility was to serve as the liaison between EUCOM and 
DoDEA.  
Title XIV of Public Law (P.L.) 95-561, the Defense Dependents Education Act 
of 1978, established the Defense Dependents’ Education System and required the 
SECDEF to establish and operate a free public education system for eligible overseas 
dependents.  Prior to World War II, there was no precedent to establish and operate 
schools for military dependents in foreign countries.  The Director of DoDEA oversees 
all agency functions from the headquarters in Virginia.  DoDEA’s regional areas 
include DoDDS-Pacific (also known as DoDEA-Pacific), DoDDS-Europe (also known 
as DoDEA-Europe), DDESS, the Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary 
Schools, also known as DoDEA-America.  In the findings section, I will address the 
name changes but for the sake of clarity, throughout the paper I will use DoDDS-
Europe and DoDDS-Pacific for schools in those regions and DDESS for schools in the 
Americas.  Subsequently, DoDEA created the Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP) to 
support students financially in remote locations where there are no DoDEA brick and 
mortar schools or where there are no adequate educational opportunities or reasonable 
access to education.  Later in the paper, I provide discussion on the perception of the 
word reasonable.  In 2010, DoDEA supported over 84,000 students worldwide in 
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traditional brick and mortar schools and provided more than an additional $50 million 
to support approximately 3,400 students where there was no DoD or Department of 
Education (DoE) schools.  Specifically, DoDDS-Europe’s NDSP financially supported 
2,071 students who attended local private schools, public foreign nation schools, 
boarding schools, or received home based education overseas. 
As a civilian GS-12, when working education issues, I reported to the civilian 
Branch Chief (GS-14) who reported to the military Division Chief (a Colonel) who 
reported to the military Director of Personnel and Readiness (J-1) (a Colonel) or Deputy 
Director, also a Colonel.  The chain of command continued from the J-1 to the military 
Chief of Staff (a two-star) to the military and civilian Deputy Commanders (DCOM) 
(three-star) to the military Commander (four-star).  Beyond our organization, as 
previously stated, the Commander reported to the Secretary of Defense. 
 
Figure 1.  EUCOM Chain of Command for Educational Issues 
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The EUCOM Commander did not live in Stuttgart, Germany, where I worked; 
therefore, the DCOMs, both military and civilian, were the highest level of my direct 
engagements.  As one of my primary responsibilities, I prepared senior leadership in my 
chain of command for attendance at meetings with the Director of DoDEA in 
Alexandria, Virginia and with the Director of DoDDS-Europe in Wiesbaden, Germany.  
In addition to engagements with the DoDEA Director and the DoDDS-Europe Area 
Director, I coordinated the twice-yearly European Schools Council (ESC) co-chaired by 
the DoDDS-Europe Director and EUCOM’s Chief of Staff.  I represented EUCOM at 
the DoDDS-Europe Director’s Area Advisory Council (AAC) and the European 
Athletic Council (EAC) meetings.  As the EUCOM liaison, the Command delegated 
certain responsibilities to me.  For example, I represented EUCOM at the working 
group to develop the agenda for the Dependents Education Council in lieu of the J-1, 
the Division Chief, and the Branch Chief.  Initially, I attended the meetings with my 
Branch Chief who then passed the responsibility to me.  In this capacity, I served as the 
Action Officer (AO) or subject matter expert (SME) for any activity related to the 
education of military dependents in EUCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) to include 
involvement in military construction (MILCON) of schools, drafting statements for 
congressional testimony, and writing white papers on the status of DoDEA’s Non-DoD 
Schools Program.  I was a primary link from EUCOM to our Component Commands, 
DoDDS-Europe, and DoDEA.  
In addition to the committees and councils, I analyzed issues brought to our 
attention by the Component Command school liaison officers who received issues 
through their council process or via emails and phone calls from other school liaison 
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officers in their area of responsibility (AOR).  Throughout Europe, different regional 
areas and/or functions fall under the command of a specific Service: Air Force bases fall 
under USAFE headquartered in Ramstein, Germany; Navy bases are under NAVEUR 
in Naples, Italy, and Army posts are under USAREUR in Heidelberg, Germany (at the 
time of this event).  In addition, Installation Management Command (IMCOM) 
provides School Liaison Officers (SLOs) support to Army locations.  Each component 
has a Headquarters School Liaison Officer (SLO) who works directly with DoDEA, 
DoDDS-Europe, or EUCOM to resolve its issues.  At each level, the military, where 
funding is available, provides civilian SLOs to facilitate communication between and 
among the schools and the military commanders.  In some locations the SLO is a 
military member assigned as an additional duty or as part of his or her role as a base or 
a garrison commander.   
As the AO or SME, if I thought there were issues that leadership needed to 
understand immediately I would brief my direct supervisor who would pick up the 
phone and make a call then get back to me or he would ask me to write a tear line, 
which is a special type of email.  Otherwise, I would monitor to see how the Component 
worked to resolve the issue with DoDDS-Europe or DoDEA.  In order to write a tear 
line I would coordinate with the affected organizations.  The purpose of the tear line 
was to consolidate vetted information in the fewest words to the highest-level decision 
maker.  The initial section of the tear line would provide all of the pertinent information 
on the current issue, the history of issue, who was aware of it and at what levels and 
finally, what actions occurred to try to resolve it.  Most importantly, it would contain 
several recommendations for action.  The next section was a summary of the first part.  
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At each point on the tear line the decision maker would delete the first part and make 
any adjustments to the recommendations then send it to the next higher level decision 
maker who would review, delete the lower level piece and send it forward.  Each person 
continued on the CC line of the email to follow the flow of information.  The benefit of 
the tear line was to inform each level of the chain of command.  At any level, the 
decision maker had the option of engaging on the issue or passing it along.  Most often 
than not, the tear lines stopped at the Chief of Staff level as the member of the European 
Schools Council.  The leaders trusted the process of coordination with the affected 
organizations required for that the short summary so that there were no surprises when 
the high-level leader spoke as an expert on the subject.  While the initial process of 
writing a tear line was time consuming and cumbersome, the product was a quick and 
effective way to communicate a large amount of coordinated information in a short 
message.  Moreover, we did not have to construct a formal staff package coordination 
that required paperwork and signatures, which was a process that could take weeks by 
which time the problem was resolved or had escalated.  As someone new to the 
organization, I had to rapidly figure out who knew what information in which 
organization and who would the decision or lack of decision affect?  Thick binders of 
issue papers and executive summaries as well as copies of council agendas and after 
action reports provided historical background that phone calls sometimes substantiated.  
A repository of information on line did not exist so tracking down the origin of the issue 
was often time consuming.  I relied on the collective memory of a small number of 
people from multiple organizations who had worked in the system for a long time.  I 
soon learned which people and in which organizations were willing to share 
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information.  Sometimes if I could not locate any history, I would summarize the 
current situation as described to me and put in my own recommendations.  
Unfortunately, there was no systematic way to capture the information for future use as 
a decision-making or information providing process. 
 EUCOM’s avenues to address issues were multiple depending on the type of 
issue.  The first was to speak directly to DoDDS-Europe, usually through the Chief of 
Staff.  The second was to by-pass DoDDS-Europe to speak directly to HQ DoDEA’s 
Chief of Policy and Legislation.  The third was to assess the dispute through our 
European Schools Council (ESC).  Most of the concerns where we by-passed DoDDS-
Europe revolved around EUCOM’s relationship with foreign countries.  As part of the 
Department of Defense and EUCOM’s priority of “building partnership capacity,” 
several mechanisms were in place to allow foreign nationals to attend DoDEA schools.  
If there were issues with the countries, then the Special Assistant to SACEUR, who was 
a former EUCOM Division Chief, or the U.S. Staff Delegation to the North American 
Treaty Organization (NATO) education liaison, who was a military member assigned 
this duty, brought them to our attention.  Usually the conversation would start with a 
phone call and a message that “some folks are talking about...” whatever the topic may 
be and since we are the school people we need to take care of it. 
An example of this was the topic mentioned by the NATO liaison concerning 
several Partnership for Peace nations who recently joined NATO or who were about to 
join.  By joining NATO, they lost their Partnership for Peace (PfP) status thus losing 
tuition free access to attend DoDEA schools.  I recall that tuition to DoDEA cost more 
than the annual salary of the military personnel from one of the nations.  I also 
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remember that the issue was not EUCOM’s responsibility.  No one seemed particularly 
clear on whose responsibility it was so I spoke directly with DoDEA’s Chief of Policy 
and Legislation.   
While the sequence of events is fuzzy, the phone conversation ended with me 
going into the paper archive files in the basement of the building, a former 1950’s 
German barracks, just four doors down from our Quality of Life Branch offices, to find 
a mimeographed document of the previous time this issue appeared.  I started to 
recreate the essence of the waiver and tracked down the relevant policies.  I was still 
relatively new to EUCOM so this seemed to be an exercise in learning the system and 
developing relationships to coordinate issues.  None of the involved organizations 
seemed to convey a sense of urgency on addressing the problem.   
My understanding at the time was that since we were the liaisons for NATO we 
had to write a package for the Office of the Secretary of Defense addressed to one of his 
Undersecretaries.  The package should contain a letter for him to sign to allow these 
nations to continue to receive tuition-free education at DoDEA schools.  Eventually, our 
office formally staffed the package in which we explained in writing that Section 
1404(c) of Public Law 95-561, “Defense Dependent Education Act of 1978," as 
amended, 20 USC 923(c), authorized the SECDEF to identify classes of dependents 
who may enroll in DoDDS on a space-available basis and to waive tuition for any such 
classes.  The DoD had a class enrollment eligibility waiver in place for attendance at 
Department of Defense Dependent Schools for PfP dependents.  DoD Directive 
1342.13, "Eligibility Requirements for Education of Elementary and Secondary School-
Age Dependents in Overseas Areas" included this waiver in February 2008.  We based 
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our argument on a continuity of message that reverberated throughout the command of 
supporting and building the relationships with partner nations.  While this was an 
important engagement, I was never quite clear why our office had a hand in this 
interaction.  I also wondered about the outcome if the Chief of Policy at DoDEA had 
not been the former J-1 at EUCOM and knew where to find the archived document.  I 
questioned why the Office of the Secretary of Defense level, NATO level, or even 
DoDEA who had the information to resolve the problem did not take the actions to find 
a resolution.  I refer to this episode as the Malta Waiver because I was on vacation in 
Malta when my Division Chief contacted me via my military spouse’s email.  He also 
worked for EUCOM.  Apparently, a new member of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense planned to visit the EUCOM Commander or Deputy Commander and someone 
in my chain of command, who knew that I was working the issue in the background, 
decided that it was an opportunity to by-pass the months of paperwork and staffing 
requirements traditionally needed to communicate the needed solution.  This sudden 
sense of urgency by senior leaders led to a day in Malta recreating the memo and 
sending it via my spouse’s work phone.  This was a significant event for me personally 
and professionally, which is why I remember it as a formative experience.   
Another part of EUCOM’s mission included assignments where DoD and 
Department of State (DoS) personnel worked together under the DoS.  We addressed 
the main concern regarding the perceived disparate education between DoD personnel 
and DoS personnel who worked in the same office but whose children attended 
different schools due to the DoDEA regulation.  We worked with both EUCOM and 
DoDEA legal departments to change the language in military orders to reflect DoD 
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eligibility to obtain DoS benefits.  These activities occurred outside of the educational 
advisory committee and council system.   
As stated earlier, DoDEA, to support the military, connects directly through a 
robust system of school councils.  DoD Instruction 1342.15, “Educational Advisory 
Committees and Councils,” outlines the responsibilities of each level of the council 
system designed to address issues at the lowest possible level.  Previously I mentioned 
that we would hear issues consolidated from our Component Commands.  If it appeared 
that there were issue affecting our components as a whole and not resolved through 
individual organizational channels and engagements then EUCOM would engage 
formally at a regional level with DoDDS-Europe through our European Schools 
Council. 
 
Figure 2.  EUCOM Chain of Command School Council Engagement with DoDEA 
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However, to progress their consolidated issues, the Components had a similar 
structure and relationship with DoDDS-Europe and DoDEA when a problem arose.  In 
addition to access by phone and email with the same DoDDS-Europe Chief of Staff and 
DoDEA Chief of Policy and Legislation plus attendance at lower level advisory 
meetings as well as high-level working groups, the Components had the biannual 
Component Commanders Advisory Council (CCAC). 
 
Figure 3.  Component Commands and DoDEA Council Engagement 
The CCAC is the main event to address component-wide issues.  The DoDDS-
Europe Director attends this meeting that the Component Commander, or designee, 
chairs.  The Commander or designee then attends the European Schools Council and, 
subsequently, the Dependents Education Council (DEC).  For an issue to reach the 
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CCAC agenda, the School Advisory Council (SAC) addresses the concern at the 
individual school level (refer back to Figure 3).  If the school principal cannot resolve 
the issue using military or DoDEA resources, the SAC elevates the issue to the 
Installation Advisory Council (IAC) that consolidates every school on the base or post 
for review (USAFE uses the term School Advisory Board or SAB).  An example of a 
local issue could be as simple as needing a new scoreboard or additional fields for 
sports.  If the base or post commander cannot resolve the issue with the corresponding 
DoDDS-Europe principal then the issue elevates to either DoDDS-Europe’s District 
Advisory Council (DAC) where it is resolved by a DoDEA Superintendent or to the 
CCAC where the Component Commander or designee and the DoDDS-Europe Director 
review it.  The types of issues elevated to the DAC are primarily curriculum related or 
policies within the schools over which the base or post commander does not have 
purview.  CCAC issues tend towards need for additional funding or schools due to 
excess population or quality of life issues for a given location.  However, if the CCAC 
could not resolve the issue, the EUCOM Branch Chief or I as the educational liaison in 
the Quality of Life (QOL) Branch formally received the issue.  If we could not resolve 
the issue and determined the issue affected a significant population in the EUCOM 
AOR, then the ESC reviewed the issue.  During my tenure, NAVEUR did not conduct 





Figure 4.  EUCOM's European Schools Council 
Prior to the ESC meeting, the ESC Working Group (ESCWG) convened to set 
the agenda.  In addition to the QOL Branch Chief and EUCOM Dependent Education 
Liaison, this group consisted of the DoDDS-Europe Deputy Director (this position 
disappeared with the creation on the Curriculum, Instruction, and Assessment (CIA) 
position in 2009) and DoDDS-Europe Chief of Staff, and the Component SLOs for U.S. 
Africa Command, USAREUR, IMCOM, NAVEUR, SOCEUR, and MARFOREUR.  
While SOCEUR and MARFOREUR, as components of EUCOM, did not have direct 
responsibility for providing educational support they did have personnel living 
throughout the AOR.  The education liaison for the newly created U.S. Africa 
Command (sometimes called AFRICOM during this time) was also included since it 
was a Combatant Command co-located in Stuttgart, Germany with personnel in the 
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EUCOM AOR.  The military officer for the U.S. delegation to NATO in Belgium 
assigned as the education liaison also attended.  He and I had few interactions but one 
issue on which we coordinated pertained to the attendance of Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) and NATO member children in DoDEA schools previously mentioned.   
The European School Council Working Group’s (ESCWG) role was to review 
Component issues and decide if there was enough of a EUCOM-wide impact for it to 
become an agenda item for the ESC.  During this working group, each component 
briefed the genesis of the issue and the process to try to reach a resolution.  Since the 
CCACs occurred before this working group, the DoDDS-Europe Chief of Staff spoke to 
those issues as well.  The issues that elevated tend to be policy related.  For example, 
USAFE had a locale where students travelled on bus to school for over an hour, yet 
DoDEA’s policy stated that students could not eat or drink on busses.  When 
approached by USAFE to change the policy, DoDEA responded that it was its policy 
and only affected a small portion of students so DoDEA would not change.  USAFE 
brought this response to EUCOM through the ESCWG.  We wrote a request to change 
the policy based on the best interests of all of the students worldwide who rode busses 
for over an hour.  DoDEA agreed to change the policy with certain parameters placed 
on types of food and beverages. 
Once an agenda was set at the ESCWG, I consolidated the Component issue 
papers on each issue as well as DoDDS-Europe’s information on academic, budget, 
personnel, military construction, NDSP budget numbers and new initiatives into a slide 
briefing and an executive summary.  Using this executive summary and proposed 
agenda, I briefed the Division Chief (sometimes he would just review and sign off in 
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approval) then the J-1 in preparation to brief the COS in preparation to obtain final 
approval from the DCOM.  Initially my direct supervisor did the briefings, but 
eventually he delegated the responsibility to me.  The purpose of this process of briefs 
through the chain of command served to inform leadership and to prepare the ESC and 
DEC attendee so there were no surprises.  We advanced any unresolved issues to the 
DEC Working Group (DECWG).  I consolidated the results of the ESC and submitted 
the items to DoDEA headquarters for addition to its agenda for the DECWG.  Finally, I 
represented EUCOM at the DECWG held at DoDEA Headquarters in Virginia where 
we set the agenda for the worldwide meeting.  
Usually, the day before the DECWG I met with the education liaisons from the 
Pacific Command (PACOM) to compare topics since we represented the preponderance 
of oversea schools.  During this time, I remember a focus on expansion in Korea though 
I did not invest any real time in understanding what it meant.  I also understood that the 
military families in Hawaii were upset about the quality of education and so a review by 
DoDEA was occurring to conclude if DoDEA should take over certain schools.  The 
Pacific version of our ESC was the Pacific Theater Education Council (PTEC) 
comprised of United States Forces Korea (USFK), United States Forces Japan (USFJ), 
Pacific Forces Air Force (PACAF), and Marine Forces Pacific Command 
(MARFORPAC).  DDESS, the stateside school system, did not have a comparable 
council though there was discussion during this time on creating one.  In addition, 




The expected level of engagement at the DEC was the commander at the highest 
level (such as the four star EUCOM Commander).  However, most times Commanders 
delegated the responsibility.  Twice I supported the EUCOM COS.  During a time of 
transition, the three star USAREUR DCOM general attended as the representative for 
EUCOM as well as for USAREUR since he was a staunch advocate for education and 
actively participated in the EUCOM ESC process.  At my final ESC in 2010, I escorted 
the new EUCOM Civilian Deputy Commander. 
Even though EUCOM consolidated the issues and co-chaired the ESC with 
DoDDS-Europe, each Component and its SLO still attended the DEC as prescribed in 
DoD Instruction 1342.5.  The component school liaisons and Component Commander 
or designees were also responsible for communicating the issues to the offices of their 
Service Chief.  The agenda items that reached this level tended towards advocating for 
additional funding from Congress or communicating certain military installation 
changes. 
One variation on the process of pushing agenda items through the school council 
system as outlined above occurred during the Component Commander’s Conference 
(CCC).  This is the biannual conference attended by the Component Commanders and 
hosted by the EUCOM Commander.  If there were any education topics brought to the 
Commander’s attention at this conference he directed the Quality of Life Branch to 
provide updates, explanations, or take on the role of resolving the issue.  The Quality of 
Life Branch conducted a formal senior spouse program during this time that usually 
highlighted areas such as education, medical and family support issues so if the topic 
was education then DoDEA or DoDDS-Europe leadership attended and the senior 
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leader spouses had direct access to them.  I never attended the CCC since there was a 
specific member of the EUCOM J-1 team who organized the spouse program and 
agenda.  Wright (2002) outlined an example of the relationship between DoDEA and 
the CCC in his research, “An Assessment of the USAFE School Board Test Program,” 
which I will specifically address in Chapter One. 
Another variation, or more specifically an anomaly, to the relationships and 
interactions established through policy and regulations was the creation of education 
support in Papa, Hungary for the Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW).  This was an example of 
the rare occasion where an issue was not initially in DoDEA or EUCOM’s purview or a 
CCAC issue.  The creation of the HAW in 2008-2009 was a significant event that 
illustrates one of the anomalies of the COCOM structure with NATO and its service 
components.  This was the first joint multinational force with a major US presence in 
Europe that does not report to the NATO SACEUR or answer to the EUCOM 
Commander and in fact established through the work processes of the United States Air 
Force and its component United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). 
A student at the Army War College, who was involved in the development of 
the HAW described in his recent research paper, the creation of this strategic 
partnership as essential to advancing United States military capabilities and a priority of 
building partnership capacity.  He concluded that 
Constructing multinational institutions that reconcile differing national legal 
practices and definitions, financial instruments, military personnel and command 
systems, technical standards, and a host of other standards, is difficult and 
tedious work.  However, precedent agreements such as the SAC MOU (Strategic 
Airlift Consortium Memorandum of Understanding) have been successfully 




This conclusion, while appropriate to the military strategy and DoD goal of building 
partnership capacity is slightly premature since the issue of dependent education was 
unresolved at this time. 
The HAW is a prime example of how a Component Command within EUCOM 
can negotiate the creation of a new base without any initial coordination with DoDEA 
on the educational requirement.  The USAFE Commander worked directly with the Air 
Force Service Chief and collaborating nations.  Once the coalition formed and families 
moved to the area, the main dispute concerned the lack of education comparable to one 
provided by DoDEA.  The USAFE SLO, DoDEA Chief of Policy and DoDDS-Europe 
Chief of Staff worked with the local government to find a solution.  They agreed to 
provide a bilingual education.  At some point, I travelled with the DoDEA Chief of 
Policy and DoDDS-Europe Chief of Staff in Papa so that EUCOM could better 
understand the situation.  When I arrived, we attended a meeting with the local 
education chief, toured the schools, and met the English-speaking teachers hired to 
teach the students from the HAW.  We discussed the feasibility of hiring DoDEA 
teachers for this location to ensure a quality education.  The main issue was that there 
was a viable school with a plan in place in a developed community.  There were 
multiple age ranges so a teacher may only have a few students in a grade.  Considering 
the support offered by the Hungarian education minister, this new requirement for 
additional funding was not reasonable.  
We also attended an education meeting with the wing commander’s spouse who 
was the self-appointed SLO working with DoDEA.  Representatives from the other 
consortium countries attended the meeting.  Many pulled their students out of the 
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Hungarian school because, in their view, the agreement for bilingual education failed.  
For each, bilingual meant Hungarian and their native language, not English.  Another 
issue presented concerned the American contractors who by DoDEA regulation could 
not receive financial reimbursement for NDSP.  As this was a very small community, a 
community solution was needed that transcended DoDEA's authority.  This is also an 
example of an issue that pulls on the resources of several organizations.  The actual cost 
of fixing problems reactively and the amount of time and personnel needed, diminished 
the financial and personnel resources that provided teacher salaries and quality 
programs for students in established traditional DoDEA schools. 
During my tenure at EUCOM, this set of issues, related to the support of 
education for military children living in remote locations, reoccurred.  Each time, we 
elevated the issue from the ESC to the DEC by way of the Working Groups or tried to 
work a solution directly with DoDEA Chief of Policy and Legislation or DoDDS-
Europe Chief of Staff.  While I will not specifically address values, I would be remiss 
not to note that those military members who spoke often of the need for high quality 
schools and education continuously connected it to the awareness that the children are 
our “future fighting force.”  Those most vocal at the table continued the mantra of 
quality of life for our service members and families to enhance recruitment and 
retention.  To support our service members defending our nation was simply the right 
thing to do.  Upon reflection, I do not recall anyone who did not agree.  The conflict in 
decision-making primarily revolved around who was responsible for administering 
and/or funding the Non-DoD School Program (NDSP).  The military side concluded it 
was DoDEA’s responsibility while DoDEA concluded that the military service, who 
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kept placing families in remote locations without consideration of the educational costs 
and requirements, was responsible. 
Eventually, based on a specific request by EUCOM, vetted through the 
European Schools Council, and multiple inputs from staff internal to DoDEA as well as 
military leadership throughout Europe and the Pacific, DoDEA announced the first 
meeting of a task force in spring 2010 to review increased quality of life issues and 
funding concerns worldwide.  For example, the military’s “strategic decision” to allow 
families to accompany military members in remote locations where there were no 
DoDEA run brick and mortar schools, such as Papa, Hungary, could land DoDEA an 
education bill for its Non-DoD Schools Program that was not accounted for in its 
budgeting process.  In addition, negative quality of life issues for military families such 
as disparate quality of education and increased out of pocket expenses existed.  
DoDEA’s Chief of Policy and Legislation and DoDEA’s General Counsel co-chaired 
the task force.  Other members included representatives from EUCOM, PACOM, 
NATO, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and Headquarters Army, Navy, and Air 
Force personnel.  The USAFE Component SLO attended as the Headquarters Air Force 
representative. 
From my limited practitioner’s point of view, this was a very dynamic time for 
several organizations for a variety of reasons to include new leadership, 
transformational minded leaders who had worked in the system for some time, and 
changes in military mission requirements that added new requirements for DoDEA.  
Lack of change in funding to support new educational requirements in remote locations 
complicated by lack of coordination between the military and DoDEA prior to 
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establishing new locations complicated the process of providing reasonable educational 
opportunities.  This small program and the issues that surrounded it fascinated me 
simply because the problems that existed involved a small number of people and 
organizations trying to work solutions at high levels with international implications.   
Several months after DoDEA formed the NDSP Task Force, I had the 
opportunity to apply for the University of Oklahoma’s PhD program in Organizational 
Leadership.  My EUCOM supervisor and the Chief of Policy and Legislation at 
DoDEA, who I considered mentors at that point, wrote letters of recommendation.  My 
application included a statement of research that summarized the problem as: 
More accompanied military tours to remote locations bring families, which 
increases the requirement for funding and educational support.  While funding to 
support this program has increased from $27M to $51.8M in the last five years, 
it has not kept pace with actual need as military missions move into remote 
locations.  Reimbursement for NDSP is governed by the Department of State 
Standardized Regulations (DSSR) education allowance that creates conflict in 
the management of the program in locations where there are DoD and DoS 
personnel together.  There is currently a debate between DoDEA and the 
military services on who should pay for education in remote locations.  Most of 
the solutions in place are temporary fixes to larger problems and each 
organization involved is limited by regulations, mission requirements, and 
budgetary constraints.  
 
Throughout my two years of coursework in the Organizational Leadership 
program, I memoed alongside theories that seemed to explain the variety of phenomena 
I observed.  Using this “theory of the day” mindset, I continued to ask what compelled 
DoDEA to agree to the request for a task force and how did “we” get everyone united in 
that decision.  I waivered often on who was the “we.”  During one class on 
Organizational Behavior, a professor introduced Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) 
that, in its basic form, I remembered simply as there is a period of little change then 
something major happens and big change occurs in reaction.  From this event one can 
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work backwards to look at the circumstances leading up to the major event.  Because I 
believed at the time that the decision to create the NDSP Task Force was a unique 
event, I fixated on that point in time from which to look backwards.  
Later, in my Small Groups Communication class, I came across an application 
of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) to organizational theory by Tushman and 
Romanelli (1985) and then applied to small groups by Gersick (1988).  The research, 
which uniquely addressed the role of a group, concluded  
The common feature is in the observed pattern of change or periods of stasis (or 
in some versions, incremental change) punctuated by short periods of radical 
change in which a group attempts to improve its fit with the demands of its 
embedding context. (Arrow, Henry, Poole, Wheelan, & Moreland, 2005, p. 329)  
This distinction of the role of groups sparked a consideration of the role of our 
council working groups (lower level workers, or action officers (AOs), in the chain of 
command yet with high level chain of command interactions) in pushing agendas across 
our own and collective organizations.  I considered the role of leadership from high-
level leaders in positon of power and influence to lower level positions such as mine 
that needed to network ways to find or create solutions. 
When I wrote the first draft of my research prospectus in my final class, I, again 
like theory of the day, pulled from leadership, communication, psychology, network, 
leadership, organizational change, and social exchange theories.  This was 
understandable considering the multidisciplinary nature of our program in 
Organizational Leadership.  However, I had nothing to unify all of the theories other 
than each was related theoretically to the issue in some form.  I wanted to understand 
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what was going on at this particular point of time and felt that everything was relevant 
and theoretically appropriate and I did not want to choose just one theoretical direction 
or discipline.   
After I drew a diagram on the board to organize my thoughts (Document 
Database, TAB 14, 4a) while I presented my paper, my professor, from a political 
science perspective, simply stated that it sounded like Kingdon.  I discovered later the 
underlying components of the research.  Kingdon (1984) focused on the governmental 
agenda setting process and concluded that there are three kinds of processes: problems, 
policies, and politics, and that “while governmental agendas are set in the problems or 
political streams, the chances of items rising on a decision agenda-a list of items up for 
actual action-are enhanced if all three streams are coupled together” (p. 21) during a 
window of opportunity.  Kingdon (1984) explained that a “policy entrepreneur” who 
advocates for and pushes agendas facilitates this coupling.  So, was the decision to form 
the NDSP task force an example of the right people, at the right place, at the right time 
consciously pushing an agenda?  Moreover, if so, how did it actually happen? 
 Research that developed from Kingdon looked at multiple parts of an 
organization, such as leadership and networking, and moved away from a linear process 
of decision-making.  Hayes (2008) reviewed Advocacy Coalition Frameworks (ACF) 
and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) and acknowledged Lindblom’s (1959) 
conclusion that most public policy change is incremental.  Kingdon recognized this 
conclusion as well in his work.  A dynamic view of multiple parts from multiple 
theories is Network Theory, which focused on the relationships between nodes and 
drew conclusions on the effects of external organizations on an open system.  Contrary 
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to this open system idea is Complexity Theory, developed with Twist and Schaap’s 
(1991) premise that “systems are thus self-generating enclosed structures whose 
mechanisms are interconnected and mutually dependent” (as cited in Klijn, 2008, p.8).  
Complexity Theory also supports an incrementalist approach contrary to PET.  The 
understanding that a gap existed in research between disciplines predicated the move to 
complexity theory that sought to create a cross-discipline view of organizations from 
multiple levels.  MacIntosh (2006) added that Complexity Theory combines multiple 
angles to understand change and dynamic systems because of complex interaction of 
parts of systems (as cited in Klijn, 2005, p.2).  I reviewed additional research related to 
Kingdon (1984) to include Sabatier (1991) who cited Jones (1970), Anderson (1975), 
and Peters (1986) to summarize political science literature.  Sabatier (1991) traced the 
expansion or move away from Kingdon’s Policy Streams and addressed the political 
science literature that focused on institution or on behavior.  He acknowledged the 
importance of policy communities and networks that involve “actors” from multiple 
levels of government.  
Despite the volume of research developed from Kingdon, with contrary 
conclusions, once again I felt that there were too many theoretical directions from 
which to choose.  I returned to Kingdon after reading John’s (2003) article, “Is There 
Life After Policy Streams, Advocacy Coalitions, and Punctuations: Using Evolutionary 
Theory to Explain Policy Change?”  He concluded that,  
Although much is uncovered by institutional processes, long-term social and 
economic ideas, networks, strategic interaction, and the conscious adoption of 
ideas, the claim is that random processes, competition, and selection exert a 
background influence, which can drive policy making and implementation 




There are just simply too many influencers or “variables” in organizational life.  This 
research focusses on the process of decision-making, the environment in which it occurs 
and the leadership that exists to facilitate or to hinder.  
I responded positively to Kingdon’s quote, “Conditions become defined as 
problems when we come to believe that we should do something about them” (Kingdon, 
1984, p. 115).  From my perspective, the impetus for action was this belief that there 
was a “true” quality of life issue as seen in the actual formation of the Task Force.  
However, what were the conditions that shaped the decision?  While I was part of the 
original EUCOM organization advocating for the task force, I do not know what 
conclusions or changes occurred since I had to leave my position a few months into the 
actual meetings due to the reassignment of my military spouse.  At the time, I was 
aware of several issues that influenced some decision makers but any conclusions were 
purely conjecture and only represented my limited view as a former DoDDS-Europe 
teacher and member of the Quality of Life Branch at Headquarters EUCOM.  Although 
I am no longer with EUCOM, I utilized professional resources and relationships to take 
this discussion to the next level by bringing a more systematic approach based in sound 
research methodology. 
My combined questioning and experiences led to the following: Given the 
expansive network of military and civilian personnel and leadership connected through 
the DoDEA school council network, often with competing priorities and multiple 
options for issue resolution, how did the topic of the Non-DoD Schools Program 
(NDSP) become an actionable item on the highest level of the educational advisory 
committee and council system?  More specifically, how were personal and 
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organizational agendas advanced that culminated in the decision to create a Task Force 
to review NDSP issues worldwide?  To answer these questions, I developed a case 
study design to investigate the process of decision-making and the role of leadership 
within the school council network specific to the creation of the NDSP Task Force in 
the spring of 2010.  My background, as an organizational leadership scholar, a former 
educator for DoDDS-Europe, and as the former military civilian education liaison for 
EUCOM, supported my ability to conduct this research on a seemingly unique 
organizational event that has both practical and theoretical applications for 






 In this chapter, I outline the problem that led to the development of this case 
study and reiterate my research questions.  Next, I acknowledge research related to the 
effects of the military lifestyle and the importance of addressing quality of life issues as 
connected to the impact on the military mission.  Then, I review research specific to the 
Department of Defense Education Activity’s formal education council and committee 
process designed to examine educational issues in support of the military.  Throughout, 
I enumerate ways that my research supports and advances this collective knowledge. 
Problem Statement and Research Questions 
 Although DoDEA and the military fall under the same parent organization, the 
Department of Defense, and thus connect to and compete for the same source of money 
for budgets, military commanders at multiple levels do not systematically consider 
educational requirements or legislative constraints when developing new strategic 
military mission requirements.  In the case where DoDEA and the military are 
intertwined, where one exists to support the other, DoDEA is dependent on the input of 
the military to inform operations while the military is dependent on DoDEA to support 
education so service members can focus on war fighting and global security. 
 While there is an educational advisory committee and council system in place 
where DoDEA briefs its budget, military construction (MILCON), and base support 
requirements, the military does not systematically consult DoDEA prior to making the 
decision to stand up new commands or new requirements that include families.  
Similarly, military decision makers can simply disregard DoDEA’s recommendations 
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not to authorize children to accompany the service member due to lack of an adequate 
educational option.  These additional accompanied military tours to remote locations 
where there are no DoDEA schools or adequate educational opportunities increase the 
requirement for funding and educational support that requires DoDEA to reallocate its 
budget away from traditional schools.  In addition, a disconnect exists between DoDEA 
and the military services on who should pay for education in remote locations since 
DoDEA has the mandate to provide education while the military is the decision maker 
to send families to remote locations where education access is limited or non-existent.  
Ultimately, due to the lack of a streamlined decision making process by which these 
educational issues are addressed, this conflict led to depleted resources and unintended 
quality of life issues for service members and accompanying families. 
 As earlier suggested, addressing this problem led to a case study of the decision 
to create a task force to review issues associated with the Non-DoD Schools Program 
(NDSP).  As mentioned in the Prologue, NDSP is the special program that financially 
supports education opportunities in remote locations or where there are no adequate 
educational opportunities for certain civilian and  military dependent children.  The 
questions to be answered are as follows: Given the expansive network of military and 
civilian personnel and leadership connected through the DoDEA school council 
network, often with competing priorities and multiple options for issue resolution, how 
did the topic of the Non-DoD Schools Program become an actionable item on the 
highest level of the educational advisory committee and council system?  More 
specifically, how were personal and organizational agendas advanced that culminated in 
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the decision to create a Task Force to review NDSP issues worldwide?  In general, I 
seek to understand the circumstances that surrounded this decision. 
Literature Review 
Research on Family and Quality of Life  
Research on the Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP) does not exist.  However, 
the emergence of research on education related quality of life initiatives and the effects 
of deployment on service members, families, and children all speak to the challenges 
facing service members in the 2007 to 2010 timeframe.  Examples, which include the 
Blue Star Military Family Lifestyle Survey (2010), Chandra (2010) The Effects of 
Deployment on Children and Clark (2013) The Effects of Frequent Relocations and 
Deployments on Children’s Educational Experience, conclude that service member 
quality of life affects performance and performance affects unit morale and cohesion.  
My research adds to this body of work by providing another source of insight into the 
importance of addressing quality of life issues for the military as connected to the 
impact on the military mission. 
Institute for Defense Analyses Report (2000) 
There exists a small body of research that includes published research specific to 
the history, legislation, academics, and educational advisory committee and council 
process for DoDEA.  In 2000, the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness (USD P&R) requested a review of DoDEA schools due to increased military 
command concerns over quality of education in the Department of Defense Dependent 
Schools in Europe.  There was a concern that “these education issues were having an 
adverse impact on Quality of Life” (Wright, 2000, p. 29).  The Institute for Defense 
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Analyses (IDA) conducted both quantitative and qualitative research on DoDEA.  
Specific to my topic, researchers reviewed the educational advisory committees and 
provided a diagram of how external organizations connect to DoDEA through regulated 
council meetings: 
 
(Wright R., 2000, pp. VII-16) 
Figure 5.  Council Committee Relationship with Administrators and Commanders 
During the qualitative phase, the researchers concluded that, “some of those 
interviewed thought there may be too much layering of committees and councils that 
deal with both educational and non-educational issues and that the process should be 
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streamlined” (Wright, 2000, pp. VII-14).  One of the recommendations from the report 
was to reorganize the communication flow and that, “DoDEA should submit changes to 
legislation and DoD Directives and Instructions to simplify and streamline the 
procedures and relationships that govern the functioning of the educational advising 
councils and committees and involve DDESS in the DEC and ACDE process.”  Wright 
recommended a new diagram: 
 
(Wright R., 2000, pp. VII-22) 




Wright (2000) also concluded that a draw-down in Europe, increased 
deployments, reorganizations, the new Math Land curriculum and perception that 
DoDEA was not responsive to concerns of senior military, contributed to the issues.  He 
specifically stated, “The DEC was dysfunctional because generals stopped attending 
and began sending civilians without decision making ability” (p.29).  I borrow this 
conclusion to provide a starting point for a ten-year period of activity that led to the 
decision to create the NDSP Task Force. 
In addition, my research provides an updated view into the activities of the 
council system with a specific focus on the decision-making processes related to the 
Non-DoD School Program as well as the acknowledgement of the multiple decision-
making activities that occur outside this formal educational council system.  The 
findings provide a springboard to evaluating possible combinations that, taken in 
context, may help leaders to anticipate, create, and evaluate circumstances for 
advancing organizational agendas within this system. 
During this same period, the military acted on its own behalf to create civilian 
school liaison positions to increase communication flow between command and school 
levels while USAFE specifically decided to create a school board structure (SAB) to 
replace the Installation Advisory Council (IAC) on each base.  While Wright’s (2000) 
report concluded an ongoing process of deterioration in the relationship between 
DoDEA and the military there is no specific mention of a timeline.  Was it possible that 
a specific incident or leader expedited the need for review in 1999 or was it the result of 
a long run of status quo?  This line of questioning connects to my earlier discussion on 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and Network Theory.  If it was a period of stasis with 
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the ongoing drawdown in Europe, increased deployments and reorganizations then what 
was the catalyst for requesting the study on DoDEA? 
Missing in both diagrams, and in the conclusion, is the breakout of the military 
side and its interaction at the European School Council (ESC) or Dependent Education 
Council (DEC) level to address the high-level legislative issues.  Similarly, neither 
diagram address the issue of the cross representation in the council system.  For 
example, United States Army in Europe (USAREUR) was at the decision making table 
while Installation Management Command (IMCOM) provided the personnel (SLO) and 
funding though each represented the Army.  The scope of the council and committee 
structure due to the lack of review of military connections outside of the councils and 
committees concerning the alternate avenues to address issues limits Wright’s research.   
USAFE School Board Program (2002) 
In 2002, DoDEA asked for a review of the USAFE School Board Test Program.  
This research, conducted again by Wright of IDA from November 2001 to July 2002, 
underscored the high-level influence of the Component Commanders and the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense to bypass DoDEA.  In this case, the USAFE Commander at 
the Combatant Commander Conference (CCC) brought up the issue of creating a school 
board model that changed DoDEA’s school council.  The attending decision makers 
denied the request.  Several months later, there was a new EUCOM Commander and 
USAFE again raised the issue.  This time the CCC attendees approved the pilot study. 
Wright’s report concluded that DoDEA’s council system was adequate in light 
of the new civilian school liaison positions so USAFE should end its SAB and return to 
the SAC/IAC model.  This engagement with USAFE hinted of future behavior when 
38 
 
setting up new programs in remote locations such as bypassing DoDEA straight to Air 
Force headquarters for support and funding.  Later research conducted by Leonhart 
(2009) supported Wright’s conclusion that the system is effective and in fact outlined 
several ways for a school principal to be effective within the system.  Leonhart (2009) 
summarized and concluded,  
The authority of the military as a political influence is a major factor in 
leadership.  To be successful and effective within this schools system, the 
principals must take the readily provided military structure and work within it.  
They cannot ignore the leadership-both that of the system headquarters and that 
of the military leadership...There are so many facets that make up a school’s 
culture, among these are personalities and qualifications of staff members, 
influence of the teacher’s union, socio-economic composition and age range of 
the student body, principal’s vision and leadership style, physical 
condition/appearance of the school building, funding, parental support, 
community partnerships and student achievement data. (p.162) 
 
Leonhart’s conclusions provide insight into the influencing elements at the school and 
community level during my targeted timeframe.  There is no specific research on the 
council system since 2002 so I begin with Wright’s research based conclusion as well as 
Leonhart’s (2009) perspective that the council system was adequate.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I discussed the problem that led to this research and the 
development of the research questions.  I provided a review of research applicable to 
my topic and addressed the ways my research supports and advances their findings.  
Overall, Wright’s research on DoDEA and its education council system came from a 
quality of academic education perspective.  My research approaches from the 
perspective of the military quality of life with a focus on remote locations governed by 
the Non-DoD School Program where there are no DoDEA schools or adequate 
educational opportunities.  In addition, as stated before, there was limited consideration 
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in the research for the extended network in which each organization exists.  The 
research did not acknowledge the process of the multitude of pre-council meetings 
conducted by lower ranked members whose job it was to set the meeting agendas, the 
timing of decision-making or issue resolution, and where specific issue resolution 
occurred.  My research provides insight into this process of decision-making.  In 
addition, it expands the understanding of the political influence found within the council 
structure from the base level up through the highest Department of Defense level and 
provides a practical application for how to operate effectively to influence decision-





Review of Related Literature and Theoretical Framework 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I review related literature and discuss the theoretical framework 
that shaped my research.  First, I discuss research on the ability to affect change in 
military organizations specific to the role of the intermediary or mid-level actors.  Next, 
I summarize network theories that span the topics of motivation, the concept of strategic 
pursuit of relationships, peer attachments, and theories of social exchange.  Then, I 
review leadership theories that provide an overview of qualities and actions.  Finally, I 
outline the components of Kingdon’s (1984) research to include discussion on his 
concepts of politics, policies, problems, windows of opportunity, and policy 
entrepreneurs in relation to advancing agendas in organizations.  I conclude the 
discussion with a contrast of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) as a rival 
explanation to Kingdon’s incremental approach to advancing agendas. 
Review of Related Literature 
Organizational Change in the Military 
Research varies on the assertion that affecting change to organizational policies 
and processes can be difficult to accomplish in hierarchical, military organizations due 
to leadership, legislation, historical precedence, and stakeholder accountability.  
Specific to my study, several recent dissertations are relevant.  Both Majewska-Button 
(2010) and Joyce (2013) on organizational change in military organizations concluded 
that middlemen (Majewska-Button 2010) or mid-level agents or actors (Joyce 2013) do 
have an effect on organizational change.  Majewska-Button (2010) conducted a meta-
41 
 
analysis of existing research from a centralized database in the Centers for Army 
Lessons Learned using organizational change and leadership development literature as 
the primary sources of how to examine change efforts within the past thirty years.  
Using grounded theory methods on 75 case studies, she identified factors that influence 
the change process and concluded that the Department of Defense is not unique in its 
change efforts so an application of a generic theory of organizational change efforts can 
apply and that the role of leadership is quite important.  I add that pushing agendas is an 
implied need for change.  Similarly, Joyce (2012), who developed a micro-political 
perspective on change developed from American and comparative politics literature to 
analyze four decades of U.S. Army development, concluded that “transformations tend 
to be driven from the middle rather than from the top or outside; and that the porous 
nature of institutional boundaries allow internal reformers to forge networks and build 
consensus for change” (p.6). 
Due to the conflicting findings within the larger body of research on 
organizational change, my research advances their work by connecting their results with 
network and leadership theories, and to support the conclusion that middlemen or mid-
level actors can affect change.  While I did not look at change, per se, I sought to 
understand the conditions necessary to facilitate the decision-making process in 
advancing agendas with the goal to create change or to evaluate the need for change.  
Furthermore, I broaden the scope on the location of the middlemen or mid-level actors 
by identifying the person generically by using the military term Action Officer (AO).  
To this end, my findings show that even the highest-level decision maker of the 




Research on network theory spans the topics of motivation, the concept of 
strategic pursuit of relationships, peer attachments, and theories of social exchange.  
Specific to my focus, the following research conclusions are relevant: “In professional 
arenas, peers’ attachments to each other across organizations may be more important for 
them than their attachment to their employers” (Gersick, Bartunek, & Dutton, 2000, p. 
1027).  Likewise, network researchers found that “interconnectedness between 
organizational elites serves to produce a core of individuals that are more likely to act in 
the interests of their class than in the interests of their individual firms or overall 
network” (Adkins, 2011, p. 59).  Another possibility emerged from structural holes 
theory within network theory that “posits that people accumulate social capital (positive 
relationships with other people) and invest it in structural holes (those places in 
networks where nodes are not linked together” (Adkins, 2011, p. 59).  This theory could 
explain how low ranking members within the organization and/or networks were able to 
influence higher-level authorities to agree to the creation of the Task Force and further 
influence change. 
Leadership Theory 
At the individual level, I researched organizational change agents, power 
brokers, and leadership.  The role of power (positional, social, political, expert, and 
reverent) is relevant.  However to limit the scope of leadership theories I address 
transformational and transactional leadership styles specifically.  I assume motivation 
and power theories within a basic contrast of transformational and transactional 
leadership.  For example, for motivation, “Followers interpret the legitimacy of leader 
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requests based largely on the type of tactics the leader uses” or for “political” reasons 
(Rusaw A., 1998, p.41).  Porter, Allen, and Anglo (1990) observed that the perception 
of political is based on areas of organizational uncertainty and resource scarcity as well 
as the need to act because of high personal stake or importance of the issue to an 
individual (as cited in Rusaw, 1998, p. 41). 
Qualities of transactional and transformational leadership reverberate in network 
theory.  Barnard (1938, 1996) concluded that managers could offer material and 
nonmaterial rewards, “particularly important were opportunities to grow on the job, 
making the workplace physically attractive, developing warm interpersonal 
relationships, opportunities for more participation in decision making, and fostering 
communion, or a sense of belonging to a group having similar interests and goals” (as 
cited in Rusaw, 2001, p. 15).  Ultimately, transactional leadership motivates followers 
by appealing to their self-interest and exchanging benefits.  This may involve values 
related to exchange processes, for example, honesty, fairness, responsibility, and 
reciprocity (Yukl, 2010, p.261). 
 Transformational leadership, in contrast, appeals to the moral values of 
followers in an attempt to raise their consciousness about ethical issues and to mobilize 
their energy and resources to reform institutions (Yukl, 2010, p. 261).  Burns (1978) 
was the first to develop the concept of transformational leadership in the sense of moral 
elevation or social reform.  Bass (1985) developed the four I’s: Idealized influence, 
Individualized Consideration, Inspirational Motivation, and Intellectual Stimulation 
(Yukl, 2010, p. 276).  Meanwhile, Bennis and Nanus highlighted the role of vision, 
becoming social architects, creating trust, and positive self-regard.  According to Bass, 
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“transformational leaders possess good visioning, rhetorical, and impression 
management skills, and they use these skills to develop strong emotional bonds with 
followers” (Hughes, Ginnett, & Curphy, 1993, p. 443).  An illustration of this is from a 
paper during my Interpersonal Dynamics of Leadership class in 2011 that included 
comment on my interactions with the EUCOM Branch Chief:  
A dynamic leader, who consistently challenged me to be independent and 
confident, to take risks, and to find my voice to stand up for issues affecting the 
educational quality of life for the families of our military personnel in our area 
of responsibility...a visionary who has the respect of the organization and who 
created a safe environment for me to express ideas and to take leads on actions.  
He provided the guidance and vision but gave me the leeway to develop and 
direct the process, while at the same time, he provided top cover when the senior 
leaders demanded quick changes and updates when their priority changes 
affected ours.  (For full text see Document Database, TAB 13a) 
 
 The discussion on qualities of leadership continued with Kouzes and Posner 
(1987) who provided a prescriptive view of developing transformational leadership.  
The five fundamental practices include challenging the process, inspiring a shared 
vision, enabling others to act, modeling the way, and encouraging the heart (Natemeyer 
& Hersey, 2011, p. 354).  Additionally, Bass and Avolio (1994) identified the roles of 
transformational leaders as mentors, coaches, and role models.  All of these descriptions 
provide parameters for qualities that I expected to read or hear about during my research 
to understand better the leadership during my chosen event. 
 Another key concept in transformational leadership includes charisma.  Much 
debate exists on the role of charisma in transformational leadership relative to the need 
to have charisma, or that one must be charismatic, in order to be transformational.  In 
addition, some studies treated transformational leadership as a personality trait or 
personal predisposition rather than a behavior that people can learn (Bryman, 1992, p. 
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100).  While transformational leadership “lacks conceptual clarity” (Northouse, 2010, p. 
189), empirical studies showed it to be an effective form of leadership that has intuitive 
appeal. 
 A weakness of transformational leadership is that, “Transformational leaders can 
be disruptive to organizations particularly if the leader’s vision is in conflict with the 
goals of the organization or if the leader is only developing strong emotional bonds with 
followers for their own (i.e. the leader’s) selfish ends” (Hughes, Ginnett, & Curphy, 
1993, p. 454).  This statement hints at the ethics underlying a transformational leader.  
In essence, a transformational leader is trying to move others to a higher or better place.  
This implies the leader’s belief that the current status quo is not fine and that his or her 
vision is better.  One may not know if it is a positive or negative change until 
circumstances present themselves.  Having said that, there is the pseudo-
transformational point of view defined by Bass (1998) that relates to a leader who is 
self-consumed, exploitive, and power oriented, with warped moral values (as cited in 
Northouse, 2010, p.173).  Again, an immediate value judgment is implied and ethical 
debates that are not usually included in the discussion of transformational leadership.  
 The concept of power also underlies each leadership concept.  In 1978, Burns, in 
The Power of Leadership, used the term power wielder (which I interpret as a leader) 
and stated, “Power wielders draw from their power base’s resources relevant to their 
own motives and the motives and resources of others upon whom they exercise power” 
(Natemeyer & Hersey, 2011).  He continued that 
 Dominated by personal motives, P draws on supporters, on funds, on  
ideology, on institutions, on old friendships, on political credits, on status, and 
on his own skills of calculation, judgment, communication, and timing to 
mobilize those elements that relate to the motives of person P wishes to control 
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– even if in the end P overrides their values and goals.  (Natemeyer & Hersey, 
2011, pp. 438-9) 
 
 Overall, leadership theory is pertinent to any organizational study and underpins 
previously mentioned theories.  My research uncovered qualities of leadership to add to 
the current body of knowledge on this subject and to serve as a means to assess 
Kingdon’s concept of a policy entrepreneur.  My case study development and 
interviews established more of the story to address many theoretical debates on types of 
leadership found in military networks and provided insights into specific qualities and 
actions.  I discuss the findings in subsequent chapters. 
Theoretical Framework (Logic Linking Data to Propositions) 
According to Yin (2009), the role of developing theory during the design phase 
is critical.  In this section, I provide a summary of the theoretical framework that guides 
this study predominantly drawn from political science, leadership, and network theories.  
I offer a justification for existing in a policy world.  I review Kingdon’s Policy Streams 
and address Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) as a relevant rival theory.  
Specifically, I discuss Kingdon’s work that addressed three types of processes (or 
streams) of problems, policies, and politics, the concept of a policy entrepreneur, and 
the concept of a policy window or window of opportunity related to agenda setting. 
It is appropriate to exist in a policy world since specific legislation determined 
the council structure and the high-ranking members of DoDEA and the military are 
political appointees.  The DoDEA school council system is the policy community with 
the focus on providing education to military families in overseas environments and 
certain stateside locations.  “Policy communities are composed of specialists in a given 
policy arena and have a common interaction” (Kingdon, 1984, p. 123).  Issues raised to 
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the committees are breakdowns in policies or in communication of policies or 
emergence of new issues, for example, the military moving toward a less centralized 
force.  Policy is inherent in the structure of the council.  The authority to address policy 
derives from laws, legislation, and directives.  Each level has authority to a certain 
degree to address issues.  I address this policy community as the unit of analysis in the 
methodology section. 
While there are multiple theoretical extensions from Kingdon’s Policy Streams 
(as discussed in the Prologue) such as coalition building and agenda setting, I stick with 
Kingdon’s Policy Streams for its simplified, practical applicability and empirical value.  
Kingdon’s framework stems from Cohen, March and Olsen’s (1972) research that 
developed the “garbage can” model of organizational choice related to describing 
decision making within organized anarchies.  They used the term to define an 
organization with problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation. 
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Model 
Kingdon outlined three types of processes in agenda setting.  The problems 
stream, seen as a crisis or some prominent event, is the first process.  The second stream 
is policies whereby there is a gradual change in policies due to individual organizational 
changes, a preponderance of actions taken as exceptions to policy and/or a disconnect 
between priorities of the policy community affecting others.  The relevant example here 
is the migration of military missions to remote locations that affected the established 
policies for administering the NDSP regulations.  The final stream is politics that 
incorporates such things as change in leadership and public mood. 
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For this research, I defined the mood as the push for military quality of life, 
which I based from my experience of the key buzzwords used both in conversations and 
in official writings.  I found an example of an official writing in the Congressional 
Testimony of the USEUCOM Commander.  This is the annual event where the 
Commander lays out his priorities to Congress.  For the March 2010 testimony, we 
wrote a draft that included mention of schools in remote locations.  We wanted to get on 
record that there was a funding issue with educational support to remote areas due to 
new mission requirements.  We also wanted to continue the message of quality of life 
initiatives that support the attracting and retaining of a high quality force.  The draft 
went up the chain of command to the office of the EUCOM Commander in Belgium 
where the staff inserted it into his Congressional testimony.  Small adjustments in the 
writing occurred along the way specific to EUCOM’s support of DoDEA as follows:  
The quality of the President’s school system, managed by the Department of 
Defense Education Activity, is a major contributor to the Quality of Life of 
European Command members.  European Command’s system is a benchmark 
for other school systems and we need your continued support and funding to 
ensure we maintain high educational standards.  We continue to work 
collaboratively with the Department of Defense Education Activity to ensure 
funding for programs such as the Virtual School for our approximately 2,000 
students in the European Command region located in areas with no school.  
Because funding for educational support in remote areas has not kept pace with 
new mission requirements, we need your support for this leading edge 
educational system for our youth.  We are now just beginning to see the effect of 
nearly $100M to replace our schools, many of which are 1950’s barracks.  We 
must continue funding this endeavor in future years.  We look forward to 
sustaining the recent accomplishments in Quality of Life and base infrastructure.  
Taking care of people enhances readiness.  In the short term, it enables the 
military services to attract and retain the high quality force our mission 
demands.  (Hearing on national defense authorization act for fiscal year 2011 
and oversight of previously authorized programs before the committee on armed 
services house of representatives one hundred eleven congress second session, 
2010, p. 90) 
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The actual transcript was surprisingly difficult to find although I easily found the 
preceding and subsequent testimonies.  If I did not have a hand in writing the draft 
section on dependent education, I would not have known of its existence.  While 
looking for the testimony it occurred to me to read the documents found to see if there 
were any prior or subsequent mentions of NDSP or quality of life wording.  Those 
posture statements provided a summary account of the command priorities, outlined the 
activities, accomplishments, and challenges for each of EUCOM’s service components 
(United States Air Forces in Europe, United States Army in Europe, Naval Forces 
Europe, Marine Forces Europe and Special Forces Europe) and highlighted 
international and interagency partnerships.  This document specifically mentioned 
USAFE’s role in the activation of the Strategic Airlift Consortium (SAC) in Papa, 
Hungary (also called the Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW) and concluded that it was “a 
watershed event in international military cooperation” (2010, p. 70).  The testimony 
noted the creation of a new Civilian Deputy Commander position at EUCOM.  These 
are all examples that make up the politics stream. 
Kingdon’s research continued that to move agendas along there must be some 
type of “policy entrepreneur” who is a person “willing to invest their resources in 
pushing their pet proposals or problems, are responsible not only for prompting 
important people to pay attention, but also for coupling solutions to problems and for 
coupling both problems and solutions to politics” (Kingdon, 1984, p. 21).  As 
previously mentioned in the literature review, due to the structure of the council system 
where the components are attended by the highest level of seniority (for example, 
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EUCOM is a four star member) meetings are often attended by lower ranking officials 
who receive their information from an even lower ranking member.  
Policy Entrepreneur 
Kingdon (1984) outlined three qualities of policy entrepreneurs as someone who 
has some claim to a hearing (expertise, ability to speak for others, authoritative decision 
making position); is known for political connections or negotiating skills; is persistent, 
give talks, write papers, send letters, and is willing to invest resources (p. 189).  
Kingdon’s policy entrepreneur concept specifically pairs well with leadership theory 
concerning types of people.  Motivation theories provide insight into individual actions 
within groups and organizations ranging from doing things because a superior delegated 
or tasked the responsibility, to more altruistic behavior or, because it is the right thing to 
do.  Other reasons include the lack of choice, social ingratiation, repaying a debt, or 
hoping for future favors.  In small group theory literature, groups rarely consider 
alternatives that are not advocated by at least one member (Poole & Hollingshead, 
2005, p. 29).  The distinction with policy entrepreneurs is the deliberate action to push 
issues and to connect people and resources.  
 
Figure 7.  Kingdon's Streams  
Policy Windows 
Finally, the policy window is an opportunity for policy entrepreneurs to push 
solutions for their issues.  This window is predictable based on budget cycles or 
changes in leadership, or it can be very unpredictable.  For my research, theoretically, a 
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Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) event (something major happened suddenly that 
prompted quick reactions) and Kingdon’s window of opportunity exist at the same time, 
which equates to the decision point of the creation of the task force and serves as the 
point from which I organized organizational memory on the formation of the task force: 
 
Figure 8.  Relation of Punctuated Equilibrium to Window of Opportunity 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) 
Jones and Baumgartner (2005) stated that studies are rare that use interviews and 
process tracing of government documents to understand causes of Punctuated 
Equilibrium Theory (PET) (p.14).  Hayes (2008) summarized another benefit as 
“Punctuated equilibrium theory broadens the scope of the policy making community to 
include, both the political institutions in the form of policy monopolies as well as public 
mobilization…Stakeholders mobilization is a major influence for dynamic policy 
change” (p. 26).  For my current case, I proposed that certain nodes and ties within the 
school council network mobilized other nodes to elevate the issues of NDSP in a short 
time period.  Additionally, there was a window of opportunity to push agendas.  This 
opportunity included changes in military leadership and pending changes in DoDEA 
leadership that contributed to the agreement to review the NDSP program.  My 
interviews and review of extant texts add to this small group of studies on PET.  In 
addition, returning to previous research, Wright’s (2000) report outlined reasons for the 
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deterioration of the relationship between DoDEA and the military command.  Wright 
concluded that there was a change in leadership, reorganization, and changes in military 
missions.  While ten years earlier, this matches the conditions surrounding the decision 
to create the Non-DoD Schools Program. 
Figure 9.  Sample Timeline Applied to Kingdon’s Streams and PET 
Conclusion 
In this section, I summarized research related to organizational change, network, 
and leadership theories.  I defined my theoretical framework and the role of Punctuated 
Equilibrium Theory in the discussion.  Finally, I presented a graphic representation of 
the theoretical framework as applied to the timeframe that led up to the decision to 
create the Non-DoD Schools Program Task Force.  Although a variety of research exists 
related to organizational change in military organizations, my research focused on the 
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decision-making process leading up to the expected change.  I took into account the 
external and environmental factors that affect decision-making such as leadership and 
the connected network of organizations and relationships.  The role of theory is 
important in the design phase of a case study.  To this end, I used Kingdon’s (1984) 
research on pushing agendas in political environments to form the theoretical 
framework for my proposal.  The key elements of a policy entrepreneur connect to 
leadership qualities while the policy window allows for a discussion of timing of events 
and a treatment of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET).  Since I identified a possible 
comparable timeframe in 2000 where developing issues came to a head, caused conflict, 
and produced an actionable result, Kingdon’s policy entrepreneur or multiple 







Methodology and Methods 
“Empirical research advances only when it is accompanied by theory and logical inquiry, and 
not when treated as a mechanistic data collection endeavor” (Yin, 2009, p. xiii) 
Introduction 
 In order to investigate the circumstances that surrounded the decision to create 
the Non-DoD Schools Program Task in the spring of 2010, my overall research design 
took into account the five components of a case study design as outlined by Yin (2009).  
Previously, I addressed the study’s questions, propositions, and logic linking data to the 
propositions.  In this section, I focus on the remaining two components: unit of analysis 
and criteria for interpreting findings identified prior to data collection.  First, I address 
the use of qualitative methods and the choice of a case study design.  Next, I identify 
my unit of analysis as the decision-making process within the school council network.  
Then, I include a summary of my three sources of data and data collection procedures 
that contains a discussion on researcher reflexivity and memoing.  Prior to the section 
on data sets, I address the process of receiving Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
approval.  Finally, I discuss the validity and reliability of the research. 
Qualitative Research 
 Qualitative methods are most appropriate for understanding the relationships 
and complex decision making situations that occurred within the school council 
network; “Using qualitative methods can document participant and stakeholder 
perspectives, engage them in process, and represent different interests and values in the 
programmes” (Simons, 2009, p. 18).  Qualitative methods are also most suitable for 
capturing individual’s perceptions of actions taken and his or hers interpretation of 
55 
 
meaning.  In addition, the quality and meaning of networks are illuminated using 
qualitative methods.  An example, found in Gersick, Bartunek, and Dutton’s (2000) 
article on the importance of professional relationships, concluded that “existing research 
has tended to focus on the structure of relationships and not on the meaning of the ties 
that compose networks” (p. 1029).  Through my research I sought to understand the 
meaning of those ties with respect to how they influenced (facilitated or denigrated) the 
process of decision-making and advancement of personal and organizational agendas. 
Case Study 
Due to the nature of my study that included an interaction among and between 
leadership, a variety of social and professional networks, and the historical conditions 
considered, case study methods were a good fit.  In A Case for the Case Study, Snow 
and Anderson (1991) concluded that 
Case study embodies the following characteristics: they are relatively holistic 
analyses of systems of action that are bounded socially, spatially, and 
temporally; they are multi-perspectival and polyphonic; they tend toward 
triangulation; they allow for the observation of behavior over time and thus 
facilitate the processual analysis of social life; and they have an open-ended, 
emergent quality.  (p. 152)  
  
Case study methods allow the flexibility of combining data from multiple sources. 
Several researchers defined case study: by Stake (1995) as the unit of study 
holistically, by Yin (2009) as a process, and by Merriam (1998) as a product.  Since my 
focus was primarily the process of agenda setting and decision-making within the 
school council network it was appropriate to use Yin (2002, 2009) to design the case 
study.  Yin (2002, 2009) stated that case study is preferred when one seeks answers to 
why/how questions; inquirer has little control over events being studied; contemporary 
phenomenon in a real-life context; and there are multiple sources of evidence.  This is a 
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single case design (Yin, 2009, p. 46) to establish meaning of events and circumstances 
related to the leadership and decision making within the school council network.  The 
choice of the decision to form the Non-DoD Schools Program Task Force in 2010 stems 
from a specific type of case study: “Intrinsic case studies are undertaken when a 
researcher wants to better understand a particular case.  It is not undertaken primarily 
because it represents other cases or because it illustrates some particular trait, 
characteristic, or problem.  Rather, it is because of its uniqueness or ordinariness that a 
case becomes interesting (Berg, 2009; Creswell, 1998, 2007; Stake, 1994, 2000).  My 
case was a unique opportunity to look at the symbiotic relationship between the military 
and a civilian run organization that share a common leader and financial source yet 
serve different purposes. 
Process Tracing and Timelines 
Timing was an important concept in the reviewed literature.  Using case study 
methods, I was able to address process tracing, analysis of contributing factors, 
backwards mapping, key event analysis, and actor’s transactions, decisions, and 
involvement over time.  Again, the specific incident of decision making to form the 
NDSP Task Force was the event.  Kingdon’s Policy Window was the opportunity for 
advocates of proposals to push solutions.  I used Rusaw’s (2001) definition of event as a 
unit of time and reference point from which memories are organized and structured.  I 
borrowed from development of Grounded Theory to establish further the grounds for 
choosing to follow issues through the school council network: “A process consists of 
unfolding temporal sequences that may have identifiable markers with clear beginning, 
end, and benchmarks in between.  The temporal sequences are linked in a process and 
lead to change.  Thus, single events become linked in a process and lead to change” 
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(Charmaz, 2006, p. 10).  In this case, the decision to create a task force is an implied 
need for change and thus serves as an intermediary step in the process rather than as an 
indicator of change.  
Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis is the decision-making process within the school council 
network.  Included in the parameters of this system are the specific education advisory 
committees as outlined in DoD Instruction 1342.15, “Educational Advisory Committees 
and Councils,” dated March 27, 1987, as well as the network of avenues, enumerated in 
the Prologue, by which an organization communicated and resolved any education 
related issue.  To limit the scope of this system I focused on the primary interactions 
among the United States European Command (EUCOM) with its Component 
Commands and the Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) and its 
Department of Defense Dependents Schools- Europe (DoDDS-Europe). 
Obtaining Institutional Review Board (IRB) Approval 
In May 2015, prior to formal data collection, I sought Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) approval from the University of Oklahoma (OU).  Concurrently, I 
submitted a formal research study request packet, per DoDEA Administrative 
Instruction 2071.3, through DoDEA’s research division.  My intent for the interviews 
was to talk with personnel to include the current DoDEA Deputy Director who was the 
former DoDDS-Europe Deputy Director, the new DoDEA Chief of Legislation who 
was one of my superiors as the J-1 at EUCOM, and the Chief of Staff of DoDDS-
Europe who I worked with daily.  Another potential interview was the new Non-DoD 
Schools Program (NDSP) director who was in charge of the partnership program 
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leading up to the 2010 timeframe.  In addition, I designed my original data collection 
plan with a focus on institutional documents such as the council and working group 
agendas, educational council meeting minutes and after action reports.  “A great deal of 
attention must be given to why particular documents are to be constructed and why 
other materials are never recorded” (Sjoberg, Williams, Vaughan, & Sjoberg, 1991, p. 
72).  I defined agenda as the literal topics as seen on the actual meeting agenda, and 
anticipated that personal agendas would come out through interviews.   
I planned to conduct a narrative analysis of the agendas for the Dependents 
Education Council (DEC) and the working group and pre-councils, such as EUCOM’s 
European Schools Council (ESC), that fed into the agenda setting process to discover 
where, when and how the topic of NDSP came to the forefront of discussion.  For 
example, per DoD Instruction 1342.15, the DEC and Theater Education Councils (TEC) 
such as the ESC should meet two times a year and produce specific agendas and reports.  
In addition, as mentioned in the prologue, the Component Commander Advisory 
Councils (CCACs) also produced consolidated reports that they submitted to DoDEA.  I 
believed the educational council agendas, meeting minutes and after action reports 
would show the level of engagement and starting points for issues related to NDSP and 
provide better insight into the process of advancing the agenda that led to the decision 
to create the task force.  For example, if I am new to an organization I may assume that 
the issues I am pushing is my own organization’s issue while in essence it came from a 
completely different place and for different reasons.    
Neither the OU IRB nor DoDEA would approve the research without approval 
first from the other.  OU finally agreed to approve contingent on DoDEA approval.  
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After two months, I received emails that the decision makers for the task force were no 
longer with DoDEA (despite the ones that are still there as mentioned above).  
Furthermore, the documents I requested were not available or classified (regardless of 
the fact that all meetings were public and the agendas and minutes were always 
transmitted over unclassified email (in other words, not classified)).  Therefore, there 
would be little benefit to DoDEA to support the research.  I had the opportunity to 
reengage through several emails but after receiving the response that all the documents 
were no longer available or classified (but I was told that the program was just fine), I 
decided to proceed using only publically available documents and participants.  I 
considered contacting the people who I knew personally within DoDEA, however as a 
researcher, I followed the formal process and so deemed the response final.  I also 
suspected that a work around would only contribute to biasing any potential 
participants.  (Reference Document Database, Consolidated Memos, Tab 11a) 
Due to my experience working in this system, I planned for the answer “no” by 
building in the parallel use of publically available documents and people (those who 
were no longer working for the elements associated directly with the school council 
system).  At the end of July when I received DoDEA’s response, I rewrote my IRB 
submission that included an IRB request to highlight that no military or civilians 
currently affiliated with the organizations would participate.  Furthermore, I could not 
use any documents previously acquired prior to IRB approval that were not publically 




Sources of Data 
 In this section, I focus on my three sources of data.  Prior to collecting publically 
available documents and conducting semi-structured interviews, I constructed a 
narrative from personal academic writings and reading notes, memories, and memos.  
After I received IRB approval, I enhanced the discussion with an analysis of publically 
available documents after which I conducted the interviews.  Finally, I triangulated the 
data to identify primary themes and comparable narratives. 
Researcher Reflexivity and Memos 
Prior to data collection, I acknowledged that my own involvement in the chosen 
case both limited and enhanced my role as researcher.  However, “as qualitative 
researchers engaged in contemporary practice, we accept that the researcher is a central 
figure who influences, if not actively constructs, the collection, selection and 
interpretation of data” (Finlay, 2002, p. 212).  From my initial draw toward qualitative 
research methods that involve the uncovering of meaning from multiple points of view 
and to my belief that one must include some structure and process when dealing with 
people in order to understand the conditions in which actions and feelings occurred, I 
already influenced my choices for design and theoretical framework.   
Finlay (2002) described five variants of reflexivity: introspection; 
intersubjective reflection; mutual collaboration; social critique; and discursive 
deconstruction.  Reflexivity as intersubjective reflection and social critique are pertinent 
due to the different rank and title positions of the participants in relation to me as their 
former employee or colleague and now in the role of the researcher.  With regard to my 
prior involvement in the chosen case, introspection is also appropriate.  However, “the 
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challenge for researchers using introspection is to use personal revelation not as an end 
in itself but as a springboard for interpretations and more general insight” (Finlay, 2002, 
p. 215).  This is why I organized my own written accounts prior to IRB approval and 
before I conducted any interviews or further data collection.  My Prologue serves as an 
initial recollection of events and timing from my perspective. 
For my Prologue, I sought to capture my memories and understandings from my 
perspective though I incorporated a few publically available documents such as 
directives and regulations to provide a clearer understanding of the structured, 
networked context in which I worked.  The findings and conclusions section of this 
research address any discrepancies between my memories and articles or data from 
interviews.  As data collection progressed, both in the development of my theoretical 
framework  before document collection and interviews,  then later through the actual 
data collection and analyses, I compiled examples of notes, diagrams, drawings, and 
memos to self that showed the progression of my thoughts (Document Database, TAB 
13 and 14).  For example, during my coursework and literature review phase I 
systematically took notes while reading (Document Database, TAB 13 b-j).  Usually I 
wrote quotes and key points on the right side of a notebook then if I had a thought or 
reflection I would jot it down on the left side.  I usually wrote “me:” to show it was an 
original thought or personal reflection.  To illustrate this point, when I read Kingdon’s 
Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy in January 2014, next to the memo: Pg.123 
Policy Communities: composed of specialists in a given policy arena…have in common 
one area…common interaction, I wrote, me: DoDEA council system is policy 
community…use this as framework.  Next to a note about policy entrepreneurs I wrote, 
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“me: this is key, believe people like ___, but I want to understand if they were aware or 
“just doing job” (Document Database, TAB 11, 3i).  These types of memos provide 
insight into my thoughts that shaped the direction for this research.  I engaged in the 
process of reflexivity and memoing throughout the duration of my research (Document 
Database, TAB 13 and 14). 
Publically Available Documents 
There were multiple avenues to acquire publically available documents to 
include the Department of Defense Education Activity website that contains all policies 
and legislation guidance, public affair releases for the years 2003-2015, budget books 
for 2003-2015, and is the home site for information for parents on the administration of 
the Non-DoD Schools Program.  Other repositories of public documents and research 
included the websites for RAND Corporation, Education Resources Information Center 
(ERIC), Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), and the Congressional 
Research Service.  I reviewed documents that included policies and legislation, 
organizational budgets, military construction budgets, congressional testimony, 
Inspector General reports, newspaper articles, DoDEA Public Releases, documents on 
the Non-DoD Schools Program website, Teacher Union Newsletters, education council 
products such as presentation slides, and research conducted by organizations such as 
RAND and the Congressional Research Institute. 
I identified approximately 125 publically available documents deemed germane 
to this research due to specific reference to at least one facet of the theoretical 
framework or relevance to illuminating some circumstance surrounding the decision to 
create the task force and organized them according to the following categories: After 
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Action Reports/Minutes/Meeting Presentation/Briefings (TAB 1), Agendas (TAB 2), 
Budget Books (TAB 3), Congressional Hearings/Testimony (TAB 4), Policies, 
Directives, Instructions, Regulations, Memorandums and Guidance (TAB 5), Executive 
Summaries (TAB 6), Newspaper Articles (TAB 7), Press Releases (TAB 8), Legislation 
(TAB 9), Miscellaneous (TAB 10), and Reports/Research (TAB 11).  The TAB 
designates their location in the physical document database (see Appendix F for Case 
Study Document Database Table of Contents for full list of documents). 
Data Collection and Analysis for Documents 
Yin’s (2009) inclusion of Miles and Huberman (1994) provided the suggestion 
to “play” with the data by arranging information into arrays, making matrixes of 
categories, and creating data display such as graphics (p. 129).  To this end, I recorded 
ideas in a variety of ways to include drawings and memos (Document Database, TAB 
14, c-f).  To organize information chronologically, I added points to my initial timeline 
(based from the memo “Awareness of Events” dated January 2015) (see Appendix E, 
Diagram 8 for timeline).  The bulk of the documents were located and organized with a 
preliminary analysis of themes prior to the interviews.   
During document collection, I kept in mind the general theoretical propositions 
and related theories as previously outlined.  I read for specific mention of a significant 
event, a leadership reference, quality of life reference, politics, policies, problems, and 
status quo.  Early searches on the actual Non-DoD Schools Program Task Force and 
education council agendas such as the DEC and ESC produced zero results.  I did 
however find a few council briefings from 2004 posted by Installation Management 
Agency (IMA) before the transition to Installation Management Command (IMCOM).  
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The presentations showed the issue of overcrowded schools elevated from the 
community level Army Family Action Plan (AFAP) process as well as an example of 
DoDEA adapting to support the military based on new operational requirements.  For 
example, during the Army in Europe Component Commander Advisory Council 
(CCAC), DoDDS briefed the following modified eligibility: “Modifications to DoDDS 
Eligibility Operation Iraqi Freedom: DoDDS-E will authorize space available tuition-
free enrollment of a student placed in the care of a temporary guardian by a single or 
dual-military parent deployed in support of OIF” (Installation Management Agency, 
2004).  These modifications or exceptions to policy occur frequently in the documents 
and show a willingness to find a solution to emerging problems. 
I read all of the public releases on DoDEA’s website for the years 2002 to 2015 
and used my preliminary timeline to capture leadership changes and references to new 
programs or activities such as the development of the Virtual School and Partnership 
Branch Grant Program (See Appendix E, Diagram 8, Timeline of Events 2000-2011).  
While I read, I noted broad categories of topics of leadership changes, budgets, military 
construction projects, new programs, and events, which led to using those as labels on 
the timeline.  Eventually I used the larger themes of Events, Decisions, New 
Organizations, New Programs, New Commanders or Directors, Process Changes, New 
Local Programs, Name Changes, and Ongoing Products. 
The DoDEA website also contained the budget books from 2003-2015 which I 
strictly read looking for figures on the Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP) and Military 
Construction (MILCON) (See Appendix E, Diagrams 4 and 5 for consolidated 
numbers).  I located other documents and presentations with NDSP numbers from 
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various websites not affiliated with DoDEA and noted an inconsistency with the 
numbers (see Appendix E, Diagram 6 for comparisons).  Other documents provided 
data points for the timeline.  From the documents and timeline, I then created a focused 
Preliminary Leadership Changes Chart for the years 2007-2010 (see Appendix E, 
Diagram 7).  After the interviews, I created the final Positional Leadership Changes 
Chart (see Figure 10).  In addition to the budget and leadership charts, several public 
releases provided data points for the timeline.   
Other documents found on the DoDEA NDSP specific part of the website 
included highlighted changes in policy in 2008 regarding reimbursement for costs 
associated with school uniforms.  This and the 2005 guidance on student placement for 
NDSP correspond with the timing of the decision to close the DoDEA run boarding 
school England.  In some instances, I found that exceptions to policy outlined on the 
website, in 2015, were not included in the policy document.   
During the publically available document collection, I gathered articles and 
research that provided insight and new layers into the activities of the multiple 
organizations connected to DoDEA’s school council network.  For example, several 
documents developed by Sullivan (2008), were helpful in illustrating and reiterating 
some of the seemingly convoluted processes that occurred during this time such as the 
Joint Strategic Planning System (see Appendix E, Diagram 2) and the Four Year 
Integrated Defense Planning Cycle (see Appendix E, Diagram 3).  I chose these to add 
another dimension to the understanding of the processes that converged on the 2010 
timeframe.  One document of specific interest was “The Unified Command Plan and 
Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress” (Feickert 2013).  This is 
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a digestible compilation of information geared toward the decision-makers in Congress.  
On the surface, it is a quick summary aimed at providing a geographical review and 
overview of each Combatant Command such as EUCOM and US Africa Command.  
The broad worldwide scope is a good start for the uninitiated and one graphic in 
particular provided a solid visual to understand the reach of the combatant commands  
which I addressed in this research (See Appendix B).  A senior army service member, 
who was not part of this research, validated my choice to use the Joint Strategic 
Planning System diagram when he commented, “Hate to tell you that these are the 
simple charts”  (Document Database, TAB 13a, Consolidated Memos dated January 25, 
2016). 
I perused Congressional Testimony and posture statements from 2007-2010 
looking for comments on quality of life and education initiatives.  In addition to finding 
a consistent message on the need for quality of life initiatives and increased funding for 
school military construction projects, I found discussion on activities such as the 
development of the Heavy Airlift Wing in Papa, Hungary, the creation of US Africa 
Command as a combatant command, and incident specific topics such as the 
significance of the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 as an indicator of changing 
relations and dynamics in NATO relationships. 
The documents tell the partial story of several organizations connected to the 
school council system to include their priorities, challenges, and transformations.  At 
times, the organizations connected to create success in obtaining increased funding for 
MILCON and established joint programs like the high school baseball program for 
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DoDDS- Europe.  Other documents, which I will address later, portrayed a negative 
light on certain organizations and specific positional leaders. 
Documents found “are useful even though they are not always accurate and may 
not be lacking in bias” (Yin, 2009, p. 103).  In my work with the military, we had a 
saying of “Trust but verify”.  To this end, I did not use uncorroborated documents.  
Alternatively, to offset this concern, I used multiple data sources and asked interviewees 
to confirm information or data points.  For example, the discrepancy in the NDSP 
budgets created an opportunity for discussion with one respondent who had in depth 
knowledge on the reasons for discrepancies.  This led to the revelation that during this 
time DoDEA was centralizing NDSP under the headquarters.  I inquired about another 
document that appeared to reflect a possible outcome of the NDSP task force.  The Dear 
Parent letter dated 2013 stated “after review of the program” and listed several changes 
(NDSP Letter to Parents SY2013-2014, 2013).  When I looked to verify that DoDEA 
made the changes to the DoD Instruction as stated in the letter, I found there were no 
changes.  During a follow up discussion, I learned that this was not a product of the task 
force but from a review when a new manager took over.  The following year a new 
legal counsel reviewed all policies and changes and subsequently invalidated the 
changes in policy.   
Similarly if a topic mentioned was not identified in the initial document review, 
I went back to look for a reference.  This occurred in the initial London Dorm closure 
conversations.  I had a cursory idea that it was an event that occurred during the time of 
interest but the fact that four interviews independently named it as a possible source of 
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the beginning of the major problems facing NDSP I determined it warranted additional 
consideration (which I do in chapter 5).  
 Another area where the documents were confusing was the use of names.  For 
example, the review of budget books shows NDSP as the Non-DoD Tuition Program 
(NDTP) prior to 2006.  The DoDEA Annual report of 2010 refers to DoDDS-Europe, 
DoDDS-Pacific, and DDESS as DoDEA-Europe, DoDEA-Pacific, and DoDEA 
Americas.  I remember that DoDEA asked us to start using DoDEA-Europe rather than 
DoDDS-E and that the reason was the headquarters was attempting to create a unified 
“Team DoDEA” that was not fractured by regions.  
Despite the plethora of research, documents, websites, policy papers, and 
newspaper articles, there was no mention of the NDSP task force (though several 
sources referenced the other academic task forces conducted during that time) and no 
publically available agendas, minutes, or presentations relevant.  Due to the lack of 
information, I extended my search to the Pacific region and found a Dependent 
Education Council list of attendees and an agenda from 2010 that did not reference 
NDSP.  Once I set my interview dates, I reviewed the documents again and finalized the 
leadership change chart and timeline so that the respondents could review the 
information.  I also prepared some additional questions to seek clarification specific to 
the individuals in light of the information.   
Participants 
Prior to obtaining OU IRB approval, I identified 33 potential participants for this 
research based on their connection to DoDEA and EUCOM during the target dates of 
2007-2010.  Each participant had an active role as a representative of an organization 
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networked through the school council system.  The choice of the council system 
naturally led to a mix of different perspectives, different pay grades, military services, 
former military service members, educators, non-educators, positional leaders, action 
officers, garrison, or base level through combatant command levels well as a variation 
of roles as stakeholders and decision-makers. 
Following IRB approval and the agreement to use publically available 
documents and individuals only, I eliminated 18 potential participants due to lack of a 
public address or since they still worked as a DoD civilian with an involved 
organization.  I recruited potential participants via email and LinkedIn.  I emailed 15 
requests to participate based on the University of Oklahoma’s templates (see Appendix 
H).  All potential participants had at least one encounter with me in my role as 
education liaison.  The email also contained the consent to participate form (see 
Appendix H).  Of the 15 requests, eight did not respond and one gave a negative 
response.  I received six positive responses (one was originally a “no” but reconsidered 
after clarification on the context of the interview).  Each signed and returned the 
consent to participate form prior to arranging the interview. 
Data Collection and Analysis for Interviews 
I conducted the interviews, five in-person, and one via Skype, from October 9, 
2015 to November 18, 2015.  Prior to each interview, I reviewed the informed consent 
form and highlighted the section stating not to share any classified or restricted 
information by the Department of Defense or any affiliated unit or agency.  As 
requested by the University of Oklahoma Institutional Review Board, I specifically 
instructed the respondents to refrain from using names.  Due to the small number of 
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respondents and the possibility of deductive re-identification, I chose to refer each by 
number.  For all interviews, I used an outline of the OU IRB approved research 
questions (see Appendix H) as a template to capture notes during the interview.  After 
each interview, the respondents (except the one conducted via Skype) had the 
opportunity to review the timeline and leadership charts.  For certain interviews, as 
previously mentioned, I asked for clarification on specific publically acquired 
documents. 
Five of the six respondents permitted audio recording.  For the interviews with 
recordings, I transcribed the interview within 24 hours then memoed to connect points 
to previously identified themes and topics and noted any anomalies (Document 
Database, TAB 10 a-f).  I deleted each audio recording after completing the 
transcription.  After each interview, I matched findings similar to the documents and 
previous interviews while noting any contrasting or new information.  I added new data 
points or noted similar mentions of an event on the timeline (Document Database, TAB 
12, Diagram g).   
After I removed all identifying information such as name, position, or rank, I 
sent the interview transcripts to each respondent to review for concurrence.  For the one 
interview without audio recording, which happened to be the first interview, I chose to 
provide a synopsis of themes and my condensed notes for concurrence.  The relevant 
events and themes identified during the interviews included discussion on the Korean 
Transformation, closing of the London Dorm, the role of the military spouse, 
perspectives regarding DoDEA’s ability to affect change, relationships, and certain 
leadership qualities and actions.  Specifically I shared the following memo: 
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Use of word relentless – I do not plan to use this as a direct quote but will absorb 
it into section on leadership/policy entrepreneur that is consistent throughout 
each interview, not from a positional use of rank but more as the quality of 
persistence.  The relevance relates to how one is perceived yet interestingly 
enough it is not in a negative vein (relevant I suppose to which side of the 
outcome one is on) but as in more of an awareness that this particular person 
will continue to persist and explore any means necessary to achieve a given 
objective.  Reputation as results oriented and ability to navigate relationships, 
processes, and systems.  (Document Database, TAB 10, Document a) 
 
My first interview recommended a book by Robert Gates, the Secretary of 
Defense during the time leading up to the decision to create the Non-DoD Schools 
Program task force.  The following memo provides insight into my reaction:  
When speaking about this time he referenced Robert Gates book Duty and 
encouraged a reading of it to see if and how he mentioned DoDEA.  I debated 
with myself for several hours after learning about the six hundred plus page 
book.  I was curious to know the historical content and the personal insights of 
the Secretary of Defense.  Yet, I wondered if my focus would pull from the 
almost completed document review and theme development and conclusion 
writing.  There was the fear that I had not considered certain aspects of the 
higher political echelon.  (Did I need to go that high?)  I chose to read the 
introduction and first chapter and surprisingly found a story that was similar to 
my own and later to those I interviewed.  After the first 50 pages or so, I realized 
that I could read the book as if it were conducting an interview using my 
questions.  (Document Database, from Consolidated Memos, TAB 11a) 
 
With the exceptions of the specific decision to create the task force and no 
mention of DoDEA, the memoirs that I found were similar stories of leadership, 
qualities, bureaucracy, the weight of position, personal connection to decision-making 
and the ultimate motivation of taking care of our troops.  As evidenced in my memo 
dated October 15, 2015, Gates verified multiple aspects of my recollection of events 
leading up to the 2010 decision to create the task force:  
To say that I took a trip down memory lane with Gates is appropriate.  The 
decision to extend deployments was made while my brother was sitting in Iraq 
(deployed) and we all wondered if he would be home for the birth of his 
daughter.  The review of JIEDDO (Joint IED (Improvised Explosive Device) 
Defeat Organization)) tapped my knowledge of a longtime family friend (a 
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student cadet of my father’s when he taught at West Point) who chose to deploy 
twice as a Civilian even after serving a complete career as an Army officer.  And 
the effects of BRAC (Base Realignment and Closure) and the debate on the 
surge and drawdown of BCTs (Brigade Combat Teams) in locations like 
Baumholder, Germany (a location) that I saw when I was asked to go to support 
their WTU (Warrior Transition Unit) only to find that the shiny new renovations 
and quality of life “stuff” for wounded warriors did not make it there because 
the Garrison was on the BRAC list.  This was the largest group at almost 100 
soldiers in a WTU in Europe and yet decisions made years in advance precluded 
the unit from actually getting the support triggered by the entire Walter Reed 
event.  The years on which Gates reflected align with the focal years leading up 
to May 2010.  I lived the times of Walter Reed, working to unravel the 
complicated dynamics of a dysfunctional system in order to explain how it 
might be fixed or worked around.  (Document Database, Consolidated Memos, 
TAB 11a) 
 
Furthermore, I plotted new events from the book on the timeline that subsequent 
interviews reiterated such as the development of the missile defense program, the repeal 
of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT), the creation of Cyber Command, and references to 
the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process.  Then considering in summer 
2009, I attended the change of command ceremony for the new EUCOM Commander in 
Stuttgart, Germany, over which Gates officiated, it seemed appropriate to include his 
memoir. 
Following the completion of the interviews and after sending the transcripts for 
review and verification, I did not “play” with the data as I had the documents.  Since I 
designed the interview questions to elicit an understanding of events based on my 
theoretical framework (for example, to understand the rival theories I asked, “Was the 
creation of the task force an anomaly or expected action?”)  (See Appendix D for 
categorized list of questions), I chose instead to analyze the transcripts using the 
categories related to my theoretical propositions and to reflect a general understanding 
of circumstances.  The use of the previously identified Questions to Ask of This Case 
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(see Appendix D) produced the categories based on my theoretical framework of 
Politics, Problems, Policies, Window of Opportunity, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, 
Leadership, Policy Entrepreneur, Circumstances and Miscellaneous (Document 
Database, TAB 12).  The category of miscellaneous related to answers given when 
asked if there was anything else relevant.  I found that miscellaneous and circumstances 
were vague enough that I could have combined both.  Given that I used Gate’s memoir 
to add information to the compiled timeline I organized my 27 pages of reading notes 
for his book (Document Database, Tab 11j) as if they were from an interview 
(Document Database, TAB 10g).  The result produced a more comprehensive view of 
the range of political and personal interactions from my level on up to the Secretary of 
Defense.  This compilation served as the base for my narrative analysis in Chapters 
Four and Five.   
I used interview data to cross check document data and vice versa.  In the event 
of new information or a recommendation, for example “add DDESS leadership,” or 
“add P&R leadership,” I returned to documents or conducted a new search.  This led to 
further focus on the levels of leadership positions where I found more references to 
name changes.  For example, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & 
Readiness) in FY2002, (based on (P.L. 107-107) post took over duties of Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy (then abolished), and the DUSD 
(P&R) redesignated Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & 
Readiness) in 2003 by DoD Directive 5124.8. yet as of 2012 is called the Principal 
Deputy.  This led to a memo where I questioned if name changes indicate the start of a 
reorganization and why would one want to disconnect from previous name?  While 
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inserting the personnel and readiness position I included the Military Community and 
Family Policy (MC&FP), another political positional level of DoDEA oversight that 
seemed a revolving door.  Later, one interview commented that I should note that the 
DoDEA Director did not leave in 2010 willingly.  I combined the additional information 
from the interviews and subsequent document review to produce the final leadership 
changes chart: 
 
Figure 10. Leadership Changes Chart 2007-2010 
I chose to remove the names of the individuals in order to highlight the number of 
vacant or new leaders during the time.  There are a remarkable number of positional 
leadership changes in the 2007-2010 timeframe in contrast to the preceding years of 




Figure 11.  Timeline 2000-2010 






Figure 12.  Timeline 2007-2010 with Theoretical Framework 
The interviews provided insight into personal and organizational motivations 
and agendas, thought processes during decision-making, and reflections on the efficacy 
of the council system and external organizations.  Recurring messages highlighted the 
symbiotic relationships of the organizations, the need for multiple avenues for problem 
resolution to facilitate the connection between the proper fiscal and human resources 
and the effects of external geopolitical (such as the draw down in Europe) and fiscal 
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influences (such as budget cuts).  New themes emerged to include the role of the 
military spouse and spouse programs, the importance of mentoring, the military as an 
external forcing function to impel DoDEA to action, personal and job related 
motivations, and the importance of “boots on the ground” (you have to see it in person 
to decide or bring the decision-maker to the location to decide).  After the interviews I 
added the themes of “boots on the ground”, trust, and authority to the themes gleaned 
from the document collection.  I highlighted the themes of leadership, communication, 
and relationships as major factors in the time leading up to the decision to create the 
Non-DoD Schools Program task force. 
The use of the word leadership in the interviews was intentionally vague to 
allow answers to occur more organically.  Answers revealed actions, positions, 
dispositions, and qualities.  Collectively the top-level commander or director set the 
tone and message that education was a priority and, as a quality of life issue, it could 
have a detrimental impact on retention and readiness if not addressed.  This consistency 
of message was evident throughout the interviews, in congressional hearings, and policy 
and position papers.  The other leadership type responses conveyed that during this 
period the changes in certain leadership positions enabled a new review of old issues.  
Most salient is the alignment of certain characteristics during positional leadership 
changeovers.  For example, an internal focused minded leader of an organization 
(education and curriculum centric) changed to one focused on an external view of the 
organization predicated on personal connection and military awareness.  Similarly, a 
military leadership position transitioned from someone focused on local issues like 
fixing the individual’s location of residence to one focused strategically on the 
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combined issues of the entire European area of responsibility.  In other areas, the 
absence of senior leadership and multiple transitions enabled conversation and 
presentation of history and issues by lower level action officers (AOs) or subject matter 
experts (SMEs). 
I noticed a trend of speaking in “we” which could reflect on my earlier musing 
in the Prologue, of not ever really knowing who is the “we”.  My general impressions 
after the interviews included that interviewees had a predilection for the level of 
conversation and usually spoke in “we”.  One focused on the political-military level and 
national dynamics, one focused on reorganizations and planning in direct support of the 
warfighting effort while another spoke in terms of working the system and developing 
leaders.  Yet another took a more mentoring, historical approach while another spoke on 
how to get things done by finding the money or writing the legislation and that there 
was no real (or good) reason to not do something to fix a problem.  I noted other 
observations to include some used examples from work while others shared insights that 
are more personal to make a point.  The respondents came with a variety of 
backgrounds related to the military and/or schools.  While some had children in the 
schools or were former DoDDS students as military children, other simply had an 
assignment where schools were a priority. 
Due to the small number of respondents and the request by some for privacy, I 
chose to combine accounts for certain parts of the narrative using common information 
in the interviews and/or information substantiated by documental support.  This 
technique enabled a more cohesive narrative while preserving anonymity.  I document 
the compilations as (Combined Accounts). 
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Criteria for Interpreting Findings 
To establish criteria for interpreting the findings, Yin (2009) outlined four 
general strategies: 1) relying on theoretical propositions, 2) developing a case 
description 3) using both qualitative and quantitative data and 4) examining rival 
explanations.  He then offered five analytic techniques: 1) pattern matching, 2) 
explanation building; 3) time-series analysis, 4) logic models and 5) cross case 
synthesis.  This is the last step in the case study design.  I used time-series analysis, 
specifically compiling chronological events, as an analytic technique to look at timing 
of events and actions.  The documents collected provided the structure and sequence.  I 
used explanation building, which is a special type of pattern matching and is conducive 
to using narrative analysis.  The results of which are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
As expected, I found references to Kingdon’s three streams, some predictable 
windows of opportunity during leadership changeovers, and some type of policy 
entrepreneur and leadership as previously outlined so relying on theoretical propositions 
was appropriate to this research.  In addition, I examined a rival explanation as relevant 
with the addition of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory as well as the idea of simple status 
quo.  As Yin (2009) stated, “real life rivals are the ones that you should carefully 
identify prior to your data collection” (p.134).  As such, the two specific rivals relevant 
to this study are Rival Theory (a theory different from the original theory that explains 
it better) and Societal Rival (social trends, not any particular force or intervention 
account for the results) (Yin, 2009, p. 135).  In other words, was the push of the NDSP 
agenda item that resulted in the formation of the task force an anomaly and signal of 
unique circumstances or just status quo and natural progression of an organized school 
council process?  I discuss the actual findings in subsequent chapters through narrative 
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analysis.  According to Riessman (2003), what makes texts “narrative” is sequence and 
consequence.  The researcher selects, organizes, connects, and evaluates events as 
meaningful for a particular audience.  In addition, Gee (1991) asserts that this 
perspective is telling as it “refers to the fact that a narrative contains a point of view 
toward what happened, telling us what is significant” (Gee, 1991).  My narrative tells 
the story, not just of how the agendas advanced but what many perceived to be the 
genesis of the problem. 
Validity and Reliability 
A case study design is subject to scrutiny concerning construct, internal, and 
external validity as well as reliability.  During the research design phase I addressed 
construct validity with the proposal to use multiple sources of evidence, external 
validity with the identification of relevant theory, while pattern matching, explanation 
building and addressing rival theoretical explanations increased internal validity.  The 
use of pattern matching, time-series analysis, and addressing rival explanations during 
the data analysis phase increased the internal validity of the study.  Furthermore, I 
triangulated the three data sets.  The creation of a case study database of publically 
available documents, raw data transcripts and chronological memos increased reliability 
(see Appendix F for Case Study Document Database for Table of Contents). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I considered the merits of qualitative methods and specifically 
the use of case study methods, reflexivity, and memoing.  My unit of analysis was the 
decision making process of the school council network which includes the formal 
educational advisory committees process established by policy, as well as, the network 
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of military organizations.  I described my three data sets and summarized data 
collection and procedures.  I collected and examined publically available documents to 
establish the circumstances that led to the timeframe conducive for the creation of the 
NDSP Task Force.  I conducted semi-structured interviews to add to the discussion and 
to provide multiple perspectives on the genesis of and need for the task force as well as 
to establish the influencers such as leadership and organizational dynamics on decision-
making.  After transcribing the interviews (Document Database, TAB 10 a-f), I 
reviewed the transcripts specifically to look for Kingdon’s processes, policy 
entrepreneur, some window of opportunity and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory.  
Throughout I used researcher reflexivity and memoing.  Overall, I used my theoretical 
framework to organize and evaluate data relevant to Kingdon’s three streams, a window 
of opportunity, and some type of policy entrepreneur and leadership, as previously 
outlined.  In addition, I examined a rival explanation that this event was simply status 
quo and not indicative of anything unique.  I discuss the findings in the following two 
chapters.  Ultimately, this case study design provided the plan to conduct a systematic 
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the decision to form the NDSP Task Force 




Theoretical Framework and Explanation Building 
Conditions become defined as problems when we come to believe that we should do 
something about them.  (Kingdon, 1984, p. 115) 
Introduction 
In this Chapter, I return to the theoretical framework provided by Kingdon 
(1984) and employ the technique of explanation building (Yin 2009) to encapsulate why 
the topic of the Non-DoD School Program (NDSP) rose to the highest level of the 
educational council network.  First, I summarize the relevant organizational agendas 
and their relation to a common thread of Quality of Life priorities.  Next, I address the 
circumstances, identified in the interviews, which influenced the decision-making 
process in the 2007-2010 timeframe.  These include leadership changes, the budget, 
policy limitations, and organizational transformations, both short and long-term.  Then, 
I offer a graphic depiction of the summary of events that influenced the decision to 
create the NDSP task force.  Finally, I provide background on the internal decision-
making process that led to the agreement to form a task force.  The discussion 
culminates in Chapter Five with the answers to the questions: Given the expansive 
network of military and civilian personnel and leadership connected through the 
Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) school council network, often 
with competing priorities and multiple options for issue resolution, how did the topic of 
the Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP) become an actionable item on the highest level 
of the educational advisory committee and council system?  More specifically, how 
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were personal and organizational agendas advanced that culminated in the decision to 
create a Task Force to review Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP) issues worldwide? 
Publically available documents situated the event to create the task force, and 
provided confirmation of the timeline of memories while interviews elevated the 
discussion to the political-military, geopolitical realities of multiple organizations while 
providing day-to-day and organizational specific insights.  In his memoirs, Secretary of 
Defense Gates (2014) reflected on his impressions of the bureaucratic climate that 
shaped the Department of Defense:  
As of January 2007, even though the nation was waging two wars, neither of 
which we were winning, life at the Pentagon was largely business as usual when 
I arrived.  I found little sense of urgency, concern, or passion about a very grim 
situation.  No senior military officers, no senior civilians came to me breathing 
fire about the downward slide of our military and civilian war efforts in the 
wars, the need for more or different equipment or for more troops, or the need 
for new strategies or tactics. (p. 115) 
 
Later he provided a perspective on the office that had oversight of DoDEA that adds to 
the understanding of the larger political level influences during this time: 
Many of these matters came under the purview of the undersecretary of defense 
for personnel and readiness (P&R).  For that office, it seemed the status quo was 
satisfactory.  Virtually every issue I wanted to tackle with regard to health 
affairs (including deficiencies in Tricare, the military health insurance program, 
which I heard about continuously from those in uniform at every rank), 
wounded warriors, and disability evaluations encountered active opposition, 
passive resistance, or just plain bureaucratic obduracy from P&R. (Gates, 2014, 
p. 140) 
 
Contrary to this sense of stagnation were the seemingly frenetic activities of the 
Combatant Commands, their Component Commands, and DoDEA as they worked to 
implement the top down Presidential, Congressional, and previous Secretary of Defense 
mandates while executing day-to-day operations that directly affected the warfighters 
and their families.  
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Organizational Agendas and Quality of Life Priorities 
DoDEA was responsible for providing a quality education to certain civilian and 
military dependents even where there were no adequate educational opportunities.  The 
NDSP financially supported this obligation.  For several years leading up to the 2007-
2010 time frame, DoDEA pushed to create a reimbursement program where the money 
would come from the military commands rather than DoDEA’s budget.  “The money 
for the DoD school system comes straight out of the Armed Forces Service Committee 
it never went through Department of Education.  So the schools compete with planes, 
bombs, boats, ships, special ops for schooling in the Department of Defense” (Interview 
dated October 26, 2015).  This was a topic at the Dependents Education Council (DEC).  
At the heart of the issue was the military had the authority to ignore DoDEA’s 
recommendation to send a family into a country.  The core of DoDEA’s argument for a 
reimbursable program centered on removing DoDEA from the fiscal equation so then 
DoDEA would serve as the unbiased advisor, delivery mechanism, and the education 
input to inform the military commands of the educational options.  Then if the military 
service decided to send families to the location then the service would incur the cost 
over and above the normal cost, as allocated by the Department of State reimbursement 
regulation, rather than DoDEA (Interview dated October 26, 2015).   
The military agenda, depending on the service, attempted to keep families 
together.  Collectively, the military focused on service member quality of life, and 
keeping the family unit intact as a condition of force readiness for the nation’s all-
volunteer force.  Overall, DoDEA and the NDSP are the support elements for education, 
but there is a strategic advantage for the operational military to work cooperatively with 
DoDEA to ensure proper support. 
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The overarching reason for the discussion on the Non-DoD Schools Program 
(NDSP) connects to the idea of quality of life.  An excerpt from a Naval Instruction 
sums up the variety of documents from the different military services on the topic: 
Commanders are responsible for providing the opportunity for a reasonable 
Quality of Life (QOL) for Navy personnel and their families.  It is both ethical 
and pragmatic for Navy leaders to care for their families – ethical because it is 
the right thing to do and pragmatic because caring for Sailors and their families 
directly impacts upon personal and job performance, retention, and readiness.  
(OPNAV Instruction 1754.1B, 2007) 
 
Even the First Lady of the United States embraced military family support as one of her 
advocacy platforms in 2009.  In her speech to the spouses of the joint staff in January 
2010, the First Lady highlighted the accomplishments and commitments to the military 
such as the increase in funding to build new schools from “Georgia to Germany” 
(House T. W., 2010).  Interviews confirmed that leaders at the top decision-making 
positions such as the Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commanders prioritized 
quality of life initiatives as a high priority.  The impact of quality of life on the military 
mission speaks to the importance of the NDSP.   
The following sections connect the events that those interviewed linked directly 
to a cause of the growing NDSP conversation.  After a broad discussion on the budget 
and military construction, I move to the specific organizational transformation of the 
administration of the Non-DoD Schools Program that centralized the program under 
DoDEA headquarters from 2002-2010.  This review compelled a new oversight that 
initially magnified the discrepancies in the program.  Next, I discuss larger 
organizational transformations that include the increase to NATO missions in remote 
locations, the creation of a new Combatant Command co-located with European 
Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany, and the development of the Heavy Airlift 
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Wing (HAW) in Papa, Hungary.  I incorporate the emerging focus on the Pacific region 
specific to the growth in the military mission in Korea as well as the concerns with the 
quality of education provided in Hawaii.  Then, I provide a synopsis of the 
unanticipated long-term effects of the decision by DoDEA, in coordination with a task 
force and EUCOM’s European School Council (ESC), to close the dormitory in 
London.  Finally, I address the role of leadership.  The choice of illustrative quotes and 
combined narratives provide insights into the decision-making thought process of these 
actions as well as a larger view of the actual military missions and activities that 
occurred outside of the educational conversation. 
Explanation Building 
When I initiated this research, I came in with the perception that the source of 
the conflict was the contentious discussion between DoDEA on one side saying that the 
military should pay when they overrule DoDEA’s recommendation to not send families 
to certain locations, and the military on the other side saying that DoDEA should pay 
since they are the element designed to support the military.  What I found was a level of 
nuance to the discussion and certain policy issues that prevented DoDEA from simply 
providing financial reimbursement to families.  Furthermore, I found a pattern of 
proactive engagement in the 2007-2010 period between military and civilian staffs to 
find solutions to an emerging problem set.  The military provided opportunities to 
address education issues through the Combatant Commanders Conferences, spouse 
programs, Quality of Life conferences in addition to the formal education council 
system.  Similarly, DoDEA facilitated a menu of exceptions to policy and provided 
access to personnel available to assist commanders that demonstrated an understanding 
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of circumstances faced by the military and families living overseas.  While the appeal 
was mostly to the budget, there was also the discussion on what one considers 
reasonable with regard to accessibility to a quality of education. 
Budgets and Military Construction 
 I admit that when I sit in a briefing, I tune out when someone briefs the 
budgets.  I listen for the “so what?” of the conversation such as what I heard regarding 
NDSP, “Our program doubled in the past two years without additional funds allocated.”  
I jumped on the train of indignation without considering that, in this case, 'they" went to 
a zero based budget so they had to look closely at requirements.  In addition, due to the 
consolidation of the NDSP from the regions, the numbers for several years did not add 
up or even match from briefing to briefing, as documents show.  Reporting numbers out 
of context provides an incomplete process but is a strategy used to stir up discussion.  
(Document Database, TAB 13a, from consolidated memos).  However, the reality is 
that the budget is usually the starting point of most conversations. 
Kingdon (1984) articulated, “Inserting funding proposal in an appropriations 
bill, for instance, may depend on the fortuitous absence of an articulate opponent” 
(p.199).  Fortunately, this was a time that there was consistent support for improving the 
facilities and school construction projects despite some political pushback to reduce the 
military presence overseas.  The additional influx of money from the 2010 National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
Enabled the Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) to begin 
School Year 2010-2011 with a major facilities renovation and construction 
initiative eventually resulted in the modernization of 134 schools worldwide 
according to an August 2010 news source.  The initiative started in October with 
the beginning of Fiscal Year 2011 and is scheduled to span the next several 
fiscal years through Fiscal Year 2016.  Close collaboration and cooperation 
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between DoDEA, The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 
the Military Services, the Department of Defense Comptroller, and the Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment resulted in a plan 
to address $3.7 billion in Military Construction (MILCON) needs for DoDEA 
facilities.  (Service, 2010) 
 
These injections were the exception, not the rule.  Overall: 
The budget was declining, how can we do this better, how can we be more 
relevant?  There was a big push inside the politics of America.  Why do we need 
all these bases overseas?  They are expensive...What’s the point?  And so, that 
brought up the theater security cooperation plans, the engagement plans and the 
detail to why should we remain engaged and I think the proof is in the pudding.  
Russia gave us more proof than we could ever hope to imagine...But politicians 
were looking at how can I save money?  It was in their best interest to build 
more barracks in...  name a place wherever.  Some Congressional personnel 
questioned why do we have all these facilities overseas when they should be in 
America and we are spending too much overseas and that money should be in 
America.  So, that was a continuous fight because everyone was focused on Iraq 
at the time.  Then focused on Iraq and then as we draw down everyone is 
focused on Afghanistan, and how do we make the budget dynamics work?  
What’s the geopolitical reason for maintaining a presence in Europe?  Europe is 
stable.  You know, Europe is stable because frankly from my perspective 
because we’re there and we enforce a level of presence...we enforce a level of 
leadership through our presence.  (Interview dated November 17, 2015) 
Everything’s about money, it’s always about money and follow the money is 
still very much you know the right lens.  Then once you follow the money 
it’s...are there certain authorities associated with the whole DoDEA enterprise.  
Well, what schools are you going to have where and can you build an additional 
school?  Can you get not only authorization but can you get the money to do 
this?  (Interview dated November 7, 2015) 
 
Despite the positive influx of MILCON money for education, there was not a push to 
increase funding for NDSP.  Rather the discussion was on what DoDEA or service 
members had to pay for due to policy issues.  For example, there were challenges with 
the Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP). 
Exceptional Family Member (EFMP) Policy Issues 
In the assignment policy system, within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
the DoD system had two requirements to go overseas.  You had a medical clearance that 
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the military cannot get around it.  If you did not get a medical clearance, you could not 
go to the next assignment.  The second clearance that was required was an educational 
clearance that was not mandatory.  If you received a recommendation that a family 
should not be there the military could still go ahead and send the family.  Even though 
these were small numbers, many times you had a situation that got economically 
unbelievable.  The military could trump DoDEA’s recommendation not to send families 
to certain locations.  Additionally, during this time the Navy had part of their military 
assignment process broken down which provided orders to the military personnel before 
screening families.  For the civilian employees, because of the American Disabilities 
Act, the format for an assignment was different.  Prior to selection, you could not ask 
for any information concerning the family member’s physical or mental issues.  After 
the civilian received notification of selection then you could ask.  The information came 
to DoDEA who made a recommendation back.  However, any reassignment of 
somebody, when you can tie it back to their promotion ability or job ability impacting 
their job, you could not deny them a placement.  There were many failures in special 
needs identified during this time (Interview dated October 26, 2015).  OSD, EUCOM 
and the military services initiated discussions to develop common screening processes 
and to communicate with families the limitations of special education support in 
oversea locations, especially where there were no DoDEA schools. 
Transformation of the Non-DoD School Program (NDSP) and Database 
 The cost of NDSP was always part of the budget briefs at the Component 
Commander Advisory Councils (CCAC), the European Schools Council (ESC), and the 
Dependents Education Council (DEC).  Internally to DoDEA, there was a consolidation 
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of the Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP).  In 2002, there was no centralized database.  
Each area director maintained her own system and there were different interpretations 
of the same regulation.  There were different operating procedures from the same 
guidance.  Therefore, from 2002 to 2007, DoDEA Headquarters in Virginia created a 
database system, standardizing procedures, and ultimately in 2008 under the new 
DoDEA director, the program centralization completed.  It took to 2010 to get it all 
under the headquarters.  DoDEA eliminated all processing overseas.  Nobody from the 
programmatic standpoint or the budget program was overseas except the education 
coordinators (Interview dated October 26, 2015).  Products of this realignment were 
several policy changes.  For example, one region wrote an exception to policy that now 
was no longer applicable because of the standardized policies and services.  Families 
then initially incurred the financial burden of the change and the regional school liaison 
officers or headquarters’ liaisons heard about it.  The issues then filtered to EUCOM or 
sometimes the education coordinators contacted me directly as they now served as 
liaisons.  
Organizational and Programmatic Transformations 
Transformation was an ongoing theme in the interviews and documents.  In his 
e-book, Good to Great, on the transformation of organizations, Collins (2011) 
concluded  
We’ve allowed the way transitions look from the outside to drive our perception 
of what they must feel like to those going through them on the inside.  From the 
outside, they look like dramatic, almost revolutionary breakthroughs.  But from 
the inside, they feel completely different, more like an organic development 




However, with the military, there were so many transformations occurring during this 
time and with the exception of a comment on the speed by which United States Africa 
Command emerged, the transformations even from the outside seemed to be slow 
processes.  At times DoDEA was unaware of planned base closures because of lack of 
access to the often times classified information.   
An analysis on the data points on the timeline prior to the interviews revealed 
patterns in the data of change that included mission, programmatic (starting or ending 
programs such as the Compassion Fatigue Program at EUCOM), leadership changes 
(positional leadership: President, Commanders, Directors), name changes, and 
reorganizations.  I noted a difference between unplanned and planned transformation.  
An example of unplanned transformation occurred after the events of September 11, 
2001 that led to the creation of a new organization, the Department of Homeland 
Security.  One example of a planned transformation was the transitional split, beginning 
in 2002, of the Installation Management Agency (IMA) from the United States Army to 
a formal command, Installation Management Command (IMCOM).  The new 
organization focused on the support element to combat operations such as providing 
garrison and base level facilities, morale, welfare and recreation activities, and school 
liaison officers and school transition specialists (Burbach & Van Pool, 2010).  
Eventually when the events occurred at Walter Reed that put a spotlight on the negative 
treatment of combat wounded service members and led to the creation of the Soldier 
and Family Assistance Centers (SFAC) and Warrior Transition Units (WTU) in 2006-
2007, the system absorbed the change.  Other examples of planned transformation 
include EUCOM’s expanded support to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
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(NATO), and the transition of certain requirements for the creation of a new Combatant 
Command (COCOM) in 2008.   
This was a transformative time with NATO where we were now changing the 
dynamic from 2005 and 2006 where we were retrenching back into some of our military 
installations and now we were getting folks back out across NATO and working hand in 
hand with our NATO partners in these locations.  They started developing asset 
locations where we as the United States could have assets at locations and partnerships 
with our NATO partners and obviously, we had to have US military personnel at those 
locations.  The vast majority of what EUCOM did fed the US activity in NATO.  Very 
little United States activity in NATO occurred without EUCOM either owning it, 
touching it, or enabling it.  So even when forces would flow from the states to 
Afghanistan or Iraq, EUCOM would have a piece of that action.  Pretty much all of the 
combat forces in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR) rotated in and out of 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Combined Accounts). 
The following is an example of the magnitude of responsibility and activity for 
EUCOM as a Global Combatant Command: 
Prior to splitting part of EUCOM to create United States Africa Command in 
2007-2008, EUCOM was all of Europe, most all of Africa and a piece of Asia, 
with Turkey.  It was 93 nations and since the Global Combatant Commands 
(GCCs) are responsible for any, and all, military operations within their 
geographic area.  By virtue of that, there are many coordinating functions with 
State Department activities within those nations.  A big difference between 
Department of Defense and Department of State is an ambassador is only 
worried about his or her nation.  There’s very little coordination, ambassador to 
ambassador, from nation to nation.  The State Department regional bureaus 
actually do that coordination.  Ambassadors don’t do much of that themselves.  
Conversely, the global combatant commands are responsible for all of that 
coordination within all their nations.  In EUCOM’s case, that includes 53 
nations today.  Combatant Commands coordinate all that military activity and all 
the activities that then need to be discussed with State Department, USAID, with 
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other partners, with all those militaries and all those governments.  We don’t do 
much in a vacuum.  There’s very little done in a vacuum, in fact those are the 
hardest operations to plan because you risk burning bridges if you do them in an 
uncoordinated fashion.  So the global combatant commands are worried about 
operations but they’re worried about maintaining US interests forward into those 
areas.  EUCOM is very concerned with building partner capacity as all of our 
GCCs are.  Working with partner nations, and it is not just their militaries, 
though it is principally their militaries, to build that capacity so we have capable 
partners when it come times for combat operations.  You really like to have 
partners you can talk to, fight alongside, and trust.  So it’s building their 
leadership, it’s helping them; it isn’t just “stuff”.  The huge component of that is 
training (Interview dated November 7, 2015).  For example, one of EUCOM’s 
Component Commands, Marine Forces in Europe (MARFOREUR) trained and 
equipped four Georgia battalions that could integrate into the Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) cycle (previously the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)) 
(Interview November 17, 2015). 
 
United States Africa Command 
In 2007-2008 EUCOM separated their plans and requirements for the African 
Continent and facilitated the creation of a new Combatant Command, United States 
Africa Command.  The dynamics were shifting.  A little bit of the leadership changed as 
the Deputy Commander for EUCOM moved over as the Commander of US Africa 
Command.  The speed by which this occurred was “a big deal” (Interview dated 
October 9, 2015).  The primary purpose was to build partnership capacity with African 
governments and liaise with entities in Washington D.C. and the Department of State.  
While the new US Africa Command had the same COCOM structure and the 
headquarters remained centrally located in the same community as EUCOM, the new 
mission focus required additional resources.  For example, Marine Forces in Europe 
(MARFOREUR), one of the Component Commands co-located with EUCOM and 
United States Africa Command, transitioned as well during this time. 
By the end of 2009, Africa Command stood up and parallel to that, 
MARFOREUR segregated and separated itself to form Marine Forces Africa 
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(MARFORAF).  MARFOREUR had the personnel but then there was a new 
MARFORAF Chief of Staff and G3/5, created in stride in 2008-9 timeframe to focus on 
being able to support US Africa Command.  To facilitate this the MARFOREUR and 
MARFORAF Chiefs of Staff met daily.  They shared the G-6 communication section, 
so it became a competition for resources.  The MARFOREUR Chief of Staff 
responsibilities revolved around ensuring the G1, the G2, the G4, and the G3/5, the 
fiscal section and contract section, and the G-6 all worked together in concert and 
everybody understood the command priorities (Interview dated November 17, 2015). 
During this time, another one of EUCOM’s Components, United States Air Forces in 
Europe (USAFE) supported the continuing war efforts through the development of the 
Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW) in Papa, Hungary in 2008.   
Papa, Hungary 
There were significant challenges in establishing educational support when the 
Air Force element stood up in Papa Hungary as a combined national program.  The 
United States was not directly involved in the selection of the site.  The group that 
selected it used criteria for the educational program that required a bilingual program.  
When they did the nomination package for the selection process, the city of Papa, 
Hungary answered that they had a bilingual program.  In fact, their bilingual program 
was for English class, Music and PE.  Teachers taught Math and Science in Hungarian 
so the school did not truly meet the criteria of a bilingual school.  It took EUCOM and 
DoDEA some time to figure out how to address the issues in the location since families 
and students were already on location because the Air Force tried to do it on their own 
for a while.  It was not until senior leaders went to the location and talked to service 
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members or where senior leaders from DoDEA and DoDDS talked to EUCOM’s senior 
leaders that EUCOM really understood what the issues were and what the challenges 
were and that it had to be a priority issue to take on.  DoDEA went to Papa to have 
conversations and to look around.  They made it very clear that they could not do a 
report and analysis.  They could not do any of that on the record because legislation 
prohibited them from certifying an education program not delivered by someone other 
than DoDEA.  EUCOM and USAFE sent representation to Papa as well and in the final 
discussion determined it was not EUCOM’s responsibility.  Ultimately, EUCOM and 
DoDEA did not have the authority, and the families were already on location.  What 
was the solution?  Maybe to get new authorizations, change policies, find someone to 
create an international school?  This discussion was on going when the NDSP task force 
stood up (Combined Accounts). 
Renewed Focus on the Pacific Region and Changes in the Intelligence Community 
 Historically 60 to 70% of issues at the Dependents Education Council (DEC) 
were Europe-centric.  Yet, issues such as Papa, Hungary, the growing US mission to 
support NATO locations, and the possibility of additional families moving to the 
continent of Africa were not large enough for individual conversation considering that 
the financial need was minimal.  At the same time, several interviews acknowledged a 
subtle shift in the topics and representation at the DEC.  During this time, the 
attendance changed with the increase in intelligence assignments, and DoD imbedding 
with other organizations.  While the existence of the intelligence community overseas 
was not new, the appearance of representation at the DEC shifted the balance of power 
with uncoordinated efforts.  Unlike the European School Council, that consolidated 
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issues before advancing to the DEC working group, the intelligence community did not 
have an avenue to vet issues so they brought the issues directly to the DEC working 
group or DEC.  However, as schools picked up steam it became clearer that there were 
agencies that worked overseas impacted by quality of life issues.  One of the challenges 
with the DEC was that anyone could bring any topic to the working group or even bring 
it to the table at the actual DEC meeting.  Unfortunately, you waste time trying to 
address an issue if no one is prepared to talk on it.  EUCOM and USAFE AOs took note 
of the emerging issues from the intelligence representatives and established 
relationships to compare notes (Combined Accounts). 
In addition to the growing involvement with the intelligence community, there 
was a lot of discussion on the Pacific theater.  Korea and Hawaii were commanding a 
lot more attention and focus on broader school issues so there was more dialogue with 
the commands.  In other words, when things are going great, DoDEA does not often 
hear from commands.  However, when there are problems, the two and the four stars are 
calling the DoDEA director (Interview dated October 26, 2015). 
The Army initiative began in 2008 to increase families and extend tours because 
the Korean four star (US military) decided he wanted to increase the number of families 
assigned there.  In doing so, it put a strain on the DoDEA system.  However, part of the 
plan was the Government of South Korea wanted US military in certain locations so it 
paid for much of the move and construction under a bilateral cost-sharing agreement.  
The topic reached the Dependent’s Education Council (DEC) where from the European 
perspective there was now a new requirement for MILCON dollars that would take 
away from the already budgeted MILCON process to fix the schools in Europe.  
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Collectively there was agreement that it was a valid requirement and everyone 
understood the need.  However, the fiscal requirement was not budgeted and would take 
away from the actual students and facilities already in existence (Combined Accounts). 
Meanwhile, in the fall of 2008, the state of Hawaii had some severe budget 
reductions.  When they tried to find a way to reduce the budget in the education system 
they came to an agreement with the teacher’s union that what they would do is furlough 
teachers every Friday.  They went from a normal 181 instructional year to 162.  They 
began implementing it somewhere in the mid fall and by around January it was 
becoming a very big issue with the commands in the Pacific region.  There was a 
perceived issue that Hawaii was a second-class education system.  The Pacific theater 
commanders made a large issue of it at the DEC and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense directed DoDEA to develop a study (Combined Accounts).   
While at first glance, any DoDEA involvement in state business such as creating 
a DDESS school in Hawaii or giving grants to local education activities or even run 
schools in the states may seem out of their jurisdiction, their mandate was to support the 
military dependent student.  For DoDEA to stay relevant and to address concerns from 
the military, certain organizational transformation of mission had to occur.  In 2007, the 
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act authorized DoDEA to work 
collaboratively with the Department of Education through the developing of the 
Educational Partnership Program (DoDEA educational partnership grant program 2009-
2010 annual evaluation report-Draft, 2011). 
Since DoDEA’s primary function was to support the dependents of certain 
civilian and military personnel assigned in selected locations in the United States and 
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overseas all of these changes affected the organization and put a spotlight on the 
requirement for and importance of NDSP.  Yet, the catalyst for a renewed discussion on 
the increase in complaints started with the decision to close the dormitory in London in 
2006.  Interviews attributed this one major event as the origin of the problem. 
Closing of the Dormitory in London  
The closing of dormitory in London was the beginning of a series of new quality 
of life issues and need for developing exceptions to policy.  I was unaware of the recent 
closure of London Dorm in 2006-2007 when I joined EUCOM in February 2009.  I 
started to hear complaints about uniform payments costing up to $1500 per student from 
the USAFE Headquarters Component School Liaison Officer.  I received phone calls 
from locations in England where DoD service members worked alongside Department 
of State personnel yet had to send their children to local schools while their colleagues 
sent their children to private or boarding schools.  There was also a lottery to attend 
higher quality public schools which usually occurred before the military move cycle so 
incoming families were sent to lees than acceptable schools. 
Four interviews attributed the closing of the dorm as the beginning of the crux of 
NDSP issues.  One thought it was a unilateral decision made by DoDDS-Europe and the 
time for input never occurred while three others interviewed were aware of the task 
force convened to look at the possibility of closing the dorm.  The following narrative 
combines the perspectives on the closure of the dormitory: 
This school supported not just US students but foreign countries and attachés.  
The closure had a lot to do with the decision to relocate the headquarters of Navy 
Europe from London to Naples.  In general, the re-stationing of forces drove this whole 
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idea.  Some of the base closures were mandates put out during the Rumsfeld years 
(2001-2006) to drawdown as much as possible.  If you are keeping a school for 20 kids 
or send them somewhere else, the NDSP becomes a very important enabler to your 
ability to do what the Secretary of Defense wants done which is to get the overseas 
footprint down to a smaller size.  That created obviously a big downsizing of London 
Central High School in terms of how many students it would take.  This occurred also 
during the 2005-2006 conversation where we were looking to outsource the school in 
Belgium (now the SHAPE International School) as a solution set so that would have 
been 300-600 kids going to international schools in Waterloo or Brussels.  There was a 
subset of Action Officers, AOs, that came together really to work this from a DoDEA 
educational quality standpoint.  At the time, we looked at this from a financial 
standpoint and from a quality of education.  The military tried to keep our families 
together as best they could.  That was a priority.  We send our service members in 
harm’s way but sometime they are in very bad locations.  Not places that are conducive 
to having families present and we send them to other locations where the quality of life 
is a little questionable.  Therefore, it made sense many years ago to have this dormitory 
school in London to support students from these outlying locations where the families 
made the decision that it was not right to take the children to the locations because there 
was no US education system.   
DoDEA came to EUCOM first and said that they were not sure this was a 
quality education system.  Military, if you really want to keep families together, then we 
want to take a strong look at this.  It paralleled the military priorities in terms of trying 
to keep families together and ensuring a quality education.  The changing force 
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structure in EUCOM at the time compelled DoDEA to look at the dormitory situation.  
We had less people at these locations, these distant locations within the NATO system, 
within the embassies in these countries, 92 countries at the time in EUCOM’s AOR.  It 
was cost intensive for these children and there were concerns about the quality of 
education.   
So there were fewer kids in the dorm that cost two or three times what they used 
to cost because you have this huge facility with this staff and the security and 
everything else in London and then there really was a question about the overall quality 
of education in terms of the family support piece of this with the students in the school.  
We made the recommendation through the European Schools Council (ESC) to the 
Dependents Education Council (DEC).  The DEC approved with a timeline for the 
closure and plans for the communication with students and parents.  There was a plan to 
hand the property back over to the British.  The school was part of a Navy base that was 
there and the Navy was interested in getting out of the base relationship with the school 
because there were no longer navy assets there. 
 To make the decision to close the dormitory, the group of AOs looked at the 
issues, looked at what the impact would be, at the policies that would be affected in 
terms of what would we do if we got rid of the dorm, what were the options for 
schooling and when we determined that it would really be on a case by case basis then 
DoDEA would work with these families to make the choice not to take their students 
with them to these locations or look at other options.  Therefore, the Non-DoDs 
program gained importance when the military started increasingly placing people at 
non-DoDs locations more and more.  All the stakeholders came together to work this 
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truly important issue to assess potential impacts to NATO missions.  There were policy 
and force support implications.  This was much bigger than just educating kids.   
The whole reason we have DoDDS schools overseas in Germany, in France, in 
Belgium, was for children to get the same quality of education as they do in the United 
States.  Otherwise, you are going to impact the all-volunteer force, service members 
staying mission ready because they want to get out to take care of the family.  There 
was a whole host of issues that came about because of the confluence of events with the 
closing of the dorm.  For example, there was a lot of finger pointing in the early days.  
“It’s not that big of an issue,” “Don’t worry about it,” “It’s onesy-twoseys”, “The 
families will find their way,” “We’ve sent other families to locations with like issues.”  
There was this initial push back.  Then when we started seeing early return of 
dependents, the challenge of getting qualified people in these positions because they 
could not take their family, we got more and more information.  For example, there 
were new financial requirements for service members.  With the closure of the dorm, 
the issue of uniforms became a very sensitive issue with USAFE in Europe with some 
of their families.  Since we did not operate a high school anymore in that area students 
were in private day schools and in one of those schools, uniforms were required and 
were about $1500 per student.  There was an enlisted family with three high schoolers.   
Once the dorm closed, there was a swirl of all these activities.  Papa, Hungary 
was probably one of the bigger topics.  We had the issue in Albacete, Spain with the 
movement of the Warrior Prep Center to a multinational program and under the rules of 
assignment policy, you assign the commander there but the family was two and a half 
hours away in Barcelona at the local Spanish speaking school where their priority was 
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to take Spanish national students and European Union nations first.  Only if there was 
space could the Spanish speaking school admit a US student.  In the United Kingdom 
and the English speaking countries there was one set of rules that applied to all DoD 
unless you were in a position that worked for the Department of State or you were in a 
special position filling a British UK position and someone was filling a US position.  
 There was another location in Spain where there was an elementary and a 
middle school but no high school.  The kids were bussed an hour and a half away.  
Were there enough students to make that fiscal and reasonable?  Basically, the closing 
of the dorm became a lightning rod for issues.  In hindsight, it probably was a bad 
decision but at the time with the facts presented, it was a very good decision (Combined 
Accounts).   
The closing of the dorm in London, a process triggered by transformation and 
draw down of troops, sparked a series of second and third order effects.  Now there was 
no DoDEA boarding school option to support families such as those with the Heavy 
Airlift Wing (HAW) or for the children of the small number of children arriving as part 
of an increase in intelligence locations and those imbedding at NATO locations.  
Multiple distinctive changes in military missions shaped this 2007-2010 timeframe.  
Rather than a solution where DoDEA “simply” requested more financial support and 
legislative authority, the discussion continued to focus on service reimbursement with 
the intent that then the services would be more discerning in sending families.  The 
military, however, preferred to start with getting the best-qualified service member in 
position.  EUCOM and the Components continued to address individual location 
challenges as each emerged.  DoDEA was the constant, support element but there was a 
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disconnect between the expectation of support and the ability to sustain new demands 
from a budgetary or policy stance. 
While I based my research questions on how the topic of NDSP advanced, the 
following figure summarizes the previously discussed circumstances of why:   
  
Figure 13.  Explanation of Events Leading to Decision to Create a Task Force 
These were the conditions with lack of a cohesive resolution.  As an AO during 
this time, I understood the challenges.  However, as a researcher, during several 
interviews I kept asking, what is the overarching problem really?  There was a program 
in DoDEA to support the non-traditional school option.  Even with the closing of the 
dorm, I did not hear anything that new policies, a change in policy, request for 
authority, or for an increased budget could not solve.  I revisit Kingdon’s (1984) quote 
about conditions becoming problems when one decides to do something about them.  
Why this time?  Why the spring of 2010?  The answers exist in the fortuitous 
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combination of leadership that transpired.  Ultimately, it was the DoDEA Director’s 
decision to create the task force that enabled the collective to identify the swirl of 
conditions as a real problem set though there was no clear or easy solution. 
Leadership 
As summarized in Chapter Three, respondents’ answers regarding leadership led 
to a breakout of specific subcategories: positional (the person has the authority to make 
a decision such as the Director of DoDEA or the Commander of EUCOM); qualities 
(actionable descriptive characteristics such as persistence and audacity); values (the 
motivation behind the choice to pursue specific actions); and dispositions (how those 
interviewed evaluated the character, personality, and temperaments of others).  
Leadership changes enabled a new review of old issues.  In addition to the multiple 
turnovers in positional leadership primarily in 2008 and 2009 (refer back to Figure 10), 
the DoDEA Chief of Staff from 2002-2008 transitioned into the new Chief of Policy 
and Legislation position with a focus on NDSP.  Subsequently, EUCOM and each of its 
Components (with the exception of USAFE) hired new headquarters’ education 
liaisons.  The Chief of Staff of DoDDS-Europe also changed and the DoDDS-Europe 
Deputy Director position disappeared with the creation of the new Curriculum, 
Assessment, and Instruction (CIA) position.   
By nature of a rank position, or an authoritative position such as Commander or 
Director, leaders pushed an agenda by making it a priority.  Similarly, the lack of an 
authoritative position empowered the Action Officer (AO), the person who had the 
director or commander’s blessing to get things done as he or she represented the 
organization’s priorities and interests.  I borrowed this term from the military and 
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applied it to each person interviewed or identified and determined in this network to 
some end each person is an AO,  so even at the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) level, 
he is the President’s AO as he “serves at the pleasure of the president” (Gates, 2014).  
He also is a positional leader by virtue of being responsible for the entire Department of 
Defense.  While each AO was a decision-maker in his or her own right, there were 
certain limitations to the authority to act.  Somehow, in the mix of change, the 
combination of several long-time, proactive advocates for the importance of NDSP, 
from both the DoDEA and military sides, converged with newer advocates, from both 
sides, who seized the opportunity to promote the topic as a priority. 
Parallel to the positive, proactive engagement of DoDEA leadership with the 
military, there was a pattern of negative comments specific to DoDEA found in 
publically available documents to include Inspector General (IG) Reports and 
Congressional oversight committee reports aimed at reducing programs within DoDEA.  
Similarly, several documents by a teachers’ union conveyed a strong anti-DoDEA 
Director message.  My discomfort in reviewing the documents came from the position 
that I did not share the same experience.  The new DoDEA director engaged positively 
with the military and was accessible at many levels.  However, what I read in the 
reports confirmed several rumors that I had heard of strife internal to the 
organization.  While it would have been easy not to include the reports, I believe it 
would have limited the goal for understanding the circumstances and leadership at the 
time.  Furthermore, my question of motivation for the agreement to assemble the task 
force (I wondered if it was to build a strong relationship with the military in order to 
insulate DoDEA from the Unions) would not benefit from the potential answers found 
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in the documents.  I handled the IG reports differently since each occurred after the 
target date of 2010, yet findings represented issues that affected the 2007-2010 
timeframe as it usually takes a year or two to investigate and report findings.  I used 
three reports (with the exception of the one on the DoDEA Director, I was surprised to 
find one on the EUCOM and US Africa Command Commanders) to verify interview 
data, organizational priorities, and purpose.  While several documents, IG reports, and 
union newsletters shed a negative light on the Director of DoDEA during this time, the 
negative tone is contrary to the overall positive recollection of those interviewed.   
Decision to Create the Task Force 
The push for the Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP) task force came from the 
Action Officer (AO) level.  Specific to dealing with NDSP daily, those at positional 
leadership positions in certain organizations connected to the school council system did 
not have the connection to the decision to create the task force.  In essence, this topic 
was simply one of many items that the education AOs back-briefed to the higher 
position leadership.  The significance of this was that the topic elevated through the 
formal system unimpeded.  Both the military and the educational sides of the discussion 
understood the benefit of opening up a broader dialogue.  The following are 
recollections regarding the decision making related to the actual creation of the task 
force from the military side: 
There was always talk about the Non-DoD Schools Program as far back as 2000 
and how it works and who gets what and how you determine where the person goes.  
For the military, the Air Force, was probably the biggest voice at the table for the 
EUCOM area of responsibility in terms of what are we going to do about the variety of 
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issues such as the cost of uniforms, bus rides over an hour, funding transportation where 
no bus route existed, providing education in Papa, and allowing students to choose 
private schools in the UK instead of having to attend local public schools.  The Army 
came on board after that.  The Navy was not a big player although there were a few 
areas where naval personnel had concerns.  For example, we had an issue in Greece 
where the government planned to shut down the school where Air Force and Navy 
personnel’s children attended.  At the same time, we were also communicating with 
Pacific Command (PACOM), an agency similar to EUCOM.  They have some similar 
issues but not the same challenges because there is no NATO in PACOM.  PACOM 
was much more about not taking families to these locations, yet they were developing 
new requirements in Korea.  EUCOM was supportive of taking families to these 
locations.  It was a little different dynamic.  We were communicating with PACOM and 
they agreed that we should probably have this conversation with DoDEA.  Eventually 
EUCOM compelled DoDEA to take this on lead to bring folks together to have these 
discussions.  They were the ones who started the whole discussion on the closure of the 
dorm in London so from the EUCOM point of view; they were responsible for 
providing education to our military families in overseas environments.  DoDEA had a 
responsibility for providing in class or virtual education options for students so they had 
to be a lead in this.  Homeschooling was an option for military families except in certain 
locations where it was illegal so that was another problem.  USAFE requested a task 
force and the European School Council also forwarded a recommendation for a task 
force to the DEC working group.  This would enable a bigger picture view for DoDEA 
of the military concerns, and similarly the military representatives would develop a 
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better understanding of the challenges of administering the program and the strain of 
uncoordinated actions (Combined Accounts). 
The following represents a perspective from the DoDEA side: 
From the DoDEA perspective, there was a perception that the Director had the 
nucleus of a group within the headquarters that understood the problem and that 
with a little bit more information that a larger group could come up with even 
better solutions.  And we could share in the identifications of the problems but 
most importantly, share in how the solutions were going to take shape.  Part of it 
was predicated on she viewed that as a means to assist and to get the 
reimbursement program approved.  It wasn’t a groundwork idea that I’m doing 
this so I can do that.  It was more of a we’ve got a group of people primarily 
some of the component commands who understand the issues.  We don’t have 
everyone on the same sheet of music.  If we do a task force, one we’re gonna 
collect more information because we’re going to ask people candidly to bring 
their problems and issues forward.  Two, we’re going to get everybody in 
agreement on how to solve the problems.  She was very much somebody who 
believed that you don’t come up with solutions in a stovepipe.  She had a lot of 
confidence that we could get to the heart of the issues and her intent was to then 
come up with solutions and take it back to the DEC and get the DEC to agree 
and then move forward from there.  This was not a topic saved just for the DEC.  
Phone calls during the week perpetually.  As she travelled, she would do office 
calls with leadership, general officers, and senior commanders.  I guarantee you 
every time she went to USAFE NDSP was a discussion, and every time she 
went to EUCOM it was a discussion.  (Interview dated October 26, 2015) 
 
Ultimately, the director made the decision.  While the Action Officers for multiple 
organizations, to include DoDEA, had the authority to push the NDSP agenda, none had 
the actual authority to make the decision to create the task force.  That authority rested 
solely with the DoDEA Director. 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I summarized the relevant organizational agendas that advanced 
in relation to the importance of service member quality of life and the potential impact 
on the military mission.  I utilized the technique of explanation building to capture the 
reasons why the topic of the Non-DoD School Program (NDSP) rose to the highest level 
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of the educational council network during 2007-2010.  The discussion reflected 
components of Kingdon’s three streams, politics, problems, and policies, as illustrated 
in Figure 13.  I included background on the leadership that represents his concept of a 
policy entrepreneur.  Specifically, I discussed several unique circumstances, such as the 
closing of the dormitory in London, the consolidation of the Non-DoD Schools Program 
under the headquarters, the emerging military missions, and the timing of the 
combination of action officers at multiple levels mixing with a new DoDEA director 
who had the background to grasp the depth of issues, and who had the decision-making 
authority to create the task force.  In the next chapter, I specifically answer my research 
questions.  I conclude the discussion on the timing, or window of opportunity, with a 
comparison of the rival explanation shaped by Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET).  
Finally, I provide a deeper understanding of the actual actions taken to advance the 




CHAPTER  FIVE 
Themes and Findings 
The US military embraces the family, the service member and family.  Just produces a 
better culture for all of us in terms of enduring support for our military and connection 
with the community, so the community understands better what our service is doing and 
what our partners are doing and then you have a child that grows up in that 
environment with a supportive family in a military environment and then that helps the 
all-volunteer force recruiting effort.  (Interview dated November 17, 2015) 
When you take that leadership leap and present those opportunities, two things will 
happen.  They will either say no or they’re going to do it.  Possibly give you some 
feedback but those are the only two options.  So, they say no.  What do you lose from a 
no?  Nothing.  (Interview dated November 18, 2015) 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters I established why and how various organizations joined 
together to look at an emerging problem set for the Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP) 
created by a blend of previous decision-making and new military mission requirements 
beyond the authority of the Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) during 
the 2007-2010 timeframe.  I identified why the topic rose in importance on the larger 
organizational level from the perspective of those interviewed.  Now, I specifically 
address how individuals and small groups of Action Officers (AOs) collaborated to 
advance the agenda through a combination of understanding the structure (both formal 
and informal) of the network of organizations as well as the role of leadership, 
relationships, and communication.  First, I provide the answers to the research 
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questions: Given the expansive network of military and civilian personnel and 
leadership connected through the Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) 
school council network, often with competing priorities and multiple options for issue 
resolution, how did the topic of the Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP) become an 
actionable item on the highest level of the educational advisory committee and council 
system?  More specifically, how were personal and organizational agendas advanced 
that culminated in the decision to create a Task Force to review Non-DoD Schools 
Program (NDSP) issues worldwide?  Next, I evaluate how this was a unique event using 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) applied overtime and to small group theory.  
Then, I expound upon the findings from the triangulation of my three data sets that 
identified the need for decision-makers who have the proper authority to hear issues 
from multiple sources and through multiple avenues.  Finally, I present literal depictions 
of how agendas advanced within the formal and informal organizational structure, and 
offer a synthesis of advice and actions that exemplify the practical application of how to 
push or advance personal or organizational agendas.  Throughout this chapter, I include 
discussion on the overarching themes of leadership, relationships, and communication. 
Answers to the Research Questions 
While the networked system to advance agendas was dynamic and complex, the 
answer to how the topic of the Non-DoD School’s Program (NDSP) reached the highest 
level of the council system is rather straightforward.  The various avenues for issue 
resolution, both formal and informal, as outlined in the Prologue and subsequent 
chapters came into play.  Formally, the CCAC and European School Council level 
addressed the topic and requested a task force, while in-person office calls with new 
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senior leaders in multiple organizations added to the dialogue as AOs ensured the topic 
of NDSP was on the agenda.  Informally, the AOs, who worked to resolve the constant 
stream of NDSP related issues specific to each organization united to advocate for a 
review.  Not only did they consolidate and identify problem areas, they produced 
recommendations for solutions.  More importantly, there was a consistency of message 
for AOs and decision-makers.  The fact that quality of life initiatives were a priority 
communicated from the top down leadership enabled the lower level action officers to 
consolidate and evaluate the need for a task force and push the topic back to those 
leaders at the DEC.  Finally, the DoDEA Director made the decision to establish the 
task force.  The decision advanced the organizational agendas of both DoDEA and the 
military, as the task force would enable dialogue to consider both sides of the 
challenges faced by each.  
Although I discussed several motivations for pushing the NDSP agenda, the 
answer for how personal agendas advanced was less clear.  I attribute this to my earlier 
observation that those interviewed tended to speak in the “we”.  Future studies should 
include interview questions specific to asking about personal motivation and agendas 
for action and interactions.  However, there was a common message in the interviews 
that those who acted believed that this small program was important and had larger 
implications if left unresolved. 
Timing and Window of Opportunity 
To gain an understanding of the elements of status quo versus a unique event I 
asked if the formation of the task force was an anomaly.  I then countered with asking if 
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it was an expected outcome of the educational council system.  The answers shed light 
on how it was both: 
We asked for a task force during a time when DoDEA was conducting multiple 
curriculum and school-based task forces so our request fit right into the activity 
of the moment.  (From consolidated memos) 
 
The decision of a task force itself was not unique however, “That DoD would 
take this on during time of war, drawdowns, recession, budget cuts, when the 
US usually tends to become more isolationist...To step out and take this on 
reflects well on the organization.”  (Interview dated October 9, 2015) 
 
I think DoDEA basically uses (a task force) whenever it has a problem that it 
doesn’t know how to solve organically.  Getting new schools built in Europe is 
another example of sort of processes that require these external injects to get 
DoDEA what it needs to be able to justify what it needs to do to right size.  It 
doesn’t shock me that there’s always sort of ad hoc ways in which DoDEA 
needs to operate in order to get things done.  Because it doesn’t seem to have an 
ability, I don’t know why, to get enough moxy within its structure.  In its 
structure in its relationship with the rest of the department, I mean the Secretary 
of Defense, to get things right.  It requires this external input to force the issue 
because people start complaining.  (Interview dated October 23, 2015) 
 
It was unique.  Well it was not unique in the sense of DoDEA routinely does a 
lot of task forces.  That was not unheard of.  It was unheard of; in essence, we 
never approached doing anything like this task force for NDSP.  NDSP had 
stayed in the shadows...with not bringing much attention at a larger element.  
(Unique) because the Director was signing up to ask everyone to participate, 
send information, be involved in it and then we’re going to make these policy 
and programmatic discussions as part of the DEC. (Interview dated October 26, 
2015) 
 
Overall, this was an anomaly because NDSP had become a larger strategic program in 
DoDEA's repertoire of providing support to military and as an enabler to the military 
agenda. 
Timing 
Earlier I referenced the research on Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) and 
small groups that concluded, “The common feature is in the observed pattern of change- 
periods of stasis (or in some versions, incremental change) punctuated by short periods 
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of radical change in which a group attempts to improve its fit with the demands of its 
embedding context” (Arrow, Henry, Poole, Wheelan, & Moreland, 2005, p. 329).  I 
would not call this a radical change to conduct the task force, but it was unique in its 
mobilization of facets of the school council network.  Every organization had 
representation at the working group level.  The dynamics changed within the groups 
looking at the issues and new external forcing functions (discussed in Chapter Four) 
emerged that highlighted the need and importance of NDSP.  DoDEA’s answer to the 
increased costs to have the services pay simply was not a solution to all of the problems 
as the demands on the program increased in response to the need for additional DoD 
personnel in locations without adequate educational opportunities. 
In light of the reality that the number of students and expense involved is so 
minimal that it does not warrant discussion when compared to the larger organization, 
the fact that a group successfully advocated for a worldwide review of the program is 
remarkable.  Moreover, there was the fact that the new DoDEA leader in 2008 had a 
proactive agenda in working with the military.  The combination of leadership, 
relationships, communication, and the qualities of persistence provides insight into 
advancing agendas.  Ultimately, a leader with decision-making authority is necessary.  
A pattern of recent collaborative victories in supporting quality of life initiatives 
ranged from regional DoDDS-Europe baseball to the worldwide MILCON money insert 
paved the way for bringing everyone to the table to explore the emerging issues related 
to NDSP.  Moreover, DoDEA and the military adapted to work together in mutual 
understanding of each other’s position based on purpose.  With respect to the decision, 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) existed with people during this time, not events.  
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There was no specific event immediately preceding the decision to create the task force.  
Yet the right people connected from numerous avenues at the same time and 
collectively worked together to keep the topic of NDSP on the agenda until a leader 
with authority to act agreed to establish a task force 
Multiple Avenues  
When you join an organization, it is like walking into the middle of multiple 
stories.  The cast of characters are in various chapters in their lives with "various" plot 
lines and settings.  Sometimes the stories intersect and for that brief period of time, a 
shared experience occurs that becomes the baseline for future interaction (Document 
Database, Consolidated Memos dated December 12, 2015).  
Another one of Kingdon’s (1984) concepts is “softening up” or the idea that to 
advance agendas one must first get discussion and awareness raised in multiple forums.  
This was our pre-briefs to senior leaders, working groups with the different councils, 
pre-meetings, and office calls with new leadership that all connect to this idea.  The 
goal was to educate the policy community, the other action officers and leadership.  
Kingdon (1984) noted that, “Even specialists might not be sensitive to a problem or 
aware of a given proposal, so entrepreneurs try to educate their fellow specialists” 
(p.135).  Interviews stressed the importance of collaboration and communication as 
related to a pattern of action.  Several interviews stated that one must never go into a 
meeting without knowing how it will turn out.  One must be aware of everyone’s pre-
coordinated conversations and conclusions.  However, despite all of the pre-
coordination and information finding, the decisions made may not reflect the previous 
lower level agreement.  Furthermore, one must be cognizant that although agreement 
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occurred in the meeting, the written findings may reflect a different result depending on 
who writes the final report.  
Quality of Life Conference and European Schools Council 
 Leading up to the 2010 time frame, EUCOM had the policy requirement and 
programmatic coordination for all quality of life aspects to include all Department of 
Defense schools, morale, welfare and recreation, health care, behavioral health, all 
things that are quality of life related or support the force and family.  One cannot 
separate quality of life for children from service members.  When making a decision to 
move to a remote location there are many factors involved such as career progression, 
family support, and education opportunities.  In 2006-2007 as the force structure started 
to change in EUCOM it was more important for services to work closer together, 
because DoD started to look at closing installations, closing facilities, doing more joint 
basing overseas, cross collaboration amongst the services was important.  It was also 
more important to talk about sharing in force support and installation issues, quality of 
life issues.  We did this in a number of ways. 
EUCOM had an annual quality of life conference that would bring in all the 
stakeholders in one venue to evaluate all aspects of quality of life, boys, and girls 
scouts, welfare and recreation, behavioral health, family support center structures, 
personnel and education.  Both voluntary adult education and dependent education so 
we really had that cross collaboration and so we would talk across the command.  What 
were the issues and then how could the team in EUCOM take on these issues and then 
work with its stateside counterparts and Office of Secretary of Defense and military 
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services to change legislation, to change funding to support and have impact on those 
topics identified at the conference?   
EUCOM Quality of Life brought in students as part of the conference to 
represent issues in the military communities.  This process, especially having 
representative from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) enabled the EUCOM 
staff to basically take a year’s worth of effort through the ESC or the Component 
Commanders conferences or the spouse conferences or the break out groups from the 
quality of life conferences to say here are the top five issues that need to be fixed at the 
DoD level.  The Director of DoDEA never missed one, the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
attended one or two and on the service side there was always somebody from the 
civilian side of leadership on the Manpower Reserve Affairs side.  This was a proactive 
process to get the Command’s message communicated through to the Pentagon 
(Condensed Accounts). 
In addition to the Quality of Life conference, a specialized focus on education 
occurred during the biannual European Schools Council.  This was part of the 
conversation about the capacity to handle the needs of the families and schooling for 
kids.  Living in a foreign environment those needs become even more important.  For 
the European School Council (ESC), the working group was the one that really talked 
about the issues and were the action officers that looked at the issues, identified them 
and put them together and then they were also the ones that went back out and informed 
their leadership on what the issues were for the meeting to get them prepped so that we 
had a real 360 degree approach from buy-in to development.  The hardest part of this 
process was to have issues on the agenda that would drive interest.  So it’s not only 
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important to have issues on the agenda that are important issues but it’s also important 
to have issues on the agenda that drive the interest of the senior leaders so now you can 
get them in the room to talk about other things (Interview dated November 18, 2015).  
Part of the process was getting the senior leaders together and ready for the ESC 
and then many of those ESC members would come back and participate or be at the 
Dependent Education Council.  We wanted Europe to identify and be able to say this is 
ours, we own it, we are responsible for it.  Thus when we present items we want to 
represent them on behalf of Europe.  From 2005 to 2009, we had topics regarding the 
reduced number of physical education activity in schools.  There were perceptions that 
art and music were being downplayed.  Questions came up about the quality of school 
leadership.  The lack of sports was an issue.  There was a perception from those external 
to DoDEA that the big issues that affected positive movements on schools in Europe 
whether it was school boards, whether was reduced PTR (pupil teacher ratio), full day 
kindergarten, or construction those were not internally driven by DoDEA but from the  
external customer which is the military (Combined Accounts). 
Another way EUCOM would get information and connect resources was during 
the senior leader spouse program.  We would bring up topics and the spouses would say 
either what can we do to help, or that they heard last month some things for us to look 
at, so forth, and so on.  It was a good dialogue and informal.  It was not as formal 
dealing with commanders, but ended up being as effective.  One facet of overseas life 
that is important to understand is that we live and work in the same community.  The 
base or the post is the community.  Those interviewed felt that EUCOM did a 
commendable job of representing issues upwards to the external customers in a way that 
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no other organization has replicated.  Whether it was Non-DoDs, whether it was 
construction of schools whether it was bussing or whatever the issues were.  People 
need to hear it in multiple forums (Combined Accounts).   
Another avenue to hear issues involved the push from local military spouses.  In 
one specific location in March 2009, senior spouses produced a paper analyzing 
DoDEA accountability and labeled it “the missing standard”.  The paper served as a 
springboard for discussion, not only at the local level, but also up to the DoDEA 
Director.  The group of spouses created a community group with the defined purpose of 
bringing parents together to identify issues relating to the DoDDS community and to 
provide a channel through which to affect change.  The main concern was the attitude of 
the school system that appeared to “wait us out.”  Due to the frequent transition of the 
community, the spouses believed that the school system stalled changes.  To accelerate 
affecting change to the system, the spouses encouraged the use of the military chain of 
command and the structures in place, but if that did not work then they recommended 
communication with Senators and Congressmen (Document Database, Tab 13a, from 
consolidated memos).     
Local community changes provided opportunities to create new relationships.  
For example, while there were growing pains associated with US Africa Command and 
EUCOM co-located in Stuttgart, Germany, the split from EUCOM did not have a 
negative effect on the relationships between the Chiefs of Staff of the Combatant 
Commands in relation to the European Schools Council and school support in the 
Stuttgart community.  During the first year as a sub-unified command, the EUCOM 
Chief of Staff invited the AFRICOM chief of staff to attend the European Schools 
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Council.  Both shared similar views and agreed that one or the other, if not both, would 
attend the school council meetings with DoDDS-Europe and DoDEA (Interview dated 
October 9, 2015).  From that time up to 2010, both commands (despite the three 
changes in EUCOM Chief of Staff and two Deputy Commanders) formed a united front 
to pursue additional MILCON dollars that resulted in a $50M congressional insert to 
build a new school in Stuttgart.  The previous allocation of money for the Boeblingen 
Elementary and High School was about $50M under budget by the time the design 
phase occurred.  Furthermore, they worked together with DoDDS-Europe to fund 
module trailers to curb the overcrowding in the schools.  This concerted effort rolled 
into a larger worldwide push to inject the DoDEA MILCON portfolio with adequate 
funds to renovate or build schools. 
Relationships and Communication in Pushing Agendas 
It’s difficult to get, with the myriad of issues going on, from force structures to 
base closures to commissary challenges the whole host of issues that you have in 
the OCONUS environment and luckily most go unseen and it’s hard to bring 
issues to the forefront that don’t impact the families of senior leaders that are 
making those decisions.  That’s difficult.  How to get them to realize, you got to 
do this now for somebody living, or interested in this for somebody living 1200 
miles away from where your front door is.  So you have to make that real for 
them.  And you have to be, I think, within a team that’s trying to push this issue 
together you have to be really clear about communication, communicating, 
communicating, communicating what the issues are, what the challenges are so 
that so that you get people to then reiterate or continue that dialogue, using the 
same terms I think is important.  (Interview dated November 18, 2015) 
 
Another way of looking at the concept of advancing or pushing a personal or 
organizational agenda is in the vein of how to work around a “no” or negative response.  
The stories told in the Prologue and during the interview phase led to the following 
thoughts and graphic depictions.  These interpretations represent four ways that 
organizations raised awareness of issues during this time.  The bottom level position 
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represents the person elevating the issue regardless of rank or formal position.  While I 
illustrated several avenues to problem solve within this network (both structurally and 
socially) Figures 13-16 graphically represent four specific scenarios.  
Scenario 1.  How to move an issue when you do not have access to the decision maker 
in your own organization: 
 
Figure 14. Way Around a Negative Response Scenario One 
Pass the issue to another organization’s AO and work with them to move it up the chain 
of command then present it back.  For example, when the senior leader of B comes for a 
visit, AAA works with BBB to get the item on the discussion agenda so when B 
presents to A it has more weight.   
Scenario 2.  How to get an issue addressed when the top of the chain of command 




Figure 15. Way Around a Negative Response Scenario Two 
Communicate the issue to another organization that has the authority.  The caveat is that 
BBB is a representative of B so BBB needs to be diligent in pushing the issue.  Even 
though one’s own organization is not involved, one must still inform the boss. 
Scenario 3: When the top decision maker is hostile or laissez-faire (or no one is in that 
position) 
 
Figure 16. Way Around a Negative Response Scenario Three 
When AAA is rep for A or AA, take charge and brief afterwards to AA who then may 
or may not pass on the information.  Need to convey the importance of message using 
every available connection. 
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Scenario 4.  When your own network cannot give you the answer 
 
Figure 17. Way Around a Negative Response Scenario Four 
Go to a decision maker in one’s network that is external to the core network.  Go there 
because you can then access the higher network authority.  The example relevant to the 
NDSP task force occurred when an action officer (AO) from USAFE asked to be one of 
the EUCOM representatives for the task force.  When EUCOM denied the request, the 
AO went to Headquarters Air Force and asked to be their representative. 
Each interview referenced previous relationships.  Even the understanding of a 
love-hate relationship can help to define how to advance an issue.  Do you continue to 
work with the person or do you find a way around?  Everyone interviewed worked for 
at least two of the organizations connected to DoDEA’s school council network.  This 
contributed to the depth of personal and organizational experiences that worked in the 
positive when pushing agenda items. 
The following section is a synthesis of interview findings that form a practical 
application of how to push or advance personal or organizational agendas.  I delineate 
between push and advance because push is an action while advance is the result.  Each, 
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predicated on themes of leadership, relationship building, trust, and communication, 
entails some type of conscious action:   
1. Find action officers (AOs) willing to work around a “no” but more importantly, 
find AOs who understand why the “no” happened.  The AOs are the middlemen, 
the working group attendees, the ones who answer to a higher authority.  The 
effective ones are those who can move in and out of the politics both among and 
between organizations.   
2. Take time to understand why you cannot do something.  Do you have the 
expertise, resources (personnel and/or fiscal), or authority?  Do you have the 
information? 
3. If you cannot do something, find someone who can (look for those not bound by 
politics.  Ask, who has the authority?  Who has the information?  Who has the 
resources?  “You gotta have someone who knows the dynamic, knows the 
people, knows the environment, has the connections, and is well connected and 
is driven by partnership collaboration to have the effect” (Interview dated 
November 18, 2015).  Sometimes it is looking for someone with technical 
ability like knowledge and experience with writing legislation. 
4. Take time to understand why the answer is “no”.  Maybe the timing is wrong, 
the action does not align with organizational priorities, and/or the actual decision 
maker is no longer there (there is a gap in position).  “Do you have the right 
people in place, with the right skill sets and the right numbers with the right 
training and background, with the right mission statement, the right 
commander’s intent, the right authorizations, and the right direction to do what 
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the commander thinks he has tasked you to do?”  (Interview dated November 7, 
2015) 
5. Another reason not to accept a “no” is that maybe the people who say “no” at 
the higher positions held the lower position at one time and got “no” so they 
believe that since they were not able to do it no one can.  Categorize this person 
as a barrier to change on this issue. 
6. Consider that maybe it is not an issue of the wrong process, but the wrong 
authority. 
Symbolically, there was no one of high rank in Defense whose specific 
job it was to ensure that the commanders and troops in the field had what 
they needed.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff spoke for the 
armed services and was the senior military advisor to the president, but 
he had no command authority over the military services or civilian 
components, and no money.  The senior civilians who were my top 
deputies in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the undersecretaries, 
had a policy advisory role and direct authority only within their own 
areas of responsibility.  The very size and structure of the department 
assured ponderousness, if not paralysis, because so many different 
organizations had to be involved in even the smallest decisions.  (pg. 
116) 
 
7. Re-engage by providing “nay sayer” with new information or necessary 
resources.  “What I tried to do was usher topics through the group and try to get 
the group to look at the topics from a broader spectrum.  Who else is involved?  
You know, who does this really impact?  What are the second and third order 
consequences of doing this or not doing it?”  (Interview dated October 26, 2015) 
8. Re-engage if you think that you were not clear in your argument or if you gain 
new facts or insights.  
9. Highlight issue to new leadership even if previous leadership said “no”.  (From 
consolidated memos: Attach this to new/incoming leaders who pick up with 
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whatever information they are handed, that’s the starting point.  So, new 
leadership is opportunity to reengage if you do not agree with current affairs or 
previous agenda not addressed.  Opportunity to provide background.  I 
remember when a new (deleted) came in and made the comment of drinking the 
Kool-Aid, “You put it down, I just picked it up and started drinking.”  
(Document Database, Tab 13a, consolidated memos)  
10. Take chances to present a new idea first.  “Just find another way to work it, but 
you had the opportunity to sell yourself, sell your case, sell the issue.  Not 
through some other action officer that works for somebody else.  So that was an 
important opportunity for us and we, we took a lot of those risks.  We did.  
Which some panned out really well...some didn’t.”  (from interview dated 
November 18, 2015)   
11. Build trust before (or is this how trust is built?) by demonstrating commitment 
and loyalty to the organization.  You cannot delegate this. 
12. Conduct business in person when possible.  “Our visit was critically important 
because you have to see and hear some things in person to understand them 
fully.  No number of briefings in Washington could take the place of sitting in 
the same room with the Iraqis, or some of our own people on the scene, for that 
matter.” (Gates, 2014, p. 35) 
13. Pair agenda with something that brings people to the table.  For example, to 
appeal to the military side, bring in the discussion of theater security then pair 
education with a strategic message.  
Make sure senior leaders understand that if we don’t have the structure in 
place to support their strategy of service members and families together 
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in remote locations.  That you’re not going to support that strategy.  So, 
if the students aren’t going and because the students aren’t going the 
spouses are staying home and guess what you have a family there and 
it’s a remote assignment all over again so you’re not producing the effect 
that you want to produce at the senior leader level...We were able to get 
senior leaders to come on board to support not only our service members 
but our families to be together...So we really pushed that so they were 
part of this process, not only to showcase the importance of being 
involved in the schools issues but from a leadership standpoint, these 
individuals own the assets across the command, the facilities, the 
installations, not the schools but all the support pieces for education so 
they (senior military leaders) had to be part of this process. (Interview 
dated November 18, 2015) 
 
14. Understand previous relationships.  “This was one of those rare instances where  
a unique set of personal relationships stretching back decades allowed us 
significantly to mitigate otherwise intractable bureaucratic hostility.  And it is 
still another reminder that when it comes to government, whether it works or not 
often depends on personal relationships.” (Gates, 2014, p. 92) 
15. Find who has the answer or resources and/or who is willing to do the work  
16. Qualities of persistence, humbleness, “relentless,” element of “willing to do 
battle,” “won’t toe the line” appear effective but are construed positively if on 
the same side of issue while negative if on the other side. 
17. It is not just important to have access to senior leaders but to be seen as a senior 
leader.  Know what you bring to the table.  Go in with information.  Others may 
have the checkbook and political connections.  What do you bring to the 
conversation? 
18. Understand that collaboration is hard work and entails paying attention, learning 
the system, and not accepting “no”. 
I really believe in collaboration, so through collaboration you then 
influence buy-in, you have people as part of the process and then good, 
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bad, ugly, whatever, they are part of the victory or also part of the 
failure.  They own the process.  For some it’s a very cumbersome 
process but I’ve always found it to be a, a way to get buy-in and create 
enduring relationships and create enduring buy-in and partnerships.  
(Interview dated November 18, 2015) 
 
19. Admit that you may not have the resources or information but are willing to 
work collaboratively.  There was a trend in all of the interviews where each 
simply stated that they did not know something.  I made a note about the quality 
of candor and honesty 
20. Do not limit yourself to pushing only good news.   
21. Appreciate honest conversation.  “There were a handful of people I could count 
on to criticize me to my face, to tell me when I had given a poor answer to a 
question, to question my patience or impatience with others in the Pentagon, and 
to question a decision.” (Gates, 2014, p. 275) 
22. It is ok to “create chaos” (Interview dated October 23, 2015).  Stirring up an 
issue even when there is no immediate solution gets people to start paying 
attention. 
23. Identify the level of solution you are willing to accept and level of effort you are 
willing to provide. 
24. Understand that not having authority does not have to be a barrier.  Just because 
you do not have authority does not mean you cannot provide input and/or 
convince people to act.  In the case of the Malta waiver:  
There are strategic opportunities that present themselves and that could 
be out of the normal program management, strategy, or capability.  In 
other words, somebody else owns it but I don’t care because it’s an 
important issue to me and the timing is right for me to hit a senior leader 
with it.  It was a strategic opportunity to have an impact that should have 
been somebody else’s job but our leadership said if we go this other 
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route it could take us months.  So let’s make this happen right now.  
(Interview dated November 18, 2015) 
 
25. Regarding the issue of fairness and consistency, it is ok to focus on individual, 
unique relationships.  However, you just need to communicate with all those at 
the table or in the group to build awareness, not necessarily consensus.  (From 
consolidated memos: Data show pattern of DoDEA willingness to listen and 
engage on unique military requirements such as the Hawaii study, Korea, and 
Papa, Hungary) 
26. Inherent in the discussion of pushing agendas are the tactics used and responded 
to.  “Have to be out and about” and “accessible” to gain information first hand 
(Interview dated October 9, 2015).   
You go out in the field and you see what’s going on.  You ask questions, you 
look at what you find, you come back with a little more analysis and then 
figure out, do I have a problem?  And your job really is how do I make 
things better for the field?  How do we achieve what we’re tasked to do?  
How do I help them?  (Interview dated October 26, 2015) 
 
27. If you are local, go in person, Tandberg (video chat), anything that gives you 
face time.  Follow up with emails and phone calls to address any questions and 
provide reminders of meetings.  
28. As an AO, you have to have access to senior leaders across organizations.  
“Take the filters off and connect the people directly with the people who can 
have the impact” (Interview dated November 18, 2015).  One of the first things 
my boss did for me was call the Chief of Legislation and Policy at DoDEA and 
told him I was his new school’s person and that I was coming to the States and 
would he find the time to meet with me.  During the one hour lunch I was 
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“brought up to speed” on multiple issues (Document Database, Tab 13a, from 
consolidated memos). 
29. Learn to be a trusted agent.   
This same process that I talked about that applies during acts of combat 
can apply and in fact worked well because the senior commander had 
someone to turn to that wasn’t in his chain of command, was not a threat, 
was not a competitor and literally the comment is, hey boss let’s go have 
a cup of coffee and go talk about this.  So we go have a cup of coffee and 
go talk about it.  In many cases it is just a conversation, what do you 
think about this, Socratic Method, well what do you think about this?  
Here’s what we’ve observed, and then you plant a few seeds and then if 
a comment is necessary, make a direct comment and then let them decide 
how they are going to handle it.  In other words, let the staffs fix 
themselves is the best way for this to happen.  (Interview dated 
November 7, 2015) 
 
30. Understand that there is a certain way, an appropriate way to engage with 
military leadership. 
I was a voice in the middle.  I had spent a considerable amount of time 
with (Director) talking about how to work with commands.  The 
unwritten code within the military is you have to be accessible to the 
generals.  You don’t have to do what they want you to do and this is 
really simplistic, but if a general asks you to do something and you 
decide not to do it you don’t send him a letter telling him no.  You send 
him a letter but you pick up the phone before you sign that letter and you 
tell him that you’re going to tell him no.  You build a rapport with these 
people, you do what you need to do, but you make sure they believe you 
heard them, you understood their message, but you just couldn’t come to 
the same conclusion that they did.  (Interview dated October 26, 2015) 
 
31. Understand your personal limitations.  What are you willing to do and what can 
you reasonably do alone? 
32. Value your organizational assets.   
I know the SLO position, school liaison officer position, within EUCOM 
was a challenge to keep on the books, has been a challenge to keep on 
the books.  What senior leaders didn’t understand is that you’ve got to 
have that active voice within the command that is knowledgeable and is 
passionate and is connected to be able to work these issues.  You can’t 
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just arrive on a Monday with little to no information and have this solved 
by Wednesday.  You gotta have someone who knows the dynamic, 
knows the people, knows the environment, has the connections and is 
well connected and is driven by partnership collaboration to have the 
effect.  (Interview dated November 18, 2015) 
 
33. Follow the issue and persist until resolution.  Persistence relates to both quality 
of continued action but also awareness of time, accelerating the decision, 
keeping the facts and players notified.  Following through to all levels, even 
when the issue is out of your hands or else it may stall elsewhere.  Monitor 
issues and continue to evaluate the merit of the request.  Advancing agendas 
takes time and persistence.  
This makes relationships, communication, and leadership important enablers to action.  
Inherent are the characteristics and abilities of Directors, Commanders, and non-
positional Action Officers to navigate through the bureaucracy.  Most of those 
interviewed emphasized the role of mentoring and training which then facilitated the 
success of others. 
Whether you’re in the civilian sector or the military sector it doesn’t really 
matter.  Building relationships, building trust you know, proving that you are a 
worthy partner, that you have something to bring, that you aren’t just taking, but 
you’re bringing capability to the discussion.  That in time of crisis, all the 
partners have the ability, and again whether US or not, have the ability to come 
together and solve problems.  (Interview dated November 7, 2015) 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I answered my research questions.  I evaluated the timing of the 
decision to create the task force in relation to the combination of leadership and 
circumstances in the 2007-2010 time frame.  I discussed findings from the data that 
identified the importance of conveying messages through multiple avenues and the 
value of leadership, relationships, and communication.  Specifically, I addressed how an 
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AO can work around a negative response, and how to evaluate opportunities during 
times of positional leadership changes to push agendas.  I concluded with a combination 
of advice and actions from the interviews that exemplify the practical application of 




Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
This qualitative case study investigated the circumstances surrounding the 
decision to create the Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP) task force in the spring of 
2010.  In this chapter, I evaluate the usefulness of my chosen theoretical framework and 
review previously identified theory and emerging literature in light of prominent themes 
identified in the research.  Next, I provide a summary of findings.  Finally, I relate the 
implications of the study and make recommendations for future research. 
Evaluation of Theoretical Framework 
From a theoretical framework perspective, the choice of Kingdon (1984) as an 
incremental approach to advancing agendas with a contrast of Punctuated Equilibrium 
Theory (PET) as an indicator that something specific happened which sparked 
immediate attention to the issue proved to be an appropriate framework.  One can see 
the flow of streams, timing of events, the implied sense of urgency due to multinational 
involvement versus ongoing, slow moving changes, the public mood, the politics, 
leadership changes, and new opportunities to advance agendas.  Throughout the data, 
the actions and qualities of a policy entrepreneur are evident along with the themes of 
leadership, relationships, and communication.  However, the concept of time is still 
rather elusive as literature and findings on policy entrepreneurs describe action over an 
indeterminate amount of time while in this case the connection of multiple policy 




Timing was an important concept in the literature and in the interviews.  Using 
case study methods, I traced and analyzed contributing factors and key events to gain a 
better understanding of actor’s transactions, decisions, and involvement over time in the 
actionable process of pushing an agenda.  Again, the specific incident of decision 
making to form the NDSP Task Force was the event from which I worked backwards.  
An unexpected find was the number of interviews that attributed the flux of problems 
on a previous decision and thus established a start point for analysis.  This provided an 
additional layer of storytelling that, in additional to answering how the topic of Non-
DoD Schools Program advanced, answered why the Non-DoD Schools Program task 
force formed. 
Earlier I acknowledged the examples of weaknesses of process tracing outlined 
by Kingdon (1984), Lichtenstein (1995), and Jones and Baumgartner (2012) as an 
adequate means to establish specific beginning of events.  However, Yin (2009) stated 
that the “ability to trace changes over time is a major strength of case study” (p. 145).  
For this particular study, I was able to trace changes over time and establish the specific 
beginning of events from the perspective of those interviewed. 
In Chapter One, I posited that the timeframe of 1998-2000 sounded similar to 
the 2010 task force decision (drawdowns in Europe and mission changes for example) 
and so warranted a discussion.  Doing a specific time-series analysis (chronology) a 
quick comparison showed a relevant pattern of leadership change, military operations 
change, and mobilization of stakeholders that supports the ongoing need for 
collaboration and strong working relationship between the civilian and military 
communities and organizations.  Both also speak to the viability of the council system 
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over time.  While this was not a study on the effectiveness of the council system, the 
data demonstrate that once again the structure of the council system was conducive to 
elevating issues.  I add the qualification that it takes a concerted, multi-pronged 
approach, and that elevating issues does not imply resolution.  
The decision to pull in the research from Wright (2000, 2002) provided a 
broader historical perspective and proved valuable for several reasons.  First, one 
interview actually mentioned the Wright report and provided a firsthand account of that 
period.  Second, now researchers have a ten-year look for future studies that provides 
substance for evaluating Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET).  Furthermore, another 
benefit of linking to the 2000 period relates to the Hayes’s (2008) dissertation 
proposition that research on the policy change process requires a policy subsystem 
studied over a decade or more.  In order to make the connection to the policy subsystem 
that I identify as the school council network, I return to the theories, such as Advocacy 
Coalition Framework, that I shelved when I chose Kingdon for the theoretical 
framework. 
Relationships and Networks 
Earlier in my paper, I justified the choice of existing in a policy world due to the 
political level of the senior leaders of each organization, and the legislative foundations 
of DoDEA and its formal educational council structure.  A return to the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (ACF), “Policy making occurs in policy subsets, which is a policy 
area that is geographically bounded and encompasses policy participants from all levels 
of government, multiple interest groups, research institutions, and the media” (Weible 
& Sabatier, p. 125) provides an enhanced definition appropriate to my findings.  The 
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variety of publically available documents representing the multiple entities focused 
specifically on the activities of DoDEA, from the teacher’s unions to newspaper outlets 
to Congressional Research organizations firmly add to my conclusion that this is a 
policy subset.  This connection provides the base for using the educational council 
network as a unit of study for future research.   
Weible and Sabatier (2006) highlight Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) to 
explain, “Policy participants both specialize in a policy subsystem to effectively achieve 
their objectives and maintain their participation over long periods of time to ensure 
objectives are achieved” (p.126).  Again, in relation to my work, the element of time is 
still undefined.  How long does it take to achieve an objective?  While Kingdon is the 
better fit for the process of pushing agendas and understanding the conditions inherent 
in the political system, the ACF is better suited to the themes identified of relationships 
and communication in relation to the coalition building that occurred to enable the push 
of the NDSP agenda. 
Leadership Qualities and Actions of Policy Entrepreneurs 
My study shows the importance of the Action Officer, or the “middle man,” as a 
policy entrepreneur when working with other policy entrepreneurs across and within 
networks.  This conclusion supports the work of Majewska-Button (2010) and Joyce 
(2013) who contended that the “middle man” or mid-level agents or actors could affect 
change in military organizations despite the bureaucracy.  I add a layer to the discussion 
by providing additional real-world stories on the activities of these action officers to 
push agendas.  The development of relationships is important.  Their effectiveness 
optimized by awareness of circumstances that includes positional leadership changes 
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and possession of certain qualities such as passion, perseverance, ability to develop 
relationships, and aptitude to work around a negative response.   
In Chapter Two, I examined transformational and transactional leadership 
theories that addressed characteristics of leaders.  While I expected to hear qualities, 
which I did, I did not expect to note that, in general, no one spoke about how their 
position enabled them to act.  The exceptions were noted when certain respondents 
mentioned that they went to meetings specifically because the weight of his rank 
ensured that the command’s voice was heard at the table.  Considering that no one 
interviewed talked about the power of positional leadership directly related to this event 
I resumed focus on the mid-level actors who do not have the top-level decision making 
authority. 
The reoccurring themes of relationships and interactions within this system 
compel me to return to a closer look at the policy entrepreneur literature, outside of 
Kingdon (1984), as a base for future research.  While his concept of the policy 
entrepreneur was an appropriate starting point to identify certain qualities and actions of 
a policy entrepreneur, the definition did not adequately apply when I associated the 
concepts in network theory to bring in the dynamics of multiple policy entrepreneur 
engagement within multiple organizations.  I discovered additional research that 
conceptualized policy entrepreneurs beyond the work of Kingdon and matched my 
findings.   
Communication and Defining Problems 
Mintrom and Norman (2009) conducted a comprehensive literature review on 
the varying conceptualizations of policy entrepreneurs.  They propose four key 
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elements: displaying social acuity (effectively operate in networks), defining problems, 
building teams (promoting and maintaining advocacy coalitions), and leading by 
example.  The element of defining problems is relevant as there were many inconsistent 
definitions of what the actual problem was in conversations leading up to the decision to 
create the task force.  At the beginning of the study, I had a preconceived conclusion, 
based on a mix of observations and conversations, of the overarching problems related 
to the administration of the Non-DoD School Program as evidenced in my original 
stated research problem statement.  While I still concur that military leaders do not 
systematically include education, the problem during my event stemmed from a 
difference in how to address the perceived problem.  Fundamentally, the question was 
who should pay for the Non-DoD School Program and why?  This leads to an 
interesting connection on the policy entrepreneur level, Mintrom and Norman (2009) 
included Crowley (2003) whose study 
Highlights competition among policy entrepreneurs themselves.  Often, 
discussions of policy entrepreneurship have characterized the policymaking 
context as consisting of a group of like-minded change advocates doing battle 
with myriad forces seeking to maintain the status quo.  Crowley alerts us to the 
more complicated possibilities.  Indeed, the politics of policy change can get 
extremely interesting when the contest does not involve simply shifting the 
status quo but also involves debate over the direction that such a shift should 
take.  (p. 660) 
   
This is where it is important for policy entrepreneurs to understand the network 
and history of issues as well as to have a clear understanding of what others perceive to 
be the problem.  As I stated earlier, a clearly identified problem or solution did not 
exist, just a swirl of circumstances and conditions.  I would also add that it might not 
always be about significantly changing current ways of doing things but rather 
realigning the conversation back to the original intent of the organization and 
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understanding that one does have the authority to address the problem.  What are the 
organization’s agendas?  In addition, I will add that in this case, it was also an 
opportunity to evaluate the need for change.  Although changes occurred externally, the 
internal system or process may not need to change.   
While one cannot take an individual policy entrepreneur out of the 
organizational context, the individual’s qualities and abilities to identify a window of 
opportunity, and subsequently to act, are just as important, “Instances occur when new 
challenges appear so significant that established systems of managing them are judged 
inadequate.  A key part of policy entrepreneurship involves seizing such moments to 
promote major change.  Such action requires creativity, energy, and political skills” 
(Mintrom & Norman, 2009).  I contribute that the political skill or savvy as gleaned 
from my interviews is the ability to transcend position: the policy entrepreneur 
functioning within bureaucratic limitations and the ability to move in and out of the 
politics.  I recommend future research on identifying the quality of relationships and 
communication that is conducive to policy entrepreneurs moving in and out of politics.   
Motivation 
Mintrom and Norman (2009) cited the need for studies on the motivations and 
strategies used by policy entrepreneurs.  My study provided some insight into 
motivations and strategies for action.  Their findings, unrelated to military 
organizations, indicate, “Bureaucratic actors who develop track records for innovative 
action and who are prepared to move across organizations are rewarded in terms of 
faster than usual career progression” (p.661).  Evidence from interviews and personal 
knowledge lend to conclusions that personal motivators in my case study include direct 
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connection to schools because of living in the community, having a child in the school 
system, or as a job responsibility.  
Another angle on motivation is internal motivators.  Earlier I presented 
examples of multiple ways issues were resolved that show how an individual or group 
moved around the answer of “no”.  What is relevant to the “no” is the understanding of 
the reason for it.  Mainstream literature based on research conducted on organizations, 
such as Collins (2011) Good to Great, concluded that the right people are self-
motivated.  Dweck’s  (2007) research on growth mindset and the “transformative power 
of effort” referenced Collins’s five-year study on organizations that concluded leaders 
“look at failures in the face and maintain faith that they would succeed in the end” (p. 
109).  She adds the work of Warren Bennis who asserted that some people do not set 
out to be leaders and have no interest in proving themselves.  Dweck concluded that 
growth minded people did not even plan to go to the top.  They got there because of 
doing what they love, the love of challenge, the belief in effort and resilience in the face 
of setback (p.12).  One of my interviews included a summation of this exact sentiment 
next to which I wrote, “This is gold.”  
Passion comes from within.  Passion is indicated by somebody who won’t give 
up.  When they see something, they will continue to follow that and push it 
because it’s bigger than themselves.  It’s bigger than the organization.  That’s 
was passion is.  Passion leads to enduring impact, let’s say.  Sometimes the 
numbers don’t line up but you have a sense that this is an important mission and 
it’s impacting a lot of people and there’s nobody else there to get behind them 
and support them.  When I see passion in someone, somebody you know, I can 
kind of step away because I know they have their own fuel system.  That passion 
will fuel them, propel them to take on the fight to engage at all levels and to 
make sure people hear them.  And I think it’s a very positive thing to have, an 
action officer, a project officer somebody in that position that can be passionate, 
and they can be outside the political bounds.  As you get up in to the more senior 




Summary of Findings 
 The topic of the Non-DoD School Program (NDSP) became an actionable item 
on the highest level of the DoDEA educational advisory committee and council system 
due to the multiple avenues for problem solving inherent in the structure (both formal 
and informal) and the activities of a small group of individuals committed to keeping 
the topic on the forefront of discussion.  Furthermore, personal and organizational 
agendas advanced due to the alignment of personnel with specific qualities and abilities 
dedicated to alleviating the barriers associated with providing a quality education to 
children of certain civilian and military members assigned to locations where there are 
no adequate educational opportunities. 
What makes this study remarkable is the combination of dynamics identified 
that occurred in the relatively short period of time that influenced the decision to create 
the Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP) task force in spring 2010.  The end process of 
the internal programmatic transition of the actual Non-DoD School’s Program from the 
regional areas to the headquarters impelled the review of how to administer the program 
while the unanticipated second and third order effects from previous decision making 
regarding the closure of the DoDEA run boarding school converged during this time.  
The creation of new military mission support structures such as the Heavy Airlift Wing 
(HAW) in Papa, Hungary, the establishment United States Africa Command,  a new 
Combatant Command, an increase of Department of Defense (DoD) personnel 
embedded with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) missions, and the 
transformation of the US military on the Korean peninsula are just a few events that 
stretched the resources of a network of organizations already depleted from budget cuts 
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and mandates to downsize.  Meanwhile, the ongoing military engagements in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and emerging global terrorist threats added to the tension.  
The public debate on who should fund the Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP), 
a $50 million ancillary program, suddenly shifted into a larger conversation on the 
importance of supporting the warfighter and the military agenda of trying to keep 
families together in remote locations where there are no adequate educational 
opportunities for school-age dependents.  The final part to the mixture was the 
amalgamation of experienced and new individuals at positional leadership and action 
officer levels across several organizations who rapidly developed a shared 
understanding of the ramifications of not finding a solution despite the absence of a 
clearly defined problem.  Ultimately, a leader with the authority to make the decision to 
create the task force emerged. 
Implications and Recommendations for Future Research 
While this research was not on the need or efficacy of the NDSP program, the 
data show that it is a necessary program with important implications to our military 
service members and families, both from a quality of life perspective and from a 
strategic military perspective.  Thus, I conclude that continued support and discussion 
on the areas of concern, such as the decision-making processes to send families to 
remote areas, is necessary.  Future studies could capture this decision-making process.  
Future studies within the military hierarchy and civilian military organizations are a 
good place to continue the discussion on the qualities and actions of policy 
entrepreneurs within bureaucratic and networked organizations to ascertain motivations 
and positive action skill sets. 
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Organizational leaders many times do not look beyond his or her own 
organization to evaluate if a decision was the right thing to do.  My research provides 
insight into several influencers on the decision making process.  One can evaluate 
possible combinations that, taken in context, will help leaders to learn to anticipate, 
create, and evaluate the circumstances for advancing organizational agendas.  One 
could design a case study on the development of the education plan in Papa, Hungary, 
which will add value to the military literature on the Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW) to 
complete the template on how to create a new mission capability with one that includes 
a systematic plan for educational requirements from the beginning.  
 The lack of access to the historical documents internal to the organizations 
related to this event such as executive summaries, educational council agendas, after 
action reports and meeting minutes limited the findings on the literal movement of 
agenda items related to the Non-DoD Schools Program as well as the activities of the 
task force.  In addition, the lack of access to the Department of Defense personnel who 
still work for the specific organizations and who had firsthand knowledge of this time 
produced a disproportionate weight of responses favoring a military perspective.  To 
offset this limitation and to add additional perspective to this study, for future research, 
I recommend pursuing the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) option to gain access to 
institutional documents.  Appendix G contains a sample letter and instructions. 
This case study represents a small subset of organizations and activities within a 
larger network and is Europe-centric by design.  In light of the fact that I established a 
baseline of activity, an opportunity for a comparative case study is to approach from the 
Pacific point of view to gain another perspective on the activities during the 2007-2010 
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timeframe leading up to the decision to create the Non-DoD School Program (NDSP) 
task force.  Another perspective to consider is the role of the military spouse and 
community mobilization to affect change or to facilitate identification of problems in 
advocating for a quality education.  Everyone interviewed benefitted from having a 
highly educated and involved spouse who was able to provide an honest perspective 
derived from the ability to cut through layers of politics and rhetoric at multiple levels. 
Conclusion 
This study adds to the body of literature on leadership theory, network theory, 
and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory.  It advances Kingdon’s (1984) work by connecting 
leadership and network theories as well as adding a discussion on the ambiguity of time.  
My research shows the confluence of leadership changes at multiple levels in multiple 
organizations, budgetary constraints and influxes, global conflicts, the transformation of 
new military missions in overseas communities paired with the drawdown of the 
military on established military installations.  My research design which included Yin’s 
(2009) five components -  a study’s questions, its propositions, unit of analysis, logic 
linking data to the propositions and criteria for interpreting the findings - allowed for a 
consideration of multiple theories related to leadership, network, and time framed by 
Kingdon’s (1984) work on advancing agendas in organizations.   
Finally, the rival hypothesis of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory provided a 
contrast that, while not evidenced directly preceding the event, allowed for a more 
robust analysis of potential events whose affects slowly rolled to create a larger 
unexpected multi-organizational impact.  A product of the research includes a physical 
database of documents to include congressional testimonies, legislation, newspaper 
145 
 
articles, and research.  This compilation incorporates proactive practical lessons gleaned 
from personal experiences of those interviewed, and from memos, to promote 
awareness of actions, organizational and functional processes, and external 
environmental circumstances one needs to consider as factors that influence decision 
making in networked organizations. 
Overall, this study provided insight into the various activities of multiple 
organizations linked together.  To achieve this I traced the topic of the Non-DoD School 
Program that had compound effects on both the program management of a non-
educational instruction program element of DoDEA and the operational mission of the 
military.  In speaking to those uninitiated with the military (less than 2% of the United 
States population is military affiliated), I extrapolate to a global issue but that can 
similarly represent the theoretical and practical applications that I combined in my study 
specific to network theory and leadership.  As I suggested in the opening of the 
Prologue, substitute the word commodity or contraband for agenda.  Developing and 
pushing a product and the concept of the policy entrepreneur go hand in hand, as one 
must find linkages and develop relationships to move information, money, contraband, 
or agendas.  At the end of the day, the result rests on the ability and the actions of 






While the event at the heart of this dissertation is over, the reason for the 
discussion persists.  Often, people ask me about the actual results of the Non-DoD 
Schools Program (NDSP) task force.  The simple answer is I do not know because I left 
a few months into the meeting after my military spouse received an assignment and, by 
regulation, I could not stay in my job.  There is no publically available information and 
those who I interviewed did not have an internalized answer other than to recommend a 
review of the Dependent Education Council (DEC) agendas and minutes.  Several 
products from the Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) website that 
appeared to reflect an outcome were actually the result of a review process when a new 
program manager assumed responsibility when the Partnership Branch of DoDEA 
absorbed the Non-DoD Schools Program.  However, I can add a special note related to 
several topics and events presented throughout the research: 
 The Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW) at Papa, Hungary achieved full operational 
capability in 2012 and continues to consist of ten NATO nations, to include 
the United States and two Partnership for Peace nations.  A review in 2015 
of the NDSP schools listing on the DoDEA website indicates that Quality 
Schools International (QSI) now provides educational support.  According to 
their website, QSI is a private, non-profit institution responsible for 37 
schools in 28 countries.  The school in Papa, Hungary, opened in 2012, 
currently supports 80 students. 
 The Hawaii Study (2013) concluded that DoDEA should not run schools in 
Hawaii (Blum, Blum, Hughes, Mmari, & Parekh, 2013). 
147 
 
 The elementary school that opened in South Korea at Camp Casey in 2010 
as part of the transformation of US Forces Korea will close in the summer of 
2016 due to the decline in enrollment once the Army stopped sponsoring 
families in that location in 2014 (Rowland, 2015).  Transformation continues 
with the on-going development of Camp Humphreys south of Seoul 
described as the largest ever for the military (Rowland & Chang, 2013). 
 As part of the Army transformation in Europe, United States Army Garrison 
(USAG) Baumholder (once slated for closure in 2005) now aligns with the 
new USAG Rheinland-Pfaltz while the garrisons of Heidelberg and 
Mannheim closed in 2013. 
 The CONUS Education Options Assessment (CEOA) started in 2014 to 
review the possibility of closing DoDEA’s schools in the United States.  The 
study conducted by the National Defense Research Institute through a 
contract with RAND Corporation costs $905,000 (Bushatz, 2014). 
 Boeblingen Elementary and High School groundbreaking in Stuttgart, 
Germany occurred November 2013 with the grand opening on September 
2015.  Originally funded for $47M, the total cost of the project was $98M  
(Little, 2015). 
 The new buildings for the international school at Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium opened 2015 (Purtiman, 2014). 
 DoDEA implemented a new Math program for school year 2015-2016 and 
currently is adopting Common Core standards.  They use the terminology 
College and Career-Ready Standards (Richmond E., 2015). 
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 EUCOM no longer orchestrates the annual Quality of Life Conference. 
 United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) still uses the School Advisory 
Board (SAB) model. 
 The 2015-2016 back to school DoDEA message highlighted: 
Beginning in School Year 2010-2011 DoDEA initiated an aggressive 
and comprehensive program to completely renovate or replace 134 of 
its schools worldwide.  In support of DoDEA’s school construction 
program Congress has appropriated $2.8 billion from FY 2011-2015; 
Through the Educational Partnership Branch, which now has 
oversight into NDSP, Non-DoD School Program (NDSP) serves 
2,794 students on 132 foreign locations at about $60 million.  
DoDEA, since 2009 awarded 331 grants to military connected Local 
Education Activities (LEA) totaling nearly $400 million, for projects 
supporting 480,000 military connected students in over 2,200 
schools. (O'Gara & Kanellis, 2015) 
 
With respect to timing, this year, 2016, is a presidential election year that will 
inevitably produce multiple windows of opportunity for advancing agendas, while 
shutting down opportunities for others.  The importance for leadership, policy 
entrepreneurs, and decision makers (not mutually exclusive) at multiple political to 
grass roots levels to understand the new dynamics, organizational networks, and factors 
that influence decision-making cannot be overstated.  The current agenda to focus on 
our armed forces and their families who remain vigilant as the military missions endure 
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Appendix B: United Campaign Plan (UCP) COCOM Areas of Responsibility 2011 
 
 




Appendix C: Acronyms 
 
AAC Area Advisory Council 
AAR After Action Report 
ACDE Advisory Council on Dependents Education 
AFB Air Force Base 
AO Action Officer 
ASD (R&FM) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management 
CCAC Component Commander’s Advisory Council 
CCC Component Commander’s Conference 
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
DAC District Advisory Council 
DASD (MC&FP) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Community and 
Family Policy) or DUSD Deputy Undersecretary 
DDESS Domestic Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (also DoDEA-
Americas) 
DEC Dependents Education Council 
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoDD Department of Defense Directive 
DoDDS Department of Defense Dependent Schools 
DoDDS-E Department of Defense Dependent Schools Europe (also DoDEA-Europe) 
DoDDS-P Department of Defense Dependent Schools Pacific (also DoDEA-Pacific) 
DoDEA Department of Defense Education Activity 
DoDI Department of Defense Instruction 
DoE Department of Education 
DoS Department of State 
EAC European Athletics Council 
ESC European Schools Council 
EUCOM United States European Command 
FYDP Future Years Defense Program 
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GWOT Global War on Terror 
HAW Heavy Airlift Wing 
IAC Installation Advisory Committee 
IDA Institute for Defense Analyses 
IMA Installation Management Agency  
IMCOM Installation Management Command 
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 
JIEDDO Joint IED (Improvised Explosive Device) Defeat Organization  
JPOC Joint Personnel Operations Center 
JSPS Joint Strategic Planning System 
LEA Local Educational Agency 
LNO Liaison Officer 
MARFOREUR United States Marine Forces Europe 
MILCON Military Construction 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NAVEUR United States Naval Forces Europe 
NDS National Defense Strategy 
NDSP Non-DoD Schools Program 
NDSP TF Non-DoD Schools Program Task Force 
NDTP Non-DoDDS Tuition Reimbursement Program 
NMS National Military Strategy 
NSPS National Security Personnel System 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
PACOM United States Pacific Command 
PET Punctuated Equilibrium Theory 
PfP Partnership for Peace 
PL Pubic Law 
QOL Quality of Life 
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 
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SAB School Advisory Board 
SAC School Advisory Council 
SAC Strategic Air Capability 
SAC Strategic Air Consortium 
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
SECDEF Secretary of Defense 
SEL Senior Enlisted Leader 
SLO School Liaison Officer (Civilian or Military) 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SO School Officer (Military) 
SOCOM United States Special Operations Command 
TEC Theater Education Council 
U.S.C. United States Code 
USAFE United States Air Force Europe 
USAFRICOM United States Africa Command 
USAREUR United States Army Europe 




Appendix D: Case Study Protocol Questions and Relationship to Theory 
 
A. Case Study Questions 
a. Level One: Questions Asked of Specific Interviewees 
i. What is your name? 
ii. What is your current job title and responsibilities? 
iii. What is/was the name of your organization during 2005-2010? 
iv. What were your organization’s priorities during 2005-2010? 
v. What was your job and what were your responsibilities during 2005-
2010? 
vi. How did your organization connect to DoDEA’s council system? 
vii. What was your role in the council system? 
viii. What is your recollection of the events leading up to the decision to 
create the NDSP Task Force in May 2010? 
1. How was the decision made? 
2. Who made the decision?  Key personnel/organizations? 
3. What were the issues?  Where did the issues originate? 
4. What was the role of the School Council System? 
5. Describe your role in the decision? 
6. How was the agenda set that led to the decision? 
ix. What was the role of leadership internal to your organization during 
this time? 
x. What was the role of leadership external to your organization during 
this time? 
xi. How was the decision to create the task force an anomaly and signal 
of unique circumstances? 
xii. How was the decision to create the task force an expected action of 
the council system? 
xiii. Is there anything else that you feel/think/believe is relevant to the 
circumstances leading up to the decision to creates the task force? 
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xiv. Is there anything about your organization that you believe/feel/think 
is relevant? 
b. Level Two: Questions Asked of the Individual Case (Questions answered by 
the Investigator) 
i. Given the expansive network of military and civilian personnel and 
leadership connected through the DoDEA school council network, 
often with competing priorities and multiple options for issue 
resolution, how did the topic of the Non-DoD Schools Program 
become an actionable item on the highest level of the educational 
advisory committee and council system? 
ii. How were personal and organizational agendas advanced that 
culminated in the decision to create a task force to review NDSP 
issues worldwide? 
iii. In general, what were the circumstances that led to the decision to 
create the NDSP task force in May 2010? 
iv. Decision Making in the Council Structure 
1. How did each organization set the agenda for the NDSP task 
force? 
2. How did each organization communicate issues to DoDEA? 
3. How did each organization record, capture meetings, agendas, 
and outcomes? 
a. What happened to the information? 
4. How did the alignment and activities of the school council 
members, in support or in opposition, influence the creation 
of the task force? 
5. How do external networks connect to DoDEA to influence 
internal decision-making and policy changes? 
v. Kingdon’s (1984) Model 
1. Problems Stream 




b. When did the topic of NDSP come to the forefront of 
conversation and who inserted topics as agenda items? 
2. Policies Stream 
a. Did the task force occur because the current school 
council system was not equipped to address issues or 
did it occur because DoD designed a system to 
support this progression and/or variation on the 
council purpose? 
b. What was the role of policy? 
3. Political Stream 
a. What were the leadership changes, historical factors, 
and key issue? 
vi. How do the organizations networked through the DoDEA school 
council system advocate for or work together to change policies 
regarding support for education in remote locations when there are 
competing organizational priorities? 
1. Policy Entrepreneur 
a. Who was/were the primary instigators of the decision 
to create the NDSP task force and how was he or 
she/they able to direct/persuade/convince/negotiate 
the terms? 
b. How did leadership within the school council system 
influence the creation of the task force? 
2. Policy Window 
a. What compelled DoDEA to agree to the request for 
the task force? 
b. What critical event or factors occurred immediately 
preceding the decision to create the task force? 
c. What events or factors occurred over an extended 




Appendix E: Charts and Diagrams 
Diagram 1.  Educational Advisory Committees 
 
 





































Diagram 3.  Four Year Integrated Defense Planning Cycle 
 




Diagram 4.  DoDEA Military Construction (MILCON) Budget Fiscal Years 2003-2014 
 
 
(Data obtained from Budget Books FY2003-2014 on Department of Defense Education 
Activity website) 
FY MILCON HQ/CSS Europe Pacific DDESS
2003 60,964         -                         6,836           31,683         22,445         
2004 52,102         2,713                     31,163         800               17,426         
2005 72,968         746                        45,258         -               26,964         
2006 99,478         -                         16,788         8,150           74,540         
2007 77,671         -                         54,974         4,589           18,108         
2008 37,937         4,066                     31,857         -               2,014           
2009 99,186         7,212                     -               -               91,974         
2010 235,482      15,655                  191,557      -               28,270         
2011 397,293      83,089                  116,046      -               198,158      
2012 572,313      89,011                  283,557      61,842         137,903      
2013 640,675      101,061                189,362      311,362      38,492         
2014 915,224      117,420 CSS only 418,918      NR 378,886      
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Diagram 6.  Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP) Budget Comparisons 
 
DoDEA Budget Books FY 2009-2012 
FY # of Students NDSP TCBR/TCA 
2009 3,145 43487/47,404,755# 
2010 3,321 63468/64,467,991# 
2011 3,638 59,721 
2012 3,540 67,556 
 
Budget Update for Dependents Education Council (DEC) FY 2009 
FY # of Students NDSP Costs (M) CPP (K) 
2005 2,562 26.7 10.4 
2006 2,824 31.4 11.1 
2007 2,951 40.1 13.6 
2008 3117 45.3 14.5 
2009 3,298 46.9 14.2 
2010 3,287 49.3 15 
2011 3,361 51.8 15.4 
 
 
Americans Working Around the Globe (AWAG) Brief 2013 
FY # of Students  NDSP Costs AVG CPP 
2009 3,298 $41,187,175 $12,489 
2010 3,321 $51,731,679 $15,577 
2011 3,638 $54,604,968 $15,010 




DoDEA 2009 Annual Report:  The Non-DoD Schools Program supported 
3,145 students throughout the world at an annual cost of $53.2 million 
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Appendix F: Case Study Documents Database Table of Contents 
(Chronological order for each category) 
A. Publically Available Documents (TAB 1- TAB 11) 
1. After Action Reports/Minutes/Meeting Presentation/Briefings (TAB 1) 
a. Component Command Advisory Council (CCAC), Installation Management 
Agency, Power Point Presentation (August 30, 2004) 
b. Component Command Advisory Council (CCAC), Installation Management 
Agency, Power Point Presentation, March 23, 2004 
c. Dependent Education Council (DEC) Budget Update (June 8, 2008) 
d. Dependent Education Council (DEC) Attendees List (June 24, 2008) 
e. Dependent Education Council (DEC) Military Construction (MILCON) 
Brief (June 24, 2009) 
f. EUCOM FY10 MILCON & HA Programs (2009)  
g. USEUCOM Infrastructure Update SAME University shows FY10 schools 
$50 insert by SASC for Boeblingen, NDAA, number two on Top 10 
Infrastructure focus area in enhanced DoDEA MILCON Program for 
DoDDS-E, includes SHAPE school US portion (July 19, 2010) 
h. Brief to Presidential Commission for Military Compensation and Retirement 
Modernization version 4  (October 7, 2013) 
2. Agendas (none publically available) (TAB 2) 
3. Budget Books (TAB 3) 
a. Department of Defense Education Activity Budget Book Fiscal Year 2003  
b. Department of Defense Education Activity Budget Book Fiscal Year 2004  
c. Department of Defense Education Activity Budget Book Fiscal Year 2005 
d. Department of Defense Education Activity Budget Book Fiscal Year 2006 
e. Department of Defense Education Activity Budget Book Fiscal Year 2007 
f. Department of Defense Education Activity Budget Book Fiscal Year 2008 
g. Department of Defense Education Activity Budget Book Fiscal Year 2009 
h. Department of Defense Education Activity Budget Book Fiscal Year 2010 
i. Department of Defense Military Construction Program FY2010 Budget 
j. Department of Defense Education Activity Budget Book Fiscal Year 2011 
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k. Department of Defense Education Activity Budget Book Fiscal Year 2012 
l. Department of Defense Education Activity Budget Book Fiscal Year 2013 
m. Department of Defense Education Activity Budget Book Fiscal Year 2014  
4. Congressional Hearings/Testimony (TAB 4) 
a. Statement of Mr. Ray Tolleson Interim Director of the Department of 
Defense Education Activity Before the Senate Appropriations Committee on 
the Department of Defense Education Activity (Military Construction 
Subcommittee) (February 29, 2000) 
b. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 
2008 Part 1 Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services United 
States Senate One Hundred Tenth Congress First Session on S. 1547 (S. 
HRG 110-201, PT. 1) U.S. Government Printing Office Washington 2008 
Gates Testimony February 2007 – first in office and announcement of Africa 
Command (AFRICOM) Craddock Testimony (May 17, 2007) 
c. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 Report of the 
Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives (2009) 
d. Rep. Chet Edwards Holds a Hearing on the U.S. European Command (2009) 
e. Children on the Homefront: The Experience of Children from Military 
Families, Testimony presented before the House Armed Services 
Committee, Subcommittee on Military Personnel on March 9, 2010 (March 
2010) 
f. Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 and 
Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on 
Armed Services House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleven Congress, 
Second Session (March 10, 2010) 
5. Policies, Directives, Instructions, Regulations, Memorandums and Guidance 
(TAB 5) 
a. DoD Instruction 1342.15, Educational Advisory Committees and Councils, 
dated March 27, 1987 
b. DoD Directive 1342.20 Department of Defense Education Activity 
(DoDEA), dated October 13, 1992 and October 19, 2007 
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c. DoD Directive 1342.21, Department of Defense Section 6 Schools, dated 
October 13, 1992 
d. DoD Directive 1342.6, Department of Defense Dependent Schools 
(DoDDS), dated October 13, 1992 
e. DoD Directive 1342.16, Provisions for Free Public Education for Eligible 
Dependent Children Pursuant to Section 6, Public Law 81-874, as amended, 
dated October 16, 1987 and change 1, dated August 5, 1994 
f. DoD Instruction 1342.25, School Boards for Department of Defense 
Dependent Elementary and Secondary Schools (DDESS), dated October 30, 
1996 
g. DoD Directive 5128.8, Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness, dated July 13, 2003, paragraph 4.1.2.2 
h. DoDEA Regulation 1035.1 Department of Defense Education Activity Use 
of Non-DoD Schools, August 2003, Change 3, May 2009 
i. EUCOM Directive 30-13 Overseas Dependents Education in USEUCOM 
(February 16, 2005) 
j. DoD Instruction 1342.12 Provision of Early Intervention and Special 
Education Services to Eligible DoD Dependents (April 11, 2005) and  (June 
17, 2015) 
k. DoDEA Guidance Students in Locations Not Served By DoDEA (November 
2005) 
l. OSD 22346-05 Office of Secretary of Defense Memorandum Order of 
Precedence (November 14, 2005) 
m. DoD Instruction 1315.19 Authorizing Special Needs Family Members 
Travel Overseas at Government Expense (December 20, 2005 with change 1 
in 2011) 
n. DoD Directive 1342.20 Department of Defense Education Activity 
(DoDEA), dated October 19, 2007 
o. USD Memorandum dated November 14, 2007, Tuition Waiver for a Class of 
Space-Available Students Enrolled in the Department of Defense Dependent 
Schools (DoDDS)  
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p. OPNAV Instruction 1754.1B Fleet and Family Support Center  (FFSC) 
Program, dated November 5, 2007 from Chief of Naval Operations   
q. DoDEA Regulation 1342.13, Eligibility Requirements for Education of 
Elementary and Secondary School Age Dependents in Overseas Areas, 
Change 2, (February 29, 2008) 
r. Department of Defense Education Activity Policy Memorandum: Non-
Department of Defense Schools Program Minimum Age Requirement for 
Kindergarten and First Grade Dependents (October 1, 2010) 
s. DoD Instruction 1342.15, Educational Advisory Committees and Councils, 
dated December 7, 2012 
t. United States Air Forces in Europe Directive, dated 2013  
u. NDSP Letter to Parents SY 2013-2014  
v. United States Air Forces in Europe Instruction 36-401, dated October 8, 
2014 
6. Executive Summaries (TAB 6) 
7. Newspaper Articles (TAB 7) 
a. London Central School to be Shut Down at End of Academic Year 
(September 6, 2006) 
b. DoDEA Ends Probe of London Central’s Closure (June 5, 2007)  
c. Stuttgart Opens Warrior Transition Unit (January 22, 2008) 
d. Poland, U.S. Sign Missile Shield Deal (August 15, 2008) 
e. Integrating Multinational Schools in Papa, Hungary Poses a Challenge 
(April 12, 2009) 
f. FEA Meeting on DoDEA Staffing Changes Put on Hold (June 12, 2009) 
g. Military to Debut Virtual School (November 5, 2009) 
h. DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System: A Path 
Toward Improvement (2009) 
i. The Military Children Left Behind: Decrepit Schools, Broken Promises  
(June 26, 2011) 




k. Work Starts on New School in Stuttgart (November 12, 2013)  
l. Groundbreaking Celebrates Future Stuttgart Schools (November 27, 2013) 
m. Camp Casey School Closing After 5 Years as Part of Relocation (August 19, 
2014) 
n. Study Could Recommend Closing Some DoDEA Schools (November 14, 
2014)  
o. On Military Bases, Common Core by Another Name (March 6, 2015) 
p. Camp Casey School to Welcome Its Final Students Monday (August 28, 
2015) 
q. IT Upgrades, Sustainability Are Hallmarks of Stuttgart Campus Project 
(September 28, 2015) 
8. Press Releases (TAB 8) 
a. Facon Named DoDEA Chief of Educational Partnerships Branch. (June 13, 
2008) 
b. DoDEA Director Reflects on His Service (June 25, 2008) 
c. Miles Selected As Director of the Department of Defense Education Activity 
(July 2, 2008) 
d. DoDEA Area Director Aligned to New Posts (May 13, 2009) 
e. DoDEA Selects Area Superintendents for Curriculum, Instruction, and 
Assessment. (June 9, 2009) 
f. Defense Schools' Director Pleased with Year's Accomplishment (June 18, 
2009) 
g. White House Press Release: President Obama Establishes Bipartisan 
National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (February 18, 
2010) 
h.  DoDEA Begins School Year With Facilities Renovation and Construction 
Initiative (August 10, 2010) 
i. Officials Name New Education Activity Director (November 16, 2011) 
j. Dr. Linda Curtis Selected as DoDEA Pacific Director (August 20, 2013) 
k. SHAPE Community Schools to Experience a Transformative New School 
Year (August 15, 2014) 
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l. Dr. Nancy Bresell Retires After 37 Years of Service to DoDEA (January 2, 
2015) 
m. Restructuring for Student Achievement (May 21, 2015) 
n. New Director Selected for DoDEA Schools in Europe (July 9, 2015) 
o. DoDEA Announces Changes in Educational Leadership (August 5, 2015) 
p. DoDEA Begins School Year 2015-2016 (August 25, 2015) 
9. Legislation (TAB 9) 
a. Public Law 95-561, Defense Dependent Education Act of 1978: An Act to 
Extend and Amend Expiring Elementary and Secondary Education 
Programs, and for Other Purpose dated November 1, 1978 
b. U.S.C. Title 20, Education, Chapter 25A, Overseas Defense Dependents’ 
Education, (929) Advisory Council on Dependents’ Education 
c. U.S.C. Title 10, Armed Forces, Chapter 108, Department of Defense 
Schools, Section 2164, DoD Domestic Dependent Elementary and 
Secondary Schools 
10. Miscellaneous (TAB 10) 
a. Teacher Union FEA Newsletter (October 7, 2009) 
b. Teacher Union FEA Newsletter Educators Have Indeed Provided Decades of 
Excellence! (Debunking the Myths of Dr. Shirley Miles) (August 2009) 
c. Remarks by the First Lady at the Joint Armed Forces Officers’ Wives’ 
Luncheon (January 26, 2010) 
d. Transcript: Air Force Times Interview with Major General Michael 
Snodgrass, U.S. Africa Command Chief of Staff (June 16, 2010) 
e. Navy School Liaison Officer Brochure (no date, retrieved 2015) 
f. Non-DoD Schools Program Schools Listing (current as of January 2016) 
11. Reports/Research (TAB 11) 
a. Review of Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) Schools, 
IDA Paper P-3544, Institute for Defense Analyses (October 2000) 
b. Review of Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) Volume II: 
Quantitative Analyses of Educational Quality (2000) 
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c. An Assessment of USAFE School Board Test Program, IDA Paper P-3711, 
Institute for Defense Analyses (July 2002) 
d. The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and 
Issues for Congress  (2003) 
e. Strategic Assessment and Development of Interorganizational  Influences in 
the Absence of Hierarchical Authority (2003) 
f. Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) The United States Naval War 
College National Decision Making Department  (September 10, 2008) 
g. Defense Resource Allocation: The Formal Processes in U.S. Defense 
Planning (2009) 
h. Successful Principals Leading School Improvement in Overseas Schools 
Educating a Large Number of Children with Military Parents: A Qualitative 
Study (Doctoral Dissertation) (2009) 
i. The Impact of Parental Deployment on Child Social and Emotional 
Functioning: Perspectives of School Staff (2009) 
j. Department of Defense Education Activity Annual Report (2010) 
k. Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components 
(December 21, 2010) 
l. Army School Support Services Strategic Plan (2010) 
m. Toward Strategy for Building Partner Capacity: Combined Ownership and 
Operations (Masters Research Project) (2010) 
n. Factors Influencing Organizational Change in the Department of Defense 
(Doctoral Dissertation) (2010) 
o. $200 Billion in Illustrative Savings (Draft). National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform (2010) 
p. Quadrennial Review Defense Report (February 2010) 
q. Children on the Homefront: The Experiences of Children from Military 
Families (March 9, 2010) 
r. Blue Star Family 2010 Military Family Lifestyle Survey (September 10, 
2010) 
s. Joint Personnel Support (October 24, 2011) 
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t. DoDEA Educational Partnership Grant Program 2009-2010 Annual 
Evaluation Report- Draft. Synergy Enterprises, Inc. (2011) 
u. The Distortion of Upward Communication in Military Organizations 
(Doctoral Dissertation) (2011) 
v. Inspector General Report: DoDEA, Dr. Shirley Miles (June 20, 2011) 
w. Military Construction: An Analysis of the FY2012 Appropriation and 
Authorization (July 13, 2011) 
x. Inspector General Report: EUCOM, Admiral Stavridis (May 3, 2012) 
y. Inspector General Report: US Africa Command General Ward  (June 26, 
2012) 
z. Department of Everything: Department of Defense Spending That Has Little 
To Do With National Security (2012) 
aa. Inspector General Report DoD Education Activity Needed Better Planning 
for Military Construction Projects (2012) 
bb. RAND Corporation, Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An 
Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits (2013)  
cc. How Wartime Military Service Affects Children and Families (2013) 
dd. The Politics of 'The Army You Have': Change and Continuity in the U.S. 
Military, 1972-2008 (Doctoral Dissertation) (2013) 
ee. The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and 
Issues for Congress (2013) 
ff. The Military Child Education in Hawaii Study (January 14, 2013) 
gg. Study Could Recommend Closing Some DoDEA Schools (November 14, 
2014) 
hh. Passing the Baton: A Bipartisan 2016 Agenda for the Veteran and Military 
Community (2015) 
B. Interview Transcriptions and Notes (TAB 12) 
a. Respondent #12 Conducted October 9, 2015 in person (notes only, no audio) 
b. Respondent #3 Conducted October 23, 2015 via Skype 
c. Respondent #10 Conducted October 26, 2015 in person 
d. Respondent #17 Conducted November 7, 2015 in person 
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e. Respondent #15 Conducted November 17, 2015 in person 
f. Respondent #1 Conducted November 18, 2015 in person 
g. Interview Comparison: Theoretical Framework 
C. Personal Memos and Memoed Reading Notes (TAB 13) 
a. Consolidated Memos and Diagrams Document (dated 2012-2016, 42 pages  
typed) 
b. Notes on Complexity Theory (November 28, 2014, three pages, handwritten) 
c. Notes Related to Grounded Theory Compilation (November 25, 2013, four 
pages, handwritten) 
d. Thoughts on Case Study (2013, seven pages, handwritten) 
e. Merriam (1998), Qualitative Research and Case Study Applications in 
Education, (n.d., three pages, handwritten) 
f. A Case for the Case Study (1991), (November 28, 2013, 12 pages, 
handwritten) 
g. Yin (2009) Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (November-
December 2013, 20 pages, handwritten) 
h. Kingdon (1984) Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, (13 Jan 2014, 
19 pages, handwritten) 
i. Dweck (2006) Mindset: The New Psychology of Success How We Can Learn 
to Fulfill Our Potential, (12 September 2015, three pages, handwritten) 
j. Gates (2014) Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (October 14, 2015, 27 
pages, handwritten) 
D. Process Pieces: Original Drawings with Handwritten Notes (TAB 14) 
a. Drawing of Network of Organizations Related to School Council System 
(November 2012)   
b. My Awareness of Events (January 2015)  
c. Ways Around a “No” (September 6, 2015) 
d. Conceptualization of Big Rock, Little Rock (September 14-15, 2015) 
e. People and Event Graphic of Big Rock, Little Rock (September 27, 2015) 
f. Draft Timeline from Documents (September 27, 2015) 
g. Respondent Interview Timeline (October-November 2015) 
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h. Focus 2007-2010 Timeline Draft (December 20, 2015) 
i. Working Version Timeline 2000-2010 (January 16, 2016) 




Appendix G: Sample Freedom of Information Act  Request Letter 
(Retrieved from http://www.dodea.edu/foia.cfm) 
 
Department of Defense Education Activity  
FOIA Requester Service Center/PA Officer  
4800 Mark Center Drive Suite 06F09-02  
Alexandria, VA 22350-1400  
  
Dear FOIA Requester Service Center/PA Officer:  
This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).  (Or; This is a 
request under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a).  I request that a copy of the following 
document(s) be provided to me: [Identify the documents as specifically as possible].  
  
In order to help you determine my status for the purpose of assessing fees, you should 
know that I am [insert one of the descriptions below]  
a representative of the news media affiliated with the _______newspaper 
(magazine, television station, etc.) and this request is made a part of news 
gathering and not for a commercial use.  
  
affiliated with an educational or noncommercial scientific institution, and this 
request is made for a scholarly or scientific purpose and not for a commercial 
use.  
  
affiliated with a private business and am seeking information for use in the 
company's business.  
  
an individual seeking information for personal use and not for a commercial use.  
  
I am willing to pay fees for this request up to a maximum of $_____.  If you 
estimate that the fees will exceed this limit, please inform me first.  
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[optional]  I request a waiver of fees for this request because disclosure of the requested  
information to me is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly 
to public understanding of the operations or activities of the DoD and is not primarily in 
my commercial interest.  [Include details about how the requested information will be 
disseminated by you to the general public.]  
  
I also include a telephone number at which I can be contacted if necessary to discuss 




(Your Signature)  
Name  
Address  
City, State, Zip Code  
Telephone number  
(Add SSN if requesting under Privacy Act)  
 
Or: 














Subject: Request to Participate in Research Project 
Dear Potential Research Participant, 
I am Michelle (Mimi) Langenderfer, a doctoral candidate in the University of 
Oklahoma’s PhD program in Organizational Leadership and the former education 
liaison with Headquarters, United States European Command (EUCOM) from 2008-
2010.  I invite you to participate in a research project studying the circumstances that 
led to the formation of the Non-DoD Schools Program (NDSP) Task Force in May 
2010.  The title of the study is, “Factors Influencing Decision Making in Networked 
Organizations: A Case Study on Leadership and the Formation of the Non-Department 
of Defense Schools Program (NDSP) Task Force.” 
You were identified as a potential participant due to your direct or indirect involvement 
with an organization associated with the decision to create the task force. 
The interview, which will be conducted in person, via phone, or via Skype, should take 
up to one hour.  Additional time, if necessary, will be added as agreed upon, after the 
initial interview.  All information is confidential and not tied to your identity unless 
permission is granted in the attached consent form. 
Please review the attached consent to participate document then contact me directly at  
719-722-4444 or Michelle.K.Langenderfer-1@ou.edu. 
Thank you so much for your help with this research project. 












   
